851.01/3912: Telegram

The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

1837. From Murphy. Gabriel Puaux, French Resident General in Morocco, who lunched yesterday with General de Gaulle told me last evening that FCNL had decided to arrest “a number” of Arab Nationalists in French Morocco for anti-French agitation. He said he hoped this would cause no unfavorable comment or reaction in the United States similar he said to certain reactions regarding past events in the Lebanon. I inquired whether the alleged agitation had assumed dangerous proportions and Puaux replied in the affirmative. I asked whether foreign inspiration was at the root of it and he declared that undoubtedly German and Spanish influences are at work. Puaux said where it was found that enemy connections existed death penalties would be invoked.

Puaux as did Massigli earlier in the evening (see my 1835 June 4, 9 p.m.9) referred to mounting criticism and doubt on part of the FCNL in Algiers and many French officials regarding American policy toward France and especially General de Gaulle. Puaux said “you know I am not exactly Gaullist in my views and I have retained a certain independence but when I find de Gaulle full of suspicion concerning American intentions and furious because it appears that in London the Americans will not be prepared to discuss French affairs with de Gaulle on a governmental level as will the British then I begin to wonder where we are going”.

I thought it might be well to emphasize to Puaux as I did to Massigli that very possibly continued French criticism would succeed in arousing unfavorable American reaction. Many Americans believe I pointed out that the United States is making a very important contribution at great expense of blood and treasure toward the liberation of France and its people. On the front in Italy from which I returned last evening perfect harmony reigns between French and [Page 698] American forces who are fighting side by side. In Algiers, however, the effects of a French inferiority complex (mentioned by both Massigli and Puaux) are manifest at every turn and have been since arrival in this area of General de Gaulle, marked by suspicion of Anglo-American motives and harping criticism of our military, economic, financial and political performance.

The facts that the United States has rearmed and helped train a new French Army, is rebuilding the French Navy, is supplying this theater of operations with the bulk of its supplies, has cooperated loyally with the FCNL in territories acknowledging [its?] jurisdiction, has publicly declared that its political purpose in France is to see a free and happy French people at full liberty to choose its own governmental institutions