861.24/1188½
Memorandum by Mr. Addison E. Southard of the Division of Defense Materials to the Assistant Chief of the Division (Merchant)
Mr. Merchant: The following is a résumé of the more practical and ponderable aspects of information and impressions about delivery of Russian Lend-Lease supplies, gleaned from informal conversations with various informed officials in the Department and in the Office of [Page 750] Lend-Lease, and from the examination of certain files made available to me.
1. Supplies under Lend-Lease for Russia have been provided for by an agreement and list designated as a “Protocol”. The first Protocol was for the year ended June 30, 1942. The so-called “Second Protocol” is for the current year of July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943. It lists a large number of items including planes, tanks, trucks, ammunition, chemicals, foodstuffs, etc., etc., amounting to a total approaching, eight million tons of which the main categories are more briefly grouped as follows: 1, 100,000 tons of armament and ammunition; 1,800,000 tons of machinery and industrial equipment and “materials”; and 4,300,000 tons of foodstuffs. This “Second Protocol” has been confirmed by letters exchanged between the U. S. and U. S. S. R. Governments, but provision is made for changes or readjustments as to items, quantities and priorities. Subsequent to the original confirmation of the Second Protocol the Russian Ambassador sent in an amended list of supplies which possibly changes the original schedules in such manner as to lead to confusion not only in production but in rail shipment to the ports of loading. This first and so far most important list of readjustments was allegedly sent directly to Mr. Harry Hopkins and not through anticipated channels. This Department apparently learned of the changes only in an informal manner, and it has been suggested that further readjustments may have been asked by the Russians which also by-passed the Department, and perhaps other interested agencies, thus making uncertain the extent to which the whole picture is plain to all officials and agencies (both U. S. and U. S. S. R.) concerned.
2. In addition to changes or readjustments directly requested here by the Russian Ambassador, or by members of the SGPC (Soviet Government Purchasing Commission) it is understood that our Army and Navy receive direct requests, either for readjustments or for entirely new items, from their Attachés in Moscow, and many of these apparently become known to the Department of State only when noted by our Ambassador and reported by him. There are said also to be in this and similar ways more or less direct communications on the general subject from the Army and Navy to Mr. Harry Hopkins, as well as to the Lend-Lease authorities, modifying and elaborating or otherwise changing the original of the “Second Protocol”. These communications bypass this Department, I understand to the extent that it never sees some of them and learns only indirectly or informally of others. This is said to be confusing and makes difficult consistent and complete knowledge by the Department of State.
The Russians are also said too often to change their minds as to priorities. This confuses production, storage, and rail shipping schedules in particular. And then again delays or disappointments [Page 751] in the availability of ships provoke somewhat troublesome and involved readjustments in production and rail transportation schedules.
In some of my conversations it was also suggested that the Russian expectations, on the basis of established schedules for armament and ammunition in particular, were on occasion considerably upset by an emergency change of mind or plan on the part of our Munitions Assignments Board as to the release of items in these categories. It was, however, remarked that General Burns, Secretary of the MAB, has been able to effect considerable improvement in this situation although it might at any moment change as the tempo and breadth of our war participation, and our consequently greater needs for these items, increased. This appears to be a situation of many potential difficulties regardless of good will on the part of those executing the Protocol schedules, and there is probably little of definite or permanent nature that can be done about it.
3. From the information made available to me, which was often more general than specific, I am convinced that the U. S. agencies and officials concerned in the fulfillment of the program, and particularly Lend-Lease have accomplished all that could reasonably be expected from practicable or ponderable angles. Some of those with whom I talked were quite positive that supplies under all the categories, with the one important exception of pharmaceuticals, were being produced in ample quantities (although less than Protocol schedules in some instances at least) promptly to fill shipping space as fast as it has been made available.
However, because of rail and port congestion and delay in arrival of vessels, either actual or threatened, there has been some easement in actual production activities which has brought output below the monthly or other periodical quotas based on the annual total to be delivered. Apparently the Russians learn promptly of some of these reductions in output and immediately present objections to the Lend-Lease and other authorities. The latter in turn explain to the Russians why output has for the moment been eased. The Russian Purchasing Agents appear themselves to be satisfied. But complaints on the same basis then originate in Moscow or other sources to whom the Purchasing Agents have presumably failed to forward the explanations given them by U. S. officials. It appears that the SGPC merely report their endeavors, without success, to have output maintained on full schedule and forget to mention restrictions on storing or shipping the goods. This apparently somewhat peculiar procedure on the part of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission is presumably to save their face in Moscow and to impress their superiors there that they are leaving no stone unturned to have output kept up to the mark necessary for ensuring completion within the year of all items in the Protocol and its amendments. Shortage, and irregularities [Page 752] in the availability, of shipping are possibly ignored in Moscow as reasons of any special weight in slowing down production to conform to actual conditions.
4. The failure to supply pharmaceuticals in proportion to other items in the Protocol was not definitely explained to me but it was suggested that the fault lay in the Surgeon General’s70 office for the more efficient functioning of which steps were being taken.
5. Inadequate shipping facilities appear to be by far the biggest obstacle to a smoother and fuller functioning of the production and delivery of supplies under the Protocol. Briefly, three main routes are provided for: one via the North Cape, one via the Persian Gulf, and one via our West Coast to Vladivostok. The Second Protocol scheduled 3,300,000 tons by the North Cape and 1, 100,000 via the Persian Gulf. These two routes have been beset with obvious and, for the moment at least, partially insurmountable difficulties. These difficulties include both shortage of shipping and shortage of naval escort for indispensable protection. Losses have been considerable, particularly on the North Cape route. In addition to sea perils there are inland transportation difficulties on the Persian Gulf route. The West Coast route has therefore been of very practical value. However, the Russians here presented in October several specific complaints regarding West Coast facilities.
[Here follows a description of some of these facilities, existing conditions in ports, labor shortages, and certain local deficiencies.]
In summary the following would seem to be the immediately important and outstanding obstacles to progress in more effective delivery of Lend-Lease supplies to Russia. At least the first two of the following four obstacles are in the way of being surmounted:
Shipping. As discussed in preceding pages the North Cape and Persian Gulf routes are handicapped by a temporary insufficiency of cargo ships and by an as yet insufficient number of naval vessels to provide indispensable escort. These handicaps should be overcome by forces already in motion. Some attention is presumably being given to ironing out transportation difficulties inland from the Persian Gulf. The West Coast–Vladivostok route is being actively and effectively used and its facilities are being satisfactorily expanded as detailed in the foregoing pages.
Pharmaceuticals. These are understood to represent the only important supply item in which production has unduly lagged. Supplies in the quantities considered desirable, and reasonable on the basis of transportation facilities, appear to depend primarily on a reorganization of the Surgeon General’s office for which there is said to exist reason for hope.
Russian Temperament. Detailed comment is probably unnecessary on this perhaps insurmountable obstacle. In the preceding pages are suggested some lines which thought on the subject might follow. [Page 753] Difficulties which inevitably arise from the difference between American and Russian temperaments are probably obvious even to observers of limited experience.
Effectiveness of American Personnel and Agencies concerned in execution of Russian supply program. There seems to be at least a possibility that an authoritative investigation might develop various instances of ineptitude to be expected in the handling of so vast and complex, an undertaking as speeding supplies to Russia by officials and offices who must have time to overcome an initial amateurishness in combining governmental and business procedures to fit emergency conditions.
On the basis of the information available to me there do not seem to be any other outstanding problems requiring near-term pressure. When the North Cape and Persian Gulf shipping situations improve there will undoubtedly arise questions of speeding up production to provide prompt cargoes. But the many potential minor difficulties should solve themselves as the production, delivery and shipping procedures ripen and function more smoothly with the benefit of accumulative practice.
Detailed statistics of production, of deliveries here and there, of shipping losses, etc., etc., are prepared monthly by OLLA.71 These reports are completed usually about three weeks after the end of the month which they cover. Copies are, I understand, placed as promptly as possible in the hands of interested officials including the Honorable Dean Acheson of the Department of State. A definite step for procuring more prompt or workable solution of difficulties as they arise is provided for in the Committee which I understand has been formed to meet periodically for the purpose. This Committee appears to include a broad representation covering all agencies responsible for the efficient operation of the Russian supply Protocol—a list of those attending the September meeting gave the names of the Russian Ambassador and seven other Russian officials, and of eighteen U. S. officials including Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Acheson, and various officials of WPB,72 WSA,73 and OLLA.