811.34553B/26: Telegram
The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 24—2:12 a.m.]
2839. For the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, and Matthews. Kennan saw Salazar this evening and had a 2–hour conversation with him. He had endeavored to arrange for my presence at the interview but protocol section of Foreign Office intervened and vetoed suggestion.
The conversation, conducted throughout in a distinctly cordial and friendly tone, was of an exploratory nature. Dr. Salazar said at outset that it was quite impossible for him to give authoritative answer offhand to questions and requests of great importance coming to his attention for the first time.
[Page 568]After Kennan had transmitted President’s letter,13 which obviously made a deep impression on the Prime Minister, and had explained nature of our desire, a general conversation ensued, in course of which the following became clear:
- 1.
- Salazar had envisaged that we would use naval facilities granted in the British agreement whenever we had occasion to, and does not expect us to request permission—either generally or in specific instances—to do so.
- 2.
- About Terceira, he had not made up his mind; but he was not unsympathetic and was obviously prepared to seek a formula which would reconcile our use of the airport with terms of existing British. He raised question, not as any formal proposal but simply in thinking out loud, whether we could not regard aircraft being delivered to England by Ferry Commands having status of British craft from time they left our country until they had passed through Portuguese territory, and said in reply to Kennan’s queries, that in this case he would not care about nationality of crews or of ground forces which might serve them. Kennan asked specifically whether this would apply to engineering and construction personnel, and he replied in the affirmative. I think incidentally that this statement should satisfy the desire of British Government that we obtain Portuguese [permission?] for participation of American technicians in improvement of Azores facilities.
- 3.
- About granting of further facilities to our forces over and above those granted the British, Salazar’s first reaction as expected was that this was equivalent to asking Portugal to come into the war. He traced the background of Portugal’s position of neutrality and dwelt at length on the case of Timor. He said that he could at any time have induced the Japanese to withdraw their occupation of the remainder of Timor and to restore the Portuguese civilian administration if he had been willing to acquiesce in the name of the Portuguese Government to their use of the airfield there but that he had not done this because he could not see Portugal as a neutral starting out to bargain with the belligerents over the facilities of the Portuguese Empire. In the case of the British Agreement, the Alliance had given Portugal the excuse for doing this and yet claiming to remain neutral. While he recognized necessity of a closer collaboration within the whole community of Atlantic Nations including our country and his in the future, there was no formal alliance in our case which could provide such an excuse. If he were to come into the war, he would as a matter of course extend to us every facility we might need in his colonies. But as to whether Portugal’s entry into the war would be in Portugal’s interests or even in those of the Allies was another question. His impression from his recent negotiations with the British was that the latter and ourselves did not wish to risk the Peninsula becoming a scene of hostilities.
Kennan described to him importance to U. S. of obtaining these facilities at a very early date and asked him to bear in mind in pondering [Page 569] these questions urgent necessity of finding some solution which would meet our needs. Kennan concluded by saying that he would have to ask for another appointment at an early date probably this same week.
In general Kennan considers this reaction relatively encouraging, and hopes that indications of British support, which will be given tomorrow by British Minister14 to Secretary General of Foreign Office15 if present plans mature, will further improve situation. He is convinced that Salazar, following receipt of President’s letter and events of past weeks, is not now unreceptive to use of islands by pure [our?] forces but would like to find a formula reconcilable with basic policy of neutrality which he is still trying to pursue.