835.00/1585: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:12 p.m.]
1506. For the Under Secretary. Reference my 1489, July 5, 7 p.m. I had a long talk with the President this afternoon at his house. He said that he wished us to understand the position of his Government and the difficulties confronting them, particularly why it had not been possible to proceed immediately to a break in relations. He said that for this important step the public and particularly the Armed Forces must be prepared, and to accomplish this he still needed a little time. He realized that our Government well might have misunderstood certain things that have happened here and seemed fully cognizant of the bad press they had in the United States. This was, he admitted, due to certain appointments that had been made and clumsy censorship but he was taking steps to remedy this and hoped that the situation would soon improve. The people had become accustomed to ease and plenty and to take such a step out of a clear sky might have serious repercussions. He stated frankly that there were still in the Armed Forces certain elements that he was not sure he could count on. And these must be brought around or at least not be in a position to challenge the Government’s decision when taken.
I asked him whether in preparing public opinion it would not seem logical to proceed vigorously against the Nazi subsidized press which was continuing to attack us and at the same time through raising or relaxing the state of siege permit the pro-democratic papers which constitute a great majority of the press to express themselves. He admitted this and said that as soon as the July 9th festivities were over he intended to devote his entire attention to this matter. He also agreed that in preparing public opinion prompt action against the Axis spies with full publicity in the press would be useful.
To my question of how long a preparatory period he felt would be necessary he mentioned a month or 5 weeks (this he repeated several times). He said it might be sooner but he could give me his guarantee that the break would take place not later than August 15. He confirmed Storni’s statement to me that once the Cabinet had taken its decisions he proposed to summon a council of notables largely composed of civilians to give him their opinion; it was he felt too serious a step for him or for the Government to take alone. This would be done very shortly.
He expressed concern over the upset in the equilibrium through materials received by neighboring countries. He realized the circumstances under which materials had been sent to these countries [Page 430] and that it had not been our Government’s intention in any way to create difficulties for Argentina but he hoped we would exert our influence to prevent any incident from occurring.
He wished me to assure our Government that when the break came his Government did not intend to ask for material. Their action would be taken without any idea of bargaining. If we could help them with certain things it would be appreciated but this would be for the future and only to the extent that we felt we could spare it.
Ramírez impressed me as nervous and not too sure of himself. He is undoubtedly worried over the strength of the opposition in the army particularly. Axis sympathizers have apparently been busy with the argument that pressure is being exerted by the United States through materials sent to Argentina’s neighbors and that a break would be interpreted as giving in to such pressure. I think I was able to disabuse him of the idea of any pressure, merely advancing the usual arguments as to why we felt a break in relations would be to their own advantage as well as to that of the Americas as a whole.