867N.01/2286

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins

Participants: U—Mr. Stettinius
A–B—Mr. Berle
A–L—Mr. Long
PA/M–Mr. Murray
NE–Mr. Alling
NE—Colonel Hoskins

At Mr. Stettinius’ request Colonel Hoskins, based on his recent trip to the Middle East and to the United Kingdom, gave the highlights on the situation and prospects in Palestine as indicated by the headings in the outline attached.

After the situation in Palestine and in London had been reviewed there followed a discussion of the situation in the United States and particularly in Washington. Mr. Long referred to certain domestic political complications in dealing with this subject during the coming months and the consequent necessity of moving very carefully.

Then followed a discussion as to the scope and location of the conversations on Near East matters that had been suggested by the Foreign Office and of the invitation that had been issued to Mr. Murray to visit London.17 Mr. Murray mentioned the preference of the Secretary that such conversations should take place in Washington rather than in London.

It was agreed (1) that no further steps could be taken until after the President’s return18 and (2) that, after the necessary information from the President had been received in regard to any conversations on Palestine that he may have had with the Prime Minister, the Under Secretary would then call together the above group for a further discussion of the suggestions made in Colonel Hoskins’ report.

[Annex]

Highlights Regarding Palestine

By Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S.

I. Basis of my Report and Conclusions

Two trips to Middle East and one to London during past year—over seven months’ travel.

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First-hand conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders, with British officials in Middle East and London, and with American Government Officials in Middle East and Washington.

II. Summary of Present Situation

A.
In Palestine
(1)
Increased tension on both sides
  • —arming and arms trials
  • —minor outbreaks despite armed forces
(2)
No indications of any compromise by leaders, either Arab or Jew; I’ve talked to both.
  • —Irreconcilable conflict between Arab desire for independence and Zionist desire for a Jewish State.
(3)
No signs of amicable cooperation between the Arab and Jewish people in Palestine or in neighboring Arab States. This confirms major conclusion of Royal Commission of 1937 as given in their 400–page report.19
(4)
Today, though lack of cooperation since 1937 confirmed, main change is that the shoe is on the other foot—today the Arabs are afraid of the Jews. This is the significant change from 1937.
(5)
Palestine Arabs more restless because of growing independence of Arabs in surrounding countries.
B.
In London
(1)
Uncertainty and indecision in War Cabinet opinion—as indicated by Law’s luncheon for me.
(2)
Constant Jewish Pressure on government and public opinion—Weizmann, Namier, Manchester Guardian.
(3)
Realization of Need for Decision
  • —leaning toward partition as ultimate solution—an Arab State, a Jewish State and Holy Places
(4)
Recognition by British of increasing permanent interests of United States in Palestine and Middle East.
(5)
Desire for Anglo-American conversations and for Anglo-American cooperation.
C.
In Washington
(1)
Increasing Zionist political pressure, I gather, on State Department, Congress and leaders of both political parties.
(2)
Desirability of Anglo-American conversations in Washington if not London re Middle East problems.
(3)
Advisability of making some decisions on American policy toward Middle East if possible, so as to clarify and assist position of our diplomatic representatives in the field.

III. Next Steps

(1)
Conferences within State Department and with War and Navy Departments, aimed at clarifying our own minds as to proper United States policy in the Middle East.
(2)
Followed by conferences with British re possibilities of agreement on Anglo-American policies to apply in Middle East.
(a)
for war period
  • Anglo-American declaration re Palestine or regional declaration aimed at preventing a blowup between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and at postponing discussions and decisions re Palestine till war is won.
(b)
for postwar period
  • Agreement on joint Anglo-American policy to be applied in Middle East to extent American interests warrant and American strength will support enforcement.
  1. For correspondence regarding the British request to hold conversations on problems of the Near and Middle East, see pp. 6 ff.
  2. President Roosevelt had been attending the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran; he returned to Washington on December 16. For correspondence concerning these Conferences, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
  3. British Cmd. 5479, July 1937.