740.0011 European War 1939/30429: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:59 p.m.]
1722. I have had a long talk with Storni. He said Ramírez had decided in view of soundings he had made of sentiment among officers in the Army that he cannot break relations: that such a step would have serious repercussions. In other words the Government’s position is as stated by Storni to Brazilian Ambassador last week (see telegram 1647, July 22, 10 p.m.) except that Storni told me he himself feels that Italian situation which has developed since then has now made break with Axis impossible, that it is too late: they have missed the bus. To do it now would be a “cowardly act”. Of course, if Japan or Germany committed any overt act of provocation that would change matters. He realizes the seriousness of this decision, particularly for the future, that it means they will not only be excluded from the peace settlement and postwar discussions but as he had told the President their failure to live up to their obligations will not be forgotten by the American Republics for the next 50 years. But he feels they have made their decision and will now have to weather through as best they can.
[Page 445]Storni considers the internal situation bad. Nationalist and pro-Axis sentiment among German-trained officers in the Army is still strong. Ramírez is right in this. Also Storni feels communism is gaining strength and the country is heading for trouble.
I told Storni that you had asked me to come up to Washington for consultation and I expected to leave within 2 weeks, probably about August 9. It was imperative therefore that I have a clear statement of their position preferably in writing before I leave. I reminded him that on July 6 the President had given me his guarantee that the break would take place before August 15. He had now apparently changed his mind. Furthermore, other assurances Ramírez had given me with regard to action he proposed to take against Axis subsidized press and espionage activities had not been put into effect. On the contrary, such action as the Government has since taken had been against pro-Democratic organizations on the alleged ground of Communist affiliations, while the Axis press was continuing its propaganda apparently unhindered.
Storni said he had already told the President that they must give me a clear statement of their position and in view of my forthcoming visit to Washington this would have to be done at once in order that my Government might have it before I arrived. He hoped that it would be ready by the end of the week. I judge it will be sent through Espil but I will be given a copy. It will not, he said, contain all that he would like to put in it as he cannot go on record in criticizing the previous Government nor can he set forth many of the weaknesses in their own internal system. But it will explain the reasons why the Government feels it cannot change its present policy of neutrality.
When I handed Storni an aide-mémoire (see Embassy’s telegram 1687, July 27 [28] 5 p.m.42) announcing our intention of taking steps to make it impossible for certain of the Axis subsidized organs to receive materials from the United States, Storni delivered quite a tirade on our own press which he said was representing the present Government here as Fascist. He contrasted the attitude of our press with that of the British which showed a clearer understanding of Argentine psychology. While cool towards Argentina, the British press had at least refrained from attacking them as our press was doing. I said I understood that several very frank articles criticizing the Argentine Government’s attitude had appeared in the British press, but had not been permitted publication here. In any event, I reminded him that Britain had not been a party to the Rio agreements and the feeling in the United States was I felt largely based upon Argentina’s failure to live up to these agreements.
[Page 446]Storni then told me that while as I knew he had planned to resign if the Government did not break relations he now felt that he should continue on for the present. He could, he thought, accomplish more by staying on in an attempt to get things back eventually into constitutional channels. If, however, he found this was not the case he would get out.
I found that Storni had lost much of his earlier fire and enthusiasm. It is apparent that he has been subjected to considerable pressure and is no longer so sure of himself. While he is probably sincere in saying he feels the Italian collapse makes it impossible for them to break, this argument is merely eyewash so far as the rest of the Government is concerned. The decision was taken last week, before Mussolini’s fall. The real reason I am convinced is that the Nationalist pro-Axis elements in the Army have now secured control. At the time Ramírez spoke to me on July 6, he was probably sincerely concerned over possible trouble with Paraguay and Brazil. Having now been reassured from these quarters he perhaps feels they can now safely go on as they are in the hope that the war will finish soon and they will then be able to secure matériel from other sources. In the meantime the Government is, I am told, gradually getting rid of the pro-rupture colonels by assigning them to posts in the provinces, while Rawson who has been the strongest single factor favoring a break and who, I am told, had stated he would accept the Ambassadorship to Brazil only after the break took place has now consented to go to Rio without it. Escobar is supposed to be slated for the Vatican.
Repeated to Rio.
- Not printed; this telegram gave notice that certain firms were to be placed on the Proclaimed List (740.00112A European War 1939/34204).↩