840.70/10–2744: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:35 p.m.]
9258. From EITO Delegation; seen by Mosely.
I. In view of the serious political implications that may be involved, there follows a detailed account of the meeting of the main EITO Committee on Wednesday, October 25. At the insistence of the Soviet Delegation, consideration was first given to Article I and the proposed Soviet amendment. The Soviet Delegation made a statement of its view that the organization should be merely consultative and coordinating, referring at some length to Articles IV, VII and VIII, that was couched in uncompromising terms, at times not far short of truculent. They again stressed the view that the powers provided for would interfere with the internal affairs and impair the sovereignty of the member states. The United States Delegation took the position that in its view the organization would be a more effective instrument to do the job that the Continental countries desperately need to have done if it is endowed with limited, carefully safeguarded, specific powers, but that the decision must necessarily be theirs. That after making such contribution as we could in the discussion, we would gladly go along with their decision. The comments by the Continental Allies substantially favored our view of the Character and functions of the organization, with some reserve noticeable on the part of the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav Delegations.
[Page 836]The chairman, Sir Cyril Hurcomb, then directed the discussion to Article VII, which led immediately to the Soviet proposal for the deletion of section 2, subsections (c) and (d), which are (b) and (c) of the printed text,63 the new (b) being the second clause of the former (a).
ReDepts service of October 24.64 We stated that just as we expected to go along with the Continental Powers in their determination as to character and functions of an organization that necessarily affects them more directly than the three Non-Continental Powers, by the same token, since the deletion of (c) with the retention of (a) constitutes a clear discrimination against us, we felt justified in stating with the fullest emphasis that we could not accept it. The meeting was then adjourned for lunch.
At the afternoon meeting the Continental delegations expressed themselves generally in accord with our view. In particular Masaryk, after stating he had consulted his Government during the noon hour, declared emphatically that Czechoslovakia would be willing, if necessary to the effective operation of the agreement, to give up for a temporary period any small degree of national sovereignty if by so doing lives could be saved and the rehabilitation of Europe advanced. As a representative of the largest locomotive producing power in Continental Europe, he said he had no objection to the retention of (c) of section 2 of Article VII.
The Soviets suggested they would be willing to see the elimination of subparagraph (a) as well as (c). We replied that while we would be guided by the decision of the Continental Powers as to the deletion of both (a) and (c), we felt that in the interests of the effective functioning of the organization it was preferable to retain both rather than delete both subsections, and that we had no objection to (a) so long as the Continental Powers were willing to accept (c). Since several delegations which had expressed themselves generally as indicated above were nevertheless awaiting instructions, further consideration of the point was deferred and the rest of the meeting was devoted to the remaining and relatively non-controversial sections of Article VII.
The texts of the articles and sections on which tentative agreement has been reached will be forwarded shortly by pouch.65
II. We invite the attention of the Department to the fact that the verbal differences between our position and that of the Soviets are not great, so far as Article VIII, the most important article, is [Page 837] concerned. It is the difference between commitments merely to cooperate fully, and additional commitments to carry out the recommendations of the organization with respect to the three primary functions of expediting traffic of common concern, the so-called “pool” arrangement, and the allocation of transport equipment and materials from enumerated sources. (In Article IV the Soviets want to forbid specifically the organization to own any transport equipment and material. In Article VII they want to emasculate the allocation provision by striking out subparagraphs (c) and (d) of section 2.)
This difference has taken on the significance of a difference of fundamental principle, in the light of the discussions that have taken place. The Soviets have insisted that, with the sanctions the three great powers can apply, a merely consultative organization will have effective power and effective coordinating function. They have insisted that advance commitments of the nature mentioned above are not needed and that current agreement can be reached on all important points without prior commitment. In one breath they say that regardless of commitments no power will accept a decision of the organization that is contrary to its interests; and that all decisions, since they will be made after full consideration of the interests of all, will be in the interest of all and are therefore sure to be honored even without specific commitment. We have found it hard not to conclude that their objective is to keep their own hands free at all times. We fear that if we agree to the Soviet proposals, after the discussions that have taken place, it will simply amount to an invitation to all participants to sign with mental reservations. In short, we believe there is now no hiding or evading the implications of the Soviet position, and we doubt therefore whether the organization could acquire sufficient prestige, if set up on the basis of the Soviet proposals, to function effectively, even though it might have had no discussions taken place.
III. Unless the Soviet Delegation changes its uncompromising attitude, we foresee the possibility that this, together with its inept tactics, may crystallize opinion in opposition to its views to a point where it may have no alternatives between full acceptance and complete rejection of the decisions of the Conference, unless all the other powers yield to them, or go ahead without them, or the project is abandoned. We assume that going ahead without them, or abandoning the project with the consequent admission of the failure of the Conference, cannot be contemplated. We also assume the Department would reject the only remaining possibility, that is, of an agreed retirement from the scene by the three great powers, leaving the Continental Allies to form an organization primarily to expedite traffic of common concern, with which the United States and United Kingdom might cooperate to assure a fair distribution of transport equipment and material from such sources as they control.
[Page 838]We believe that if the present trend continues (and there is no indication to the contrary) with the possibilities of compromise becoming more and more difficult, a point may be reached where we and the other powers may feel we cannot afford to yield. In fact we fear that three weeks of attempting to reason with the Soviets without yielding our position may have already brought us past the point where we can yield without encouraging the Soviets to follow the same tactics in future negotiations of this nature.
In considering what may have been their motives in sending a large and imposing delegation apparently without any discretion to take other than an adamant stand against the organization’s having any real powers, we cannot ignore the possibility that their main purpose is to see that an emasculated organization shall emerge from the Conference. If this is the case we are fast heading toward a situation where we shall have to make a very difficult choice.
IV. Ronald of the ForOff has suggested, and we have agreed, that after the next meeting of the main committee on Friday, October 27, the main committee meetings will be recessed until the middle or end of next week, and that in the meantime we resume tripartite meetings with the Soviets. We believe we should take this means of pressing upon the Soviets the desirability of adopting the position taken at the meeting on Monday October 23, by our Delegation; namely, that we would accept the decisions of the Continental Allies. He advises that at a long meeting on Thursday afternoon, October 26, with Koukin, Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, and Boyar of the Soviet Delegation, he urged this point without success; and that they insisted that if our three delegations could agree the Continental Allies would “follow our lead”. He nevertheless expresses an optimism which we see no reason to share that the Soviets will eventually accept our view. He proposes that at the tripartite meetings we prepare an agreed statement of the issues on all points of difference for submission to our respective Governments. The Department may wish to consider the desirability at that time of taking the matter up again in Moscow on a basis of the utmost urgency.
Please bring this to the attention of Ambassador Winant.65a
This answers the Department’s 8904 of October 25. [EITO Delegation.]