840.70/11–1044: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 10—4:55 p.m.]
9799. Part 1. ReDepts 9344 of November 8. At the reception at the Soviet Embassy on November 7 on the anniversary of the October revolution, General Obydin stated separately to Hurcomb and Hooker that he felt sure we would come to an understanding on the EITO agreement. Khachaturov has also asked Ronald for information on certain technical questions, implying future discussion. Since there has been no confirmation of the rumor referred to in our 9603 of November 577 that the Soviet Delegation might leave, and the comment on which the rumor was based appears to have referred to the possibility only of a single individual leaving, we feel that there is no immediate danger of the departure of the Soviet Delegation.
In response to Department’s point 1, perhaps it should have been made clearer that the Ronald formula calls for the complete liberation of the territory of the Government in question. While it is, of course, possible that the Russians may take the position envisaged by the Department that the Committee of Liberation should be regarded as eligible to become a signatory when only a part of Poland is liberated, this would simply constitute a rejection of the Ronald formula. Such rejection is, of course, possible but we feel it is the only formula so far advanced that makes it possible for the Russians, if they wish, to go ahead with the EITO agreement pending a settlement of the Polish issue. We consider it worthwhile on that account, provided we have assured ourselves in advance that it will be sufficiently acceptable to the other Continental Allies.
As to Department’s points 2, 3 and 4, Ronald proposes to avoid the danger of appearing to confront the Continental Allies with a fait accompli by discussing the redraft of the agreement, including [Page 857] the Ronald formula, first with the French, and by securing their aid in presenting it to the other Continental Allies, before presenting it to the Soviets. In general, we all feel that the Continental Allies will go along with anything reasonable on which they consider the United States, United Kingdom and USSR are likely to be in agreement, especially if we keep closely enough in touch with them on an informal basis to avoid offending their sensibilities.
As to Department’s point 5, the Interim Commission is prevented from functioning on a bipartite basis by the British failure formally to appoint Barrington-Ward to the Commission. The British now say he is merely their nominee for the EITO Executive Board, although at the first tripartite meeting they stated Barrington-Ward would be their Interim Commissioner.
The British have claimed that the original reason for creating the Commission, i.e. the likelihood of a long delay in setting up EITO, no longer exists. The facts speak for themselves on this point. They also claim that the necessity for associating the Continental Allies in the work to be done makes the Interim Commission as originally planned inappropriate. This we do not regard as valid. The Commission setup can obviously be molded in any way that seems appropriate to meet the needs of the occasion. The British have conveniently forgotten their assent to the joint support by the United States and USSR to the prompt setting up of the Commission, expressed at the first tripartite meeting with the Soviets over a month ago. (The Soviets, it is true, have never mentioned the Commission subsequently, except once 2 weeks later when asked when their Interim Commissioner would be appointed and they replied, “soon”.)
Part 2. We believe that Ronald’s proposal for sounding out the Continental Allies on the proposed redraft of the agreement, including the Ronald formula, is in substantial conformity with the procedure proposed by the Department save only that it does not involve circularizing the delegations by letter and it expressly contemplates ascertaining the views of the Continental Allies before discussing our proposals with the Soviets.
Part 3. Ronald also now believes that in the event of general concurrence in the redraft of the agreement, there should be some sort of final convening of the Main Committee or of the Conference, which the Soviets need not attend if they do not care to sit at the same table as the Poles. While we question the desirability of this procedure, the issue has not yet presented itself and we mention it merely for information.
- Not printed.↩