500.CC/8–344

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: It is quite possible that in the coming discussions with the other principal United Nations, concerning the proposed General International Organization, questions will arise directly or indirectly related to the subject of post-war territorial settlements, as for example the question of “Territorial Trusteeships.”

It is noted that the Table of Contents of the United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization dated 18 July 1944, (which have been furnished the other governments concerned), indicates that Section IX63 deals with “Arrangements for Territorial Trusteeships” and that the “documents on this subject will be available later.”

It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff64 after examining the 6th July draft of Section IX, that this subject of Territorial Trusteeships is closely related to the broader subject of territorial settlements and that the question as to whether either subject should be discussed at this time is directly related to two basic military considerations. These military considerations are:

a.
The incalculable importance to the United States of the early entry of Russia into the war against Japan, and
b.
The very profound changes that will be found in the relative military strengths of the major powers of the world upon the conclusion of the present war.

In order that our representatives at forthcoming discussions may be informed of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning these military considerations, the accompanying memorandum expressive of these views is enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
G. C. Marshall
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

Subject: Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements.

1.
Discussions are to be held in the near future with representatives of the three other principal United Nations concerning the proposed future international organization. While these discussions are intended to be exploratory only, it is possible that directly or indirectly, questions concerning territorial settlements may arise. Should this be the case, it appears certain that on some questions of this nature, Russian aspirations will be found in conflict with those of the British on the one hand, and with those of China on the other. The interests of the United States would undoubtedly be involved, particularly as to the future status of the Japanese Mandated Islands,65 and British and Chinese interests could be expected to come in conflict, especially as to Hong Kong.
2.
The question of whether the subject of territorial settlements should be discussed during these conversations—either specifically as to certain areas, or in general terms as to the trusteeship or other status of such areas under the General International Organization—is an important matter of policy which should be determined only after thorough examination of all factors involved. Among the basic factors which must be given full weight in determining the United States policy in this regard is the over-all military situation as it can be foreseen both before and after the defeat of Japan.
3.
While the war with Germany is well advanced toward a final conclusion, the defeat of Japan is not yet in sight. The defeat of Germany will leave Russia in a position of assured military dominance [Page 701] in eastern Europe and in the Middle East. While it is true that on the fall of Germany the United States and Britain will occupy and control western Europe, their strength in that area will thereafter progressively decline with the withdrawal of all but their occupational and enforcement forces, for employment against Japan, or for demobilization.
4.
At present, the war against Japan is being carried on almost entirely by the United States. Notwithstanding British commitments, this will continue to be substantially true after the defeat of Germany, unless Russia effectively enters the war against Japan. In this connection it must be borne in mind that whether or not Russia enters the war, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast Asia in so far as military power is concerned.
5.
The land forces of Russia can provide a major contribution by being brought to bear directly against the most powerful element of Japanese military strength—her Army. The air forces of Russia or of the United States, operating from Siberian or Korean bases, would provide the most effective short range land-based air attack against the heart of Japan. Should Russia promptly and effectively enter the war after the fall of Germany, she would bring her great land and air forces into action directly against Japan, thereby materially shortening the war and effecting vast savings in American lives and treasure. Should Russia abstain from such action, due to our untimely pressing the subject of territorial settlement—or any other avoidable cause—we must be prepared to accept responsibility for a longer war. In other words, it should be clearly recognized by those guiding these prospective discussions that there is an important connection between the timeliness of discussing territorial trusteeships or other forms of territorial settlements and the earliest and least costly defeat of Japan and therefore that discussion of these controversial subjects should be delayed until that end is achieved.
6.
In all discussions of post-war international arrangements it will be of great importance that our representatives keep clearly in mind the essential facts of the future world-wide military situation, which, in the last analysis, not only will largely determine the eventual territorial settlements, but which must be recognized and accepted if we are to create a post-war world structure on the basis of that reality without which it can not be expected to endure. When Germany and Japan are defeated and disarmed, and assuming they are prevented from re-building their military power, the facts of the post-war military situation will be those briefly stated in the following paragraphs.
