860C.01/8–2344: Telegram
The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 24—3:05 a.m.]
Polish Series [No.] 80. I had a 2-hour talk with Premier Mikolajczyk this evening. I saw him at his request.
I asked him how he was. He said he was all right but this did not apply to the situation. The state of affairs in Warsaw was a serious problem. On August 21 he had received a message from the Vice [Page 1390] Premier and Government delegate in Poland12 and the chairman of the Council of National Unity13 there saying that as the Government seemed unable to obtain aid for Warsaw it should resign.
Two days later in telegram 3081, Ambassador Harriman further declared that “in our long term relations with the Soviets I feel that whenever they take action of which we strongly disapprove we should impress our views on them as firmly as possible and show our displeasure. It is only by such procedure that I would have confidence that we can eventually find common ground”. (740.0011 European War 1939/8–1944)
Mikolajczyk reviewed the position regarding aid given Warsaw. He said 134 planes carrying supplies had been sent to Poland since the rising started. Twenty-three had been lost including three that crashed on their return to their base. Thirty-four had actually flown to Warsaw. The rest had stopped at intermediate places. The Polish insurgents reported receiving 77% of what was dropped. This aid was useful. But 150 flights had been scheduled for this period. The planes sent therefore did not equal the number regularly scheduled.
After August 16 he continued, Polish crews only were allowed to fly to Poland. The English crews went as far as Italy. The Poles were allowed four crews nightly. From August 16 to 20 no planes flew to Warsaw due to operational difficulties. On each August 20 and 21 one Polish crew flew as far as Warsaw, the remaining three dropped their supplies in forests some distance away but this material was useful nevertheless. But the sum total of supplies was not adequate for the needs.
Mikolajczyk said that on August 21 he saw Eden and made two suggestions. He asked for additional planes. He suggested one large operation which would provide the Polish forces in Warsaw with enough material to fight for a fortnight. He also suggested that if British air crews could not be used, Polish air crews should be allowed to undertake the task. He also asked the British to issue a statement recognizing the Polish underground army as a military force with combatant rights as had been done with the Maquis in France.
At a further meeting with Eden and Sinclair, British Air Minister, next day, Mikolajczyk was told the British War Cabinet had decided it was not practicable to send the desired large operational flight. When Mikolajczyk proposed 14 Polish crews nightly instead of 4, Sinclair said that from the military point of view he could not agree to this, but if it were politically necessary he would agree. But in that case he would not order the competent air marshal to permit this but would advise him to do so. To Mikolajczyk’s enquiry whether the British could supply the necessary machines, Sinclair said he thought the machines were available. But SOI14 said that only four machines could be made available each night.
Mikolajczyk said he was seeing Eden again tomorrow. He hoped then to have a reply on the two points raised, namely (a) the additional [Page 1391] crews and planes, and (b) combatant rights. If he could obtain them he thought this would enable him to counteract the present attitude of the political elements in Warsaw.
The military situation there, he said, was still not hopeless. The Polish forces had even gained ground recently. They had captured some munitions from the Germans. He mentioned 11,000 rifles and 6,000 hand grenades.
He felt there was no hope of securing Soviet permission for use of the American shuttle service to assist Warsaw. He said the situation was growing particularly difficult as there were many wounded and a growing shortage of food, and such an expedition could provide badly-need medicines and condensed foods.
Passing to the problem of Polish-Soviet relations Mikolajczyk said the Polish Cabinet had yesterday drawn up its counter proposals. (He would provide the United States and British Governments with a translation tomorrow for their secret information.) A definite decision on them had not yet been taken.15 They had been referred to the underground authorities in Poland. The telegram went last night and he expects an answer in a day or two. It was considered essential to do this for two reasons. Opinion there was inflamed against the Government because of its inability to secure a greater measure of help for Warsaw. It was also wrought up because of recent mass arrests by the Soviet authorities of Polish underground military and civilian personnel.
The latter question was acute. He planned shortly to send to United States and the British a confidential memorandum on the subject. On this point the Government was confronted with a dilemma. He referred to the orders to the underground to disclose themselves to the Russian troops when they should enter Poland and to cooperate with them. They had been told that if arrested the Polish Government would bring the matter before public opinion. To do so now however would end the possibility of any Polish-Soviet arrangement.
Mikolajczyk said the Polish Government’s proposals sought to meet most of the points which the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the National Council had raised when he was in Moscow. But he had attempted to preserve the legal thread (as described in my 73 August 1816) and to assure that the new government which should be formed in Poland should be appointed by the President. He thought the proposals were framed in such a way that the problem of personalities would not be a hindrance.
Mikolajczyk thought there was a chance of Soviet acceptance of the proposals. He did not think that members of the National Council [Page 1392] would of themselves do so. But he thought there was just a chance that Stalin would. He had three reasons for believing in this possibility. The first was his belief that Stalin desired good relations with the United States and Britain. He would be influenced by their attitude toward the legal Polish Government and by British and American public opinion. Secondly, in his opinion Stalin desired to assure peaceful conditions in the rear of the Soviet forces. Thirdly, he thought Stalin feared the rising of a new Germany in time and desired a stable relationship with Poland.
Mikolajczyk said the Socialists in the Cabinet had opposed the counter proposals. They felt the Russians would not keep their word. The Government would be the prisoner of the Soviets. Mikolajczyk had said to them “This was possible, indeed very possible” but the Polish Government could not prevent the communizing of Poland from outside. He felt that if Stalin were “not quite determined” to communize Poland, they could accomplish more from inside than outside. He recognized all the risks, both personal and political. He felt that the Government’s proposals which sought to preserve the legal position and to assure at least equal strength of the Democratic Parties with the Communist Party in the Government offered some possibility of preventing communization of the country. He was sure, on the other hand, that if the situation were left exclusively to the Soviet-sponsored National Council backed by Russia and the Red Army, a Communist system in Poland was a distinct possibility.
Mikolajczyk said that two of the three Socialist members of the Cabinet (Stanczyk17 and Grosfeld18) had been inclined to agree with his reasoning but had been obliged to vote with the Vice Premier (Kwapinski19) against the proposals because the executive committee of the Socialist Party had so decided. The difficulties were consequently many.
- Jan Jankowski. By a decree of the President of Poland on September 1, 1942, a delegate of the Polish Government in Exile at London represented the Prime Minister in German-occupied Poland, and was also a member of the Cabinet.↩
- Kazimierz Puzak.↩
- Signal Operations Instructions (Army).↩
- The text of the final Polish proposals to the Soviet Government is contained in Polish Series telegram 88, August 30, from Moscow, p. 1315.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Jan Stanczyk, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.↩
- Ludwik Grosfeld, Minister of Finance.↩
- Jan Kwapinski, Vice Premier and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Shipping.↩