840.50/1716
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Secretary of State Hull, The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister, and Lord Halifax, British Ambassador |
The British Ambassador, accompanied by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, called at his request.
After the usual exchange of felicitations and expressions of welcome, the Foreign Minister brought up the Free French situation and its bearing on the relations between Great Britain and the United States.20 Mr. Eden had nothing particularly new to offer to the well-known story about the course of De Gaulle and his followers toward all phases of the international situation as related to the Governments of Great Britain, and more particularly to the United States. In fact he did not seem to be familiar by any means with the full story of the United States’ side of this matter. I began with the fall of Paris and traced the course and attitude of the United States toward the Vichy Government, toward the Free French and toward the French people as a whole and concluded with the completion of the preliminary preparations for the North African military expedition.
I then emphasized the fact that in March 1941 Prime Minister Churchill had in writing strongly urged this Government to maintain its policy toward Vichy,21 and that on other occasions, including his two visits to this country, he personally urged me to continue this policy by all means, saying among other things that the French fleet constituted the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that it together [Page 10] with the Italian fleet would be entirely superior to the British fleet. On each occasion I said that this Government would continue to maintain its relations with Vichy, and I explained on each occasion some of the vital phases of this policy. I emphasized also the fact that De Gaulle had rarely ever approached this Government except for political recognition, and had never engaged in serious discussion of the military situation; that this Government, not deeming it practical to become involved in French politics, consistently declined to join in the desires of De Gaulle for general and worldwide political recognition, and that this is, so far as I know, the sum total of his grievance against this Government. I further emphasized the fact that the Government here has no ill will toward De Gaulle but that it only regrets that he seems to be so constituted, temperamentally at least, that he seeks political preferment in the main. I then added that according to Churchill, he was a most difficult person to get along with and had given them almost unlimited trouble. I concluded this reference by saying that if there were other cases of temperamental persons like De Gaulle, they would materially interfere with the military duties and undertakings of our Governments. Mr. Eden made a mild effort to justify Great Britain’s course by mentioning the aid which De Gaulle had brought to Great Britain in the war. I had already pointed out the tremendous aid this Government through its Vichy policy had brought to the British and to the whole Allied cause.
The Foreign Minister then said that he was over here to discuss any and all questions pertaining to the present or future international situation. I expressed appreciation at this and said that this Government for various reasons had not moved as rapidly in approaching some of the important questions and problems that lie ahead as had the British Government, one of the reasons being that we were greatly concerned in the first place about the development of public opinion in this country in favor of the more vital and important phases of international cooperation which must be invoked by the United Nations. I added that I and my associates had during recent months been giving much attention to this phase, and that I now feel that public opinion is much more favorable to the renewal of our Trade Agreements Act22 than it was prior to either of the preceding renewals. I turned to the British Ambassador for corroboration on this point and he readily agreed. I then said that this Government, by means of an informal exchange of views, feels much more competent now to go forward with the exploration of the many problems presented than had been the situation heretofore. I emphasized at this point the vital importance of each country, especially the United States, in keeping public opinion educated and up to date with respect [Page 11] to each of the important methods, plans or proposals calling for international cooperation. I said that this step is absolutely necessary to safeguard any plan or program against fickle and sudden lapses or changes in public sentiment during the present and the future when thinking is abnormal and opinion is brittle and often rests on misapprehensions or prejudices or other unstable and uncertain considerations. I added that so long as a sound and stable public opinion is kept up to date in support of the necessary methods and programs of international cooperation, there will not be serious difficulty, relatively speaking, in working out such programs by the United Nations and carrying them forward with certainty and speed; otherwise, an attitude of uncertainty will pervade everything everywhere. Mr. Eden concurred in this and expressed his gratification at my statement about public opinion in relation to the trade agreements program and liberal commercial policy involving questions of monetary exchange, credit, capital movements, surpluses, et cetera.