7.
The successful termination of the war against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of relative national [Page 702] military strengths, a change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years. This is a fact of fundamental importance in its bearing upon future international political settlements and all discussions leading thereto. Aside from the elimination of Germany and Japan as military powers, and developments in the relative economic power of principal nations, there are technical and material factors which have contributed greatly to this change. Among these are the development of aviation, the general mechanization of warfare and the marked shift in the munitioning potentials of the great powers.
8.
After the defeat of Japan, the United States and Russia will be the strongest military powers in the world. This is due in each case primarily to a combination of geographical position and extent, manpower, and vast munitioning potential. While the United States can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers are such as to preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire.
9.
As a military power, the British Empire in the post-war era will be in a lower category than the United States and Russia. The primacy of the British Empire in the century before World War I, and her second-to-none position until World War II, have built up a traditional concept of British military power. It is important that, as regards British military power, we clearly recognize the substantial change that has taken place. Except for the elimination of Germany as a threat and rival, nearly all the essential factors of national power in the post-war era will have altered, to the disadvantage of the British Empire. Both in an absolute sense and relative to the United States and Russia, the British Empire will emerge from the war having lost ground both economically and militarily. In addition to the broad effect of such losses on the military power of the Empire, there are two factors which directly depreciate the military power of the United Kingdom. These are the inroads of aviation and submarine developments on the former security of her sea lanes, and the relative decline in her munitioning capacity during the past seventy years, from about fifty per cent to approximately eight per cent of world totals. A future world conflict may be expected to find British military resources so strained in the defense of her essential sea lanes, so involved in maintaining the integrity of her Empire, that little, if any, of these resources will be available for offensive action against a land power.
10.
Notwithstanding her vast population and area, China possesses at present but little military strength. This condition will not be improved prior to her extensive industrialization, which in turn is dependent on the firm establishment of political unity and a stable government. Her ultimate munitioning potential, while it may be considerable, will not be developed for a long time and can not be expected to be of the order of magnitude of either Russia or the United States because of the smaller size of her reserves of iron ore.
11.
As a military power, France will be found in a category below the British Empire. Nevertheless, France after her recovery will be in a position to exert a greater effort than Britain in land operations on the European continent, because of her high degree of economic self-sufficiency and the very considerable munitioning capacity she will eventually possess after the re-acquisition of the Lorraine ore fields and the reconstruction of her industry.
12.
In spite of her resources in manpower, Italy, because of her very notable deficiencies in essential mineral reserves, must remain a relatively minor military power, largely dependent upon others for her munitioning needs.
13.
To summarize:
a.
From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that discussions concerning the related subjects of territorial trusteeship and territorial settlements, particularly as they may adversely affect our relations with Russia, be delayed until after the defeat of Japan.
b.
Concerning the post-war era, such discussions should give due weight to the facts that:
(1)
As regards their military power, the United States and Russia are dominant in their respective areas.
(2)
The relative strength and geographic positions of the United States and Russia are such as to preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire.
(3)
The relative military power of the British Empire has declined and will continue to be considerably less than that of Russia or the United States, but superior to that of any nation other than those two powers.
(4)
The military power of China at present and for many years to come will be very small.
(5)
Assuming the effective disarmament of Germany and Japan, nations other than United States, Russia, and the British Empire, may be potential sources of breaches of the international peace and security, as conceived by the General International Organization, but even collectively they will not possess sufficient military power to involve the world in a global war against the concerted will of the three great powers.
  1. For text of Section IX, Arrangements for Territorial Trusteeships, see p. 665.
  2. Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and Gen. George C. Marshall.
  3. In a memorandum of July 10, 1944, not printed, President Roosevelt reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “we have agreed that we are seeking no additional territory as a result of the war.” He added, however, that he was working on the idea that the United Nations would ask the United States to act as Trustee for the Japanese Mandated Islands; he assumed that with this authority would also go the military authority to protect or fortify them. (Doc. P/3, February 13, 1945.)