Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper¹

secret

[Undated.]

U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union

Our overall objective in our relations with the Soviet Union is the establishment of the closest, most cooperative relationship on the basis of the mutual acceptance and observance of the essential principles of good international conduct.

Because of the over-riding wartime necessity of avoiding friction which might jeopardize military cooperation, more emphasis has hitherto been placed on cooperating with the Soviet Union per se than on finding an agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is to endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order.

An excellent start was made at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences² toward establishing a common agreement in regard to the broad principles of international cooperation. Recent Soviet policy with regard to Poland, however, its adamant attitude on the Baltic States, and [the policy?] indicated in other areas have been far from encouraging in this respect.

There is a danger that the Soviet Government may mistake friendliness for weakness and continue to operate in the belief that it can obtain all the benefits of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain no matter what policies it pursues in regard to its neighbors unless the British and ourselves demonstrate more forcefully that observation by the Soviet Union of accepted principles of international conduct is both to its own ultimate advantage and essential to lasting cooperation with the Western Powers.

Nothing should be done along political lines which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against Germany but, as and when the military situation in Europe permits, increased emphasis should be placed on the principles upon which enduring cooperation must be based. This would require greater willingness on our part to risk Soviet displeasure and franker and more realistic discussions with the Soviet Union in regard to its policies in Europe. It would, of course, be against our interest to seek (or to follow the British in seeking) points of friction or to obstruct or deny legitimate Soviet interests.

It is nevertheless important that the Soviet Government realize that, while we desire its cooperation in world affairs as much as it desires ours, we do not intend to acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues. Cooperation on that basis is perilously close to collusion. A greater degree of firmness in our attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union would avoid more serious difficulties in the future and would place our relations with it on a firmer foundation.

1. Annex 2 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
2. For the records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 558 ff. For the records of the Tehran Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 475 ff.