740.00112A E. W. 1939/36136: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 7—6:11 p.m.]
6798. For Department and OEW from Riefler. Reference Department’s 6016, September 29. MEW has been informed that Department considers it not feasible to formulate at present an exact statement which would be issued by both the British and American Governments if at a later date such a statement proved necessary. It is noted, nevertheless, that the Department and interested agencies in drafting any final statement would probably base this statement largely on the one contained in Embassy’s 5845.
Because of procedures in the House of Commons it is rather difficult for the British to agree to any long delay in the formulation of the statement should one be necessary. Following excerpt from Foot’s39 note to Riefler October 5 is self-explanatory.
“There remains the question of a public statement. As you know we also are anxious to avoid having to make such a statement and are so instructing our missions. We certainly shall say nothing in public if we can help it and if a statement becomes unavoidable we shall, of course, do our best to hold it up until a form of words has been agreed with your Government. But we still feel that it would be a wise precaution to prepare an agreed draft now for use in case of necessity. What I have particularly in mind is the possibility of the matter being raised in the House of Commons, either at question time or during a debate. Under our procedure any Member is entitled to put down a question for oral answer at 2 days’ notice although in practice we generally have 4 or 5 days’ notice of a question addressed to this Ministry. Members can sometimes be persuaded to postpone or withdraw their questions but not always. If we were to give a vague or temporising reply we should obviously be weakening the effect of the whispering campaign and of the warning given to selected neutral firms.
Another possibility is that the matter might be raised in a general debate on the war situation or on the work of the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Some Member of Parliament with business connections in a neutral country might raise it in the course of his speech. The Minister who winds up the debate would be expected to give a reply then and there and would be in a position of some embarrassment if he could not do so.
If these circumstances were to arise and we could not delay a public statement we would use the draft already submitted which has been cleared with all the interested Departments in the British Government. [Page 342] I gather that your Government does not object to the substance. I should be most grateful if you could ascertain what are the points which give them some difficulty.”
In Acheson’s letter to Riefler of June 19, 1943, page 3, it was stated, “It would be necessary to work out very carefully in advance the tenor of any statement which circumstances might require.” Pursuant to this instruction in the Embassy’s extended negotiations with MEW and other interested British agencies effort was made in drafting the statement contained in telegram 5845 to protect the Department from any repercussions which might arise in the other American Republics should it prove necessary to issue a statement. Agreement in advance in the near future regarding points to be included in a joint statement therefore seems very important as a protective measure. Accordingly the Embassy urges and hopes that the Department can agree shortly to points to be included in any statement (subject to minor revision as circumstances may require) and in the meantime if an inescapable obligation for a statement in the House of Commons happens to arise prior to the receipt of the draft approved by the Department we are informing MEW that the draft contained in telegram 5845 should be used as suggested in the last paragraph of Foot’s letter quoted above.
Foot’s letter also raised question of sending the instructions which have gone forward to Lisbon, Madrid, Stockholm and Bern, to the Missions at Tangier, Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran as well. With regard to this point his letter states:
“It appears that we are now agreed on the action to be taken in Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and Portugal, namely, that warnings are to be given in suitable cases to neutral firms and individuals and that there is to be a whispering campaign on this subject. We are, therefore, sending instructions forthwith to the four Missions concerned. We had intended, however, to send similar instructions to His Majesty’s representatives at Tangier, Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran. I observe that your memorandum makes no reference to these capitals. I shall be grateful if you will let me know what the State Department intends to do in these cases.”
An early expression of your views in this respect also would be appreciated. [Riefler.]
- Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.↩