740.00119 EAC/9–1944: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 20—12:01 a.m.]
7775. Comea 91. Most of today’s meeting of the European Advisory Commission was devoted to further consideration of Bulgarian armistice terms. In the absence of the further instructions referred to in Department’s 7492, (September 14, midnight) and of comment on my telegrams 7630 (September 15, midnight), 7654 (September 16, 6 p.m.) and 7680 (September 17, midnight), I reserved my position on the proposals presented. The Soviet delegate was likewise not prepared to comment on the British proposal (my 7680, September 17, midnight) for making Bulgarian evacuation of Allied territory a precondition for signing an armistice.
The United Kingdom delegation presented a new draft of article I, to replace articles I, II and V of the United States-United Kingdom [Page 425] draft and article I of the Soviet draft (my 7503, September 12, 11 p.m.) as follows:
“Part 1. Bulgaria having ceased hostilities with the USSR on blank date and severed relations with Germany on blank date will cease hostilities against all the other United Nations and will sever relations with Germany’s satellites.
Part 2. Bulgaria will disarm the German Armed Forces in Bulgaria and hand them over as prisoners of war. The Bulgarian Government will also intern nationals of Germany and her satellites.
Part 3. The Bulgarian Government will maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In no circumstances will any such forces be used on Allied territory without the prior consent of the Allied Government concerned.
Part 4. The Bulgarian Government will carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization as may be prescribed by the Allies, and will hold Bulgarian war material at the disposal of the Allies.”
With regard to part 1 of this article, United Kingdom delegate felt strongly that Bulgaria should be obligated specifically to cease hostilities against United Nations other than Russia and to sever relations with the satellites; his Government had no knowledge whether Bulgaria had in fact taken these steps. Part 4, he continued, was needed to provide a basis for disarming whatever Bulgarian forces were not used under Soviet direction.
Discussion centered around part 3 of new United Kingdom draft of article I. Strang stressed the disquiet of the British public, and even more of Greece and Yugoslavia, if Bulgaria were recognized formally as co-belligerent as provided under Soviet article I. New British draft was designed to provide for use of Bulgarian forces under Soviet command without granting formal co-belligerency and under restriction that such forces could not be used on territory of an Ally without prior consent of that Ally. If the Bulgarians were enabled to present themselves as liberators of Greek or Yugoslav territory, the effect on the public would be deplorable and it might be difficult to get the Bulgarian forces out of those areas. I questioned whether a defeated country could be compelled to provide forces against the common enemy without granting it co-belligerent status, and informally approved the idea that Bulgarian forces should be used on the territory of an Ally only with consent of that Ally. The Soviet delegate insisted on the interest of all the Allies to secure Bulgaria’s maximum effort against Germany both for the material advantages involved and for the political effect of discrediting the Nazi puppet leaders in the satellites. He pointed out that since Bulgaria has already entered the war against Germany, the Bulgarian people must be told that the aim of their struggle is to restore their independence and sovereignty. The formula of co-belligerency, he [Page 426] felt, placed no obligations on the victors in either the Bulgarian or the Rumanian case. I reminded the Commission that from the beginning my Government had proposed a declaration on Bulgarian independence to accompany the armistice, and stated that it was reasonable to accept Bulgarian aid in destroying the common enemy because we were all interested in saving lives of Allied soldiers, and that it was our desire to find a formula which would provide for this without hurting the pride and interests of Allies who had long supported our cause. Strang suggested including in part 3 of his new article I a statement of the number of Bulgarian divisions to be used as well as the Soviet reference to “for the purpose of restoring her independence and sovereignty”.
In the Soviet article I the United Kingdom delegate objected specifically to the words “has gone to war and will wage war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and her satellites” as a formal recognition of co-belligerency. He felt the Rumanian and Bulgarian cases were not comparable since two Allied peoples had suffered under Bulgarian oppression; Bulgaria, which had had a series of tricky governments, ought not to be allowed through these maneuvers to achieve formal co-belligerent status. This part of the discussion closed with the Soviet delegate insisting on his draft of article I, and the British unwilling to accept it.
A new draft of article XIII was proposed by the British, as follows:
“Part 1. The Bulgarian Government will carry out the instructions of the Allies for giving effect to the armistice, the interpretation of which will be laid down by the Allies. The Bulgarian Government will give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send to Bulgaria and will meet any further Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security.
Part 2. An Allied Control Commission, of which the Soviet member will be chairman, will be set up to regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms and to communicate to the Bulgarian Government the instructions and further requirements of the Allies mentioned in part 1 above.”
British pointed out similarity of part 1 to part 17 of Rumanian Armistice; they attached importance to the provision for further instructions relating to fulfillment of the armistice terms and of Allied requirements for peace and security. Strang explained that part 2 provided for a tripartite commission, with each Power having an equal share and the Soviet member serving as permanent chairman, but not under the direction of the Soviet High Command. Gousev felt that the new British draft might apply under normal armistice conditions followed by general cessation of hostilities. Since, however, Bulgaria must wage war on Germany, the Control Commission [Page 427] must, he stated, be subject to the Commander in Chief in charge of operations in that area. The British delegate expressed doubt that active hostilities against Germany would take place on any considerable scale on Bulgarian territory. Throughout the discussion Gousev laid repeated stress on subordinating all other aims to that of using every possible force, including Bulgarian, for the earliest possible defeat of Germany.
With regard to signature, Strang stated United Kingdom Government was considering possibility of double signature by the Soviet Commander and SACMED, if signature by latter on behalf of United Kingdom and United States was agreeable to the United States Government. Strang expressed willingness to consider Ankara as the place of negotiation, while Gousev continued to prefer Moscow.