840.70/11–1544: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:35 p.m.]
9978. At a meeting last evening, November 14, with Ronald and Noel-Baker, the former read aloud the text of the Department’s proposed reply to the Soviet note received from the British Embassy in Washington and characterized it as a “soft answer”. He made it clear that the sharp answer favored by the Foreign Office is based on considerations having nothing to do with EITO, and that, so far as EITO is concerned, a soft answer would be more likely to bring about ultimate Soviet participation. In accordance with the Department’s instructions (Department’s 9526 of November 13) and having no other information, we offered no comment.
2. We are in agreement with the procedure outlined in the second section of the Department’s 9526, and do not consider it substantially incompatible with the procedure envisaged by the Foreign Office as reported in the second section of the Embassy’s 9879 of November 12.
The Department’s proposal that all the delegations be informally advised that informal discussions will be held, and that this information be conveyed prior to the delivery of the United States and United Kingdom replies to the Soviet notes, was not contemplated by the Foreign Office, but judging from Ronald’s comments last evening, we do not believe it will be opposed by the Foreign Office.
We believe that the extent to which Massigli can be useful in the discussions with other Continental Allies cannot be ascertained until we have first talked with him. We assume that the Department will have no objection to making use of his good offices to the extent that they may appear to be useful. We have not, however, committed ourselves to the use of Massigli and will be in a position to deal directly with the Continental Allies if the Department should feel that it is for any reason undesirable to use the French.
Ronald made it clear that the Foreign Office “will insist” that at least further meeting either of the Main Committee or the Conference [Page 868] be held, stating it to be necessary out of courtesy to the Continental Allies but in our opinion actually as an indication of British refusal to be influenced by Soviet insistence on excluding the Polish Government. It appears that the present Foreign Office view is that such a meeting should be held very soon after the start of informal discussions. They envisage that a drafting committee composed of United States, United Kingdom, French, Dutch and Czech representatives might be appointed (on the assumption that the USSR will not be present); and that it might not be necessary subsequently to reconvene the Main Committee or the Conference again. We believe that if a meeting of the Main Committee or the Conference is to be held at all, it would be best to hold it after substantial agreement has been informally arrived at on the text of the EITO document; such a meeting would then be merely a formal gesture and considerably less likely to give offense to the Soviets than a meeting held at the outset of the informal discussions.
3. In response to the query in the last sentence of the Department’s 9526, EITO would come into being upon signature of the agreement by those governments eligible to sign under Article XI as redrafted. At present besides the United States, United Kingdom and USSR, France is eligible, and we are informed that Belgium and Greece shortly will be.
Ronald advises that the Foreign Office has again redrafted Article XI with a view to defining adequately the relations of the organization to prospective members not yet eligible to become signatories under section 2 of the Article. In general the purpose is to make clear that the organization will plan for the benefit of prospective as well as current members and that they may be brought into the activities of the organization in advance of actual membership as may appear desirable. This may answer some of the doubts about the Ronald formula, implied in the penultimate sentence of Department’s 9526.
The Ronald formula would not affect the functioning of EITO so far as signatory governments are concerned. As to governments whose accession to membership is deferred under the formula, the functions of the organization could be more clearly defined by the latest revision of Article XI which we expect to receive shortly from the Foreign Office. Article XI has not yet been approved by the Foreign Minister but is to be presented to him in the immediate future. Since the above-mentioned Foreign Office redraft of the Article does not affect the eligibility provisions which are the substance of the so-called “Ronald formula”, we should appreciate an early indication from the Department whether or not it approves of this formula. It should then be possible to give the informal notification to the other delegations recommended by the Department, [Page 869] and when and if an acceptance in principle by the Department of the new text of the agreement is received, we can commence informal discussions, probably beginning with Massigli.
4. Both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of War Transport remain adamant in opposition to the Interim Commission. Ronald was especially emphatic and stated that in his opinion progress could only be made if the idea of the Interim Commission was dropped altogether. Their argument is as follows:
The draft directive presupposes acceptance of the draft agreement by the big three but in fact the USSR has not accepted the draft agreement in substance whereas the Continental Allies have. It is likely therefore that the draft directive would have to be modified to secure Soviet participation, which would cause delay; and in any event it is hardly worth while arranging for finance and staff and other detailed arrangements unless the Commission is to have a life of several months. But the Commission could not be established on a tripartite basis as originally conceived since at least France would now have to be included. Other Allied Governments would have ground for complaint after Soviet refusal to cooperate in the organization if a body is set up in which the Soviets participate and from which they are excluded. The Soviets may well prefer to retain the Commission, since it is only advisory, and sabotage the setting up of EITO. The participation of France may cause jealousy by the other European Governments which might jeopardize their cooperation in a future organization. Moreover, the Commission would have no authority in territories where the responsibility for transport has been handed over to the national government except with that government’s cooperation. There are also manifold disadvantages in including France but excluding the USSR.
We stated that we could not drop the idea of the Interim Commission as proposed by Ronald, and reemphasized the Department’s feeling that it should be promptly established in order to meet immediate needs. In particular, we stated our belief that the Interim Commission is a flexible instrument no less apt than any other that might be devised for taking full account of the interests and sensibilities of the Continental Allies. We suggested that if the British insist on not having the Interim Commission, they give us some definite indication of what they propose as a substitute, which we can present to the Department. They agreed to do this and will shortly give us a statement of a proposed interim agreement.
5. During the discussion both Noel-Baker and Ronald spoke in the most resentful terms of the Soviet attitude on the whole EITO question. They stated several times that an invitation to the Soviets to come into the Interim Commission while the question of Poland was still in abeyance would in effect take away from the force of Mr. [Page 870] Eden’s strong oral statement to Mr. Gousev as reported in Embassy’s 9807 of November 10.
We believe that in essence the Foreign Office opposition to the Interim Commission as well as their insistence upon another formal meeting of the Conference or Main Committee is related to their feeling that stiff, uncompromising attitude must be maintained against the Soviets for broad political reasons. Therefore, we feel that the attitude of the Foreign Office on these points can only be influenced by representations made directly to Eden under specific instructions.