103.9166/5522: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

1444. Embassy’s 1357, August 2, for OWI.

1. We have hesitated to offer comment on the somewhat fantastic reaction here to Hanson Baldwin’s article in the August Reader’s Digest until we could submit something fairly definitive.

This article, following Baldwin’s New York Times article critical of China’s military effort, the IPR article (our 1291) and Pearl Buck’s in Life about May 13, has caused resentment that is deep and bitter in some of the highest circles and is widespread in varying degrees. It has been the subject of much discussion among higher officials, of a special meeting of Cabinet Ministers and party heads, and of conferences between various officials and the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang. The importance attached to it is also indicated by Madame Chiang’s press statement of August 11. Baldwin’s repetition of the well known Japanese propaganda line that China is a geographic area and not a nation was especially exasperating to the Chinese. On the other hand, as indicated by Fisher, the legitimate criticism in the article has caused some quiet satisfaction in the more liberal quarters.

Such criticism came as a great shock to reactionary Government and party leaders who are used to hearing China overpraised and many of whom have complacently believed that Americans at home were completely duped by Chinese censorship (Embassy’s 999, June 23) and propaganda (including the propaganda of Madame Chiang’s visit) and that we, no less than the British, would do almost anything in wooing of China to keep her in war which, for her own sake, she has no intention of abandoning.

As example of the extremes in the situation, the Information Minister when discussing the Times article on one occasion was virtually hysterical and his usual fluent English became unintelligible gibberish. Vice Foreign Minister Hoo, a cosmopolitan and experienced diplomat, accuses Baldwin of furthering alleged U. S. Navy desires to divert to [Page 88] the southwest Pacific aid being sent to China. Others attribute the article to a campaign against repeal of the Exclusion Act.10

2. In our opinion there is considerable possibility that continued public criticism will have adverse effect on our relations with the Chinese Government in that it will likely increase the present antiforeign bias which the Generalissimo, Madame Chiang (airgram A–22, August 2) and others seem to have and will turn that bias more and more in our direction.

3. In the expectation that Baldwin’s and the other articles may create widespread discussion in American editorial columns and perhaps bring forth further comment critical of China, we venture to suggest that the adverse effect upon our relations might be to some extent counteracted, and that any possible good effects upon the Chinese Government of such criticism might be enhanced, by the issuing by the Department of an informal statement which might take cognizance, in a restrained way, (1) of the unfair aspects of general criticism of the Chinese Government for the situation which various circumstances and factors have conspired to develop, (2) of our own relationship to the cutting off, through our involvement in the war, of the Burma channel to the outside world which is generally considered the cause of some of China’s major economic difficulties and which is a lasting cause of Chinese resentment against us, (3) of our expectations of China now and during the war, and (4) of our (necessary) confidence in the future with respect to China: that is, a statement which, by deprecating the criticism, will tend to preserve our relations on a sincerely friendly basis and which, by showing that our Government is fully aware of conditions in China and of the implications in those conditions, might thereby have some beneficial effects on those Chinese leaders who have become content to sit back and wait for us to win the war for them as well as for ourselves.

From the point of view of our observation here, we respectfully suggest that such a statement might generally be along lines as follows: that it is easy to be critical of a distant ally in regard to whose serious problems the American newswriters and public have received little accurate information, that such criticism does not further the general war effort, especially when not constructive; that for 6 years Chinese people have made untold sacrifices to maintain national existence against a ruthless and modernly equipped enemy; that the United States was attacked by Japan because we refused to sacrifice a principle involving China’s interests but of course we do not hold this against China and the existence in China now of internal [Page 89] economic and other war time problems does not to any degree make us less friendly toward China but rather increases our own determination to continue and increase our aid; that we appreciate the contribution to war effort which China has already made and have full faith in the ability of China’s leaders to increase that effort and make it more effective; that we have faith in the fundamental democracy of Chinese people and in the ultimate wisdom of China’s leaders in their task of rebuilding a war torn nation [following?] the democratic principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; that we confidently expect that when the inevitable victory is won by increased exertion and sacrifice on the part of China as well as on our and the other Allies’ part, the Chinese nation will achieve its deserved place in the post-war family of collaborating nations.

Atcheson
  1. See pp. 769 ff.