Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

740.00119 European War 1939/1265: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 31, 1943—3 p.m.
[Received February 7—1:45 p.m.]

68. Department’s 37, January 21, 3 p.m.⁷⁴ I took occasion on January 29 carefully and in detail to explain to Molotov the immediate considerations involved in American policy toward Finland as outlined in section I (a) of the memorandum and stated that I would appreciate any comments he might wish to make in regard to this policy. Molotov exhibited unusual interest in my statements and interrupted the interpreter frequently to make sure that he understood every point. Upon conclusion he stated that he would bring the considerations advanced to the attention of his Government. Although he gave no specific approval of the policy, from his responsive, cordial and at times affirmative attitude I obtained the impression that subjectively he was in accord with it.

Molotov thereupon remarked that he desired to express certain personal views in respect to Soviet-Finnish relations. He stated that the Soviet Union had been forced into war with Finland by reason of Finnish seizures of Soviet territory, and that the Soviet Union had not sought and did not want this war; however, “unfortunately the Finns were still on Soviet territory”, and the war must continue. He added that his Government believed the Finns would find it impossible to broaden their participation in the war since they had already exerted too great an effort in correspondence with their existing forces. It was on this point alone that Molotov appeared to question the immediate considerations advanced by me.

In view of the inclination shown by Molotov to discuss the Soviet attitude toward Finland, and of the lack of bitterness expressed by him in his remarks, I considered it a favorable moment to go into the question of the general considerations in American policy toward Finland as set forth in paragraph 1(b) of the memoranda [memorandum].

After I had outlined these considerations Molotov stated that he would bring these views to the attention of his Government. He confirmed in part the basic consideration by remarking “If the Finns withdrew from their partnership with Germany and gave up their territorial gains it would without doubt be to the interest of the Soviet Union and the United Nations” and inquired “How serious are the grounds to believe that the Finns wish to withdraw”. There was no doubt that Molotov was considerably interested in the turn in which the discussion had taken. I stated that in my opinion there were indications that the Finnish Government believed that it might be advisable to terminate its conflict with Russia. Molotov inquired whether I or the American Government had information as to the nature of the Finnish conditions for such a withdrawal. I replied in the negative. Molotov then carefully reviewed the statements made by me listing specifically:

1. The immediate considerations of the American Government for the maintenance of American-Finnish relations.

2. The advantages to the Soviet Union, the United Nations and certain neutrals of a Finnish withdrawal from the war.

3. The existence of certain indications that Finland might be prevailed upon for the withdrawal from the war “under certain conditions”.

After reiterating that the Soviet Government did not wish war with Finland, Molotov again stated that he would refer my views to his Government.

Standley

74. Not printed; it instructed Ambassador Standley to approach the Soviet Government as soon as possible in regard to the Finnish problem, using as a basis the Department’s memorandum of December 18, 1942, printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, p. 112.