Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin ¹

secret
operational priority

[Washington,] 4 September 1943.

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting on the State Department level.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England, and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale Combined Chiefs’ Conference.

5. If Mr. Molotov comes and Mr. Eden I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.

6. The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I congratulate you again.

7. While this coming conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty clays because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.

8. Turning now to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower’s headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?

9. I have no objection to adding a French member to their meetings because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with the surrender terms already signed² I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

10. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.

Roosevelt

1. Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement: “(Delivered [to] Stalin 1930 [i.e., 6:30 p.m.] Sept 6)”.
2. The words “already signed” were added at Churchill’s suggestion. This was apparently the first notice given to Stalin of the signature of the Italian armistice on September 3. This was followed by a more detailed notification in a message from Churchill to Stalin on September 5 (see Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, p. 155) and in a joint message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin on September 9 (see ante, p. 1283).