Mr. Eden inquired about the proposed Congressional resolution approving in advance the necessary degree of international cooperation called for during the present and post-war periods. I replied that naturally a suitable expression of this sort by Congress would have a splendid effect abroad, including Russia; that the whole question of establishing and preserving close and understanding working relations between the legislative and Executive branches of the Government calls for close attention at all times during the war and post-war period; that thorough understanding of all essential phases must be maintained between the two branches to the end that each can function as fully and effectively as possible within its respective spheres, and that this is the only way to avoid controversy and deadlocks and other deadly effects on the international situation. I added that, of course, the Executive branch, charged under the Constitution primarily and chiefly with the conduct of foreign policy, is at least impliedly charged with the initiation of foreign policy, and that in order to avoid misunderstanding and apparent conflict between the Executive and legislative branches, especially the Senate, it is very important that neither should bestow on the other, functions or privileges or other authority that might result later in efforts of one to veto the plans or objectives of the other contrary to the strict limitations of their respective functions. I concluded by saying that every attention will be given to the always difficult problem of keeping up the closest possible working relations between the Executive and the Senate as it relates to foreign policy and international affairs; that while the Senate undertakes on its own initiative and in its own separate and independent capacity as a vitally important member of the legislative branch of the Government to define its views on any [Page 12] phase of foreign policy, present or future, without any delegation by the Executive branch of its legitimate functions under the Constitution, such expression by the Senate is most desirable, assuming that the situation is first carefully canvassed in order to make sure that any such proposal will receive an overwhelming vote, in any event, more than two-thirds of the vote. I again emphasized that the effect of such a statement on countries like Russia, not to mention others, would be exceptionally good. I said that the hurdle to get over related to the necessity for several weeks of the most detailed conference among all of the senators favorably inclined and agreement on every essential phase carefully worked out in advance, so that there would be understanding and unity in the actions of the senators. I added that this preliminary step of full and detailed conference was an indispensable prerequisite to any successful action by the Senate on a proposed resolution. I reiterated that it is all-important to keep public opinion educated and stabilized up to date with respect to the hitherto controversial questions in foreign affairs. Otherwise, Congress could not be expected to maintain any position that it might take in the event public opinion should lapse or swerve in the wrong direction.
Mr. Eden spoke about the cumbersome situation of democratic governments in carrying on negotiations and referred to an incident between him and Stalin23 some months ago, in which the latter indicated just how he could that afternoon draw a map with respect to certain areas, but that Eden was obliged to say to Stalin that he could not go into such matters without consulting his Government. We both agreed on the extreme importance of ascertaining Russia’s probable future course with respect to Europe and the world situation. I inquired whether, in his opinion, there was any alternative course Russia might pursue in addition to the possible course of isolation on her part after lopping off certain territory along the boundaries of Europe, accompanied by the maintenance of heavy armament, or whether in her own best interests, economically and otherwise, she might not decide to be a part of the world and to meet all of her responsibilities under a sane practical policy of international cooperation in all essential respects. Mr. Eden replied by saying that there was no alternative course that he knew of.
I said to Mr. Eden early in the conversation that I trusted him absolutely so far as the most confidential conversations are concerned, both on and off the record, and that the doors of the State Department are wide open to him to confer at any and all times fully and freely with any official from Under Secretary Welles down to the desk men in the geographic and other divisions. I added that I hoped he [Page 13] would feel entirely free to avail himself of this invitation to any extent at all desirable on his part. He said that he would be glad if I or my associates would talk with Mr. Strang, one of his associates in the Foreign Office, who accompanied him. I said that I, of course, would be glad to comply with his request. It was agreed that Mr. Strang has been considered by us as more or less unfriendly.
- For correspondence concerning the disunity between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa, see vol. ii, pp. 23 ff.↩
- See Prime Minister Churchill’s message to President Roosevelt, March 12, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 119.↩
- Approved June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.↩
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