740.0011 European War 1939/24454: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)
883. Refer to letter of July 30, 1942 to the Ambassador from the Under Secretary.46
The President had a long conversation with Ambassador Michels on August 5. In this conversation the Ambassador communicated [Page 30] very much, the same message from President Ríos as that which the Ambassador had previously communicated to the Department.
In response to the Ambassador’s remarks the President said that he was going to speak very frankly on account of his great friendship for Chile and the Chilean people. At the present moment Chile was placed in a false light throughout the Americas and was regarded generally as following the same line and policy as that pursued by Argentina. The President knew, of course, that this was not the case but the fact was that public opinion throughout the Americas thought that this was so. The President did not believe with a view to the future the Chilean people would wish to have this misapprehension continued.
The President then stated that he was not thinking only of the United States but he was thinking also of the safety of all of the countries of the Americas. Under present conditions there was no way in which the Chilean Government, so long as Axis diplomatic and consular establishments continued to function in Chile, could prevent the sending of information by those establishments covering such vitally important matters as the movement of ships and other intelligence directly related to the war effort of the American nations. The President knew that such information was reaching Japan and Germany directly from Chile. It might be, the President added, that in certain cases this information was received through Spain but he felt that a grave danger to the Western Hemisphere arose from the information sent by the Axis diplomats themselves. The President then stated bluntly that he did not desire that Chile should enter the war but he did urgently desire that Chile break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.
The President then discussed the defense problem of Chile. He did not foresee any danger to Chile other than that which might result from an isolated bombardment of the Chilean coast undertaken by some Japanese submarine which would make the effort for propaganda purposes. Such an attack would create little danger. In any event, the batteries furnished Chile by the United States made it possible for Chile to defend her most exposed ports from any such attack as this. The President then explained what the United States was doing in patrolling the Atlantic coast in order to ascertain the whereabouts of German submarines. The bulk of this patrol work was being undertaken by small planes which did not generally have a flying range of more than two or three hundred miles. The results obtained from this patrol service had been outstandingly successful. The President assured the Ambassador that were Chile to break diplomatic relations, the United States, under the schedules now being prepared for a lend-lease agreement, can furnish at least fifty to one [Page 31] hundred planes of the same character as those being used for patrolling the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.
This report with regard to the President’s conversation is being furnished you for your strictly personal information. You will kindly not indicate knowledge of what took place at this conversation except to President Ríos in the event he should on his own initiative bring up the matter. Under no conditions furnish any written document with respect to this conversation.
- Not printed.↩