891.77/713

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. John D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

The Minister65 referred to the recent formal notification to the Iranian Government of the proposed transfer to the American Army of responsibility for the operation of the southern section of the Transiranian Railroad. It appeared that he had received a cable from his Government on this subject.

He said that it seemed unwise to divide operations between the Americans in the south and the Russians in the north, since there would be danger of a bottleneck developing at the point of junction (presumably Tehran). He also appeared to feel that the Russians would not devote sufficient attention to the maintenance of their section and would ultimately turn it back to Iranian control in bad condition.

The Minister suggested that the Department discuss this question with the War Department, with a view to determining whether steps should not be taken looking toward American operation of the entire railroad system. He expressed the belief that the Russian Government would not be reluctant to agree to such an arrangement. Although he did not specifically say so, it seemed probable that this suggestion was made under instructions from the Iranian Government.

I told the Minister that I did not know what factors might influence our policy in this matter. In particular, I pointed out that our Army might not feel that it could spare the personnel and equipment necessary to operate the northern section of the line. However, I said that I would bring his remarks to the attention of the appropriate persons in the Department and the War Department. The Minister said that [Page 318] he understood perfectly that there might be considerations which would prevent us from taking action at this time.

The Minister also mentioned the desirability, from the Iranian point of view, of having clear-cut assent by the British and Soviet Governments to our operation of the railroad. He said that this was necessary to avoid any question as to Iranian obligations under the Anglo-Russian-Iranian Treaty of Alliance. I told the Minister that we had received a cable from our Legation at Tehran, dated December 13, stating that British consent had been given and that the Soviet Ambassador was cabling his Government on the subject. He agreed that this appeared satisfactory but said that the cable he had received only a few days before his conversation with me had specifically stated that British and Russian assent had not been received.

  1. The Iranian Minister.