835.00/1653: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

1604. For the Under Secretary. The Minister of Finance, Jorge Santamarina, told me in strict confidence last night that Ramírez has apparently been informed from some source in the United States that our Government is no longer interested in seeing this Government break relations: That we feel it is now too late for such action to be of any use. He asked if I knew whether this was true since the report had not had a good effect on the President. I replied that [Page 439] while I had nothing on it I thought he must agree that the psychological moment to have taken this action would have been immediately after the new Government took over. As it would then have confirmed the earlier impression abroad that one of the prime motives of the revolution was to place Argentina squarely on the side of the other American Republics. As it was, in the 6 weeks since June 4 the only action of importance this Government had taken was the radio telecommunications decree, and I felt that opinion was crystallizing in the United States, at least with the press and public, that this Government was more interested in bearing down on pro-democracy organizations on the alleged ground of Communist affiliations than in proceeding vigorously to implement the Rio Resolutions. However, unfortunate as the delay had been I believed that in their own interest they would certainly break with the Axis and I felt this was my Government’s view; but it was of course a question solely for determination by the Argentine Government. I pointed out the obvious inconsistency in the President’s feeling upset at our reported indifference as to whether they acted or not and the insistence both by the President and Foreign Minister that there must be no evidence of pressure on our part. If the report that had come to the President had any basis in fact then surely this was the best evidence their Government could have that we were not exerting pressure.

Santamarina said Ramírez apparently felt pressure was being exercised through Brazil: That they understood Brazil had 200,000 troops concentrated near the Argentine border (Brazilian Ambassador denies this and tells me he has so informed the Government here). I then reviewed to Santamarina the situation as outlined in your personal letter to me of June 28 which has also been helpful in my talks with Ramírez and Storni. Santamarina claims they fully understood that no war or other critical material will be forthcoming unless they break and confirmed what Ramírez told me that they have no idea of bargaining the break for such material nor do they expect us to make up to them in material for the time they have lost since Rio. Storni also realizes this.

It occurs to me that Ramírez’ source in the United States may have been an over-condensed report from Espil following a conversation which your letter of June 28 indicated you expected to have with him. I cannot see any particular harm in their having the impression we are no longer interested but if in my next talk with Storni he raises the question, I shall elaborate our point of view along the lines of your letter, much of which as I say I have already used in a previous talk.

Armour