Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

840.70/11–444: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

London, November 4, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received November 4—5:30 p.m.]

9584. For Berle from EITO Delegation.

I. At a meeting Thursday November 2 with Ronald, Hurcomb and Weston, Ronald proposed the following course of action with respect to the EITO Conference:

That a communication be addressed by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Soviets and all the other participants in the Conference whose territories have been fully liberated, setting before them a revision of the EITO draft agreement embodying all the concessions which we are prepared to make to the Soviets; that the communication state that all points of view had been thoroughly set forth at the Conference and that the revision of the agreement substantially reconciles all important differences; that the Conference might be considered therefore to have satisfactorily concluded its work; that the countries addressed were invited to adhere to the agreement and that the other participants would be similarly invited when they found themselves, by virtue of the liberation of their territories, in a position to participate fully on the work of the organization. The purpose of this proposal was, of course, to get around the Polish question. Ronald stated, however, that in his view the United States and United Kingdom should go ahead with the organization, together with such of the Continental Allies as might adhere to it, with or without the Soviets. He also expressed the view that it should be unnecessary to go ahead with the Interim Commission.

We raised three possible objections to this procedure which we said in our view called for consideration:

1. That we felt there was a possibility of its prejudicing the position of our Government with respect to the Polish issue and that therefore we would wish to reserve our position until the Department could express itself on the matter.

2. That by thus placing a proposed text of the agreement before the Soviets on what amounted to a “take it or leave it” basis, we would in effect be presenting the Soviets with a challenge apart from the political question raised below. We stated that we feared this might result in closing the door to their eventual participation which is so important to the proper functioning of EITO.

3. That the course proposed involved the possibility, as a result of Soviet refusal to participate, of ending up as a western European arrangement thus raising a political question of far-reaching implications on which we would like to reserve our position. We stated that therefore this aspect of the proposal also seemed to us to have the elements of a challenge to the Soviets.

II. Using Ronald’s proposal as a point of departure, we submit the following proposal for the consideration of the Department:

As indicated in our 9448 of November 1, we here are inclined to feel that that portion of the second part of the reply suggested by the British which after deploring the Soviet withdrawal states that they believe that “given good will on the part of all concerned”, agreement could be reached and that the grounds for withdrawal are “both unsufficient and irrelevant” and asking in what manner the Soviet Government proposed to make known their withdrawal is all in the nature of a reprimand and does not advance the purposes for which the Conference was called.

With a view to suggesting a course which would best advance those purposes and without expressing ourselves on the desirability of a reprimand to the Soviets or on any of the political questions that may be involved, it is proposed that the Department suggest to the British the course indicated below as a substitute for that portion of the second part of their proposed reply to which we refer above:

1. That we follow Ronald’s proposed procedure to the extent of presenting the Soviets with a revised draft of the agreement embodying all the concessions that we are prepared to make without characterizing it either as a basis for discussion or as a final offer and asking their adherence; but that we indicate orally to the Soviets that we do not expect to present it to any of the other participants in the Conference until we have received the Soviet reply; that we propose to the Soviets that on their acceptance, this document be submitted in similar fashion to each of the Continental Allies as its territory becomes fully liberated from the enemy; and that we propose an immediate appropriate public announcement of this plan, couched in general terms, which would indicate that it is the result of the work of the Conference and that the Conference may therefore be considered to have successfully concluded its task.

2. That, as a part of the same communication, we remind the Soviets of their statement that they approved the Interim Commission and intended to appoint a member to it; that we inform them that our Commissioners have been appointed and in view of the nature of the emergency propose to proceed immediately with their work; that we invite them to appoint their Commissioner as soon as possible and, if they wish, to have an observer present in the meantime; and that we inform them that it is proposed that the Commission carry on its work with special emphasis on certain of the functions outlined in the draft directive, temporarily deferring its activities with respect to other enumerated functions (making reference, in so far as they are not of fundamental importance, to those functions which the Soviets might be most likely to question).

We have discussed the above proposal in general terms with Weston, who indicates the belief that it is in substantial accord with the British views, except that they would strongly prefer to have Clay and Barrington-Ward go ahead without the Soviets. We feel equally strongly that this is undesirable since it would involve, we believe, prematurely giving up our effort to bring EITO into being. Weston, we believe, personally leans toward our position.

III. The attention of the Department is invited to the following points about the above proposal:

(a) It gets around the Polish issue as a stumbling block to concluding the EITO arrangement in the same way that Ronald’s proposal does.

(b) It avoids any challenge to the Soviets such as is involved in Ronald’s proposal, which carries an implied threat of proceeding without them and which deprives them of an opportunity of discussing the draft submitted.

(c) It contemplates the continuance of the Interim Commission and thus eliminates any danger of our being immobilized in dealing with the present emergency on account of a Soviet failure to answer our communication. In the event of a favorable Soviet reply that would permit the prompt establishment of EITO, the Commission might be dropped as soon as EITO could be got functioning.

(d) Unlike Ronald’s proposal, it does not commit us to a course of action which might end up in a western European regional arrangement, with all the political implications that are attached thereto, and thus permits us to defer our decision on such a course of action.

(e) If the Soviets reject our proposal, we will, nevertheless, have risked nothing, and our position will be no worse than it is now (aside from possible political implications, as to which we are not in a position to express ourselves).

An outline of our proposed basis for revision of the draft agreement, which we believe acceptable to the British, will be submitted shortly. We believe, as indicated in our 9446 of November 1, that the Continental Allies will accept any reasonable compromise agreed to by the United States, United Kingdom and USSR.

You may wish to show this to Mr. Winant. [EITO Delegation.]

Gallman