867N.01/2286
Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel
Harold B. Hoskins
[Washington,] December 14, 1943.
Participants: |
U—Mr. Stettinius |
|
A–B—Mr. Berle |
|
A–L—Mr. Long |
|
PA/M–Mr. Murray |
|
NE–Mr. Alling |
|
NE—Colonel Hoskins |
At Mr. Stettinius’ request Colonel Hoskins, based on his recent trip to
the Middle East and to the United Kingdom, gave the highlights on the
situation and prospects in Palestine as indicated by the headings in the
outline attached.
After the situation in Palestine and in London had been reviewed there
followed a discussion of the situation in the United States and
particularly in Washington. Mr. Long referred to certain domestic
political complications in dealing with this subject during the coming
months and the consequent necessity of moving very carefully.
Then followed a discussion as to the scope and location of the
conversations on Near East matters that had been suggested by the
Foreign Office and of the invitation that had been issued to Mr. Murray
to visit London.17 Mr. Murray mentioned the preference of the Secretary that
such conversations should take place in Washington rather than in
London.
It was agreed (1) that no further steps could be taken until after the
President’s return18 and (2) that, after the
necessary information from the President had been received in regard to
any conversations on Palestine that he may have had with the Prime
Minister, the Under Secretary would then call together the above group
for a further discussion of the suggestions made in Colonel Hoskins’
report.
[Annex]
Highlights Regarding Palestine
By Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S.
I. Basis of my Report and
Conclusions
Two trips to Middle East and one to London during past year—over
seven months’ travel.
[Page 826]
First-hand conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders, with British
officials in Middle East and London, and with American Government
Officials in Middle East and Washington.
II. Summary of Present
Situation
- A.
-
In Palestine
- (1)
- Increased tension on both sides
- —arming and arms trials
- —minor outbreaks despite armed forces
- (2)
- No indications of any compromise by leaders, either
Arab or Jew; I’ve talked to both.
- —Irreconcilable conflict between Arab desire
for independence and Zionist desire for a Jewish
State.
- (3)
- No signs of amicable cooperation between the Arab and
Jewish people in Palestine or in neighboring Arab
States. This confirms major conclusion of Royal
Commission of 1937 as given in their 400–page
report.19
- (4)
- Today, though lack of cooperation since 1937
confirmed, main change is that the shoe is on the other
foot—today the Arabs are afraid of the Jews. This is the
significant change from 1937.
- (5)
- Palestine Arabs more restless because of growing
independence of Arabs in surrounding countries.
- B.
-
In London
- (1)
- Uncertainty and indecision in War Cabinet opinion—as
indicated by Law’s luncheon for me.
- (2)
- Constant Jewish Pressure on government and public
opinion—Weizmann, Namier, Manchester
Guardian.
- (3)
- Realization of Need for Decision
- —leaning toward partition as ultimate
solution—an Arab State, a Jewish State and Holy
Places
- (4)
- Recognition by British of increasing permanent
interests of United States in Palestine and Middle
East.
- (5)
- Desire for Anglo-American conversations and for
Anglo-American cooperation.
- C.
-
In Washington
- (1)
- Increasing Zionist political pressure, I gather, on
State Department, Congress and leaders of both political
parties.
- (2)
- Desirability of Anglo-American conversations in
Washington if not London re Middle East problems.
- (3)
- Advisability of making some decisions on American
policy toward Middle East if possible, so as to clarify
and assist position of our diplomatic representatives in
the field.
III. Next Steps
- (1)
- Conferences within State Department and with War and Navy
Departments, aimed at clarifying our own minds as to proper
United States policy in the Middle East.
- (2)
- Followed by conferences with British re possibilities of
agreement on Anglo-American policies to apply in Middle East.
- (a)
-
for war period
- Anglo-American declaration re Palestine or
regional declaration aimed at preventing a blowup
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and at
postponing discussions and decisions re Palestine
till war is won.
- (b)
-
for postwar period
- Agreement on joint Anglo-American policy to be
applied in Middle East to extent American
interests warrant and American strength will
support enforcement.