835.00/1690
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 21.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s despatch no. 10943, of July 13, 1943, I have the honor to submit the following observations for the Department’s consideration regarding the policy to be pursued towards the present Government here.
While undoubtedly there is confusion and a lack of definition in the Government’s policy, both internal and external, I feel we should not be unduly discouraged. My talks with Storni and the President have brought out clearly that so far as the Government’s foreign policy is concerned, they intend within a reasonably short period to break relations with the Axis. If and when this action is taken, I feel that the air will be very much cleared. In fact, I doubt if it is now possible to estimate how great will be the effect of this single act. Logically the Government would then, if not before, have to permit the democratic press to speak out in favor of this step which they have so long advocated, but under the state of siege have been unable to urge in clear and unequivocal language. Once the people, as represented by the democratic press, and in public meeting, which it is hoped may then be permitted, have expressed themselves, it seems possible that General Ramírez, sensitive as he has already shown himself to be to public sentiment, will realize the overwhelmingly democratic feeling in the country and put himself at the head of a movement which will return the Government to constitutional channels at a date earlier than now envisaged. It seems reasonably established that the origin of the movement that resulted in the overthrow of the previous Government lay at least partially in the talks which certain Radical leaders held with General Ramírez. It is true that the military, and particularly the group of colonels who played a prominent role, and still continue to do so, in the movement, have little use for the politician—and are determined to clean up corruption and rid the country of graft and chicanery. These officers, who are apparently sincere in their “crusade”, will very possibly attempt to oppose the return of the Government to constitutional channels, at least until they feel that a thorough housecleaning has been made and a lesson given to the “politicos” for some time to come. However, if my reasoning is correct, and the expression of popular sentiment which will greet the Government’s action in placing Argentina clearly on the side of the democracies in the present war is what it promises to be, I believe that even the military will be carried by the current, and will see the logic, if not necessity, of transferring the Government back into constitutional [Page 436] channels. In such case, should Ramírez call for free elections and should the various political parties, particularly the Radicals, agree in the national emergency to settle their differences and put forward Ramírez as their candidate, perhaps on a program of national union, the result might well be a new Argentina not only prepared to take its place, admittedly very late, by the side of the other American republics in cooperating wholeheartedly in continental defense but ready to take its part in the even more important problems of the post-war settlement.
If the Department agrees that this forecast presents even a possibility of realization, I feel sure it will also agree that our Government should do everything possible to ease the way, even though it might appear that we are departing from a policy already decided upon. It is, frankly, for this reason that I have expressed myself, perhaps over-emphatically, in favor of reaching an immediate settlement of the petroleum question: of assuring the Government that our offer of spare parts required for American planes now in the possession of the Argentine Army and Navy, still holds good, etc. Anything that will tend to show that we have faith in the good intentions of the new Government, that we are prepared, even before they break relations, to give them the benefit of the doubt and cooperate with them will, I feel, create a feeling of confidence and understanding that no amount of material given, once the step has been taken, would yield.
I realize, of course, that consideration must be given to the sentiment in the other republics, notably Brazil, which have cooperated wholeheartedly with us in the days when cooperation involved a real risk. But I feel that the Department will agree that the future of inter-American solidarity and cooperation is really involved: that if this war were to come to its victorious conclusion without Argentina having come in wholeheartedly on the side of the democracies, continental cooperation in the future would be more difficult.
Whatever may be the motives of those directing the policies of the new Government in advocating a break in the relations, I repeat that if the break occurs, I believe these smaller motives will be swept aside in the powerful liberal forces which such an act will inevitably unleash and that those half-hearted or even antagonistic elements which the Government has for its own good reasons found it necessary to associate with it in one form or another will be forced to join with the current or get out.
It must frankly be admitted that there is some basis for the opinion held by certain observers here that the present Government is following the pattern of Brazil: that in its internal policy the Government will be strongly nationalistic, continuing along dictatorship lines, [Page 437] although in the international field lining up with the democracies. In other words, that even if the Government breaks relations with the Axis it will continue with press censorship and repression of liberal and pro-democratic organizations within the country.
This is of course a possibility. On the other hand, important distinctions exist between the situation in Brazil and in Argentina. In the first place the more educated and intellectual groups—those holding opinions on national and international questions—are, in Argentina, more concentrated in strategic centers, particularly the federal capital, than is the case in Brazil. Furthermore, I think it must be admitted that the Argentine press, as represented by such outstanding newspapers as La Prensa and La Nación in the capital, not to mention certain of the provincial organs, wield an influence which the press of Brazil, even in the days when it was allowed greater liberty of expression, never had. In short, it would be more difficult for the Government here to continue to bottle up public opinion and control the press than in the case of Brazil.
Finally, in Brazil the Vargas Government had been well in the saddle for some years prior to the entrance of Brazil into the war, and was in a position to cope with the new situation without reorientating its internal policy, whereas the Government of Argentina has been in office just over a month and is still not entirely sure of itself.
For these reasons I do not feel that the analogy of Brazil necessarily holds true, even though certain surface tendencies exhibit a disquieting similarity to those which showed themselves in Brazil soon after the advent of the present regime in that country.
Respectfully yours,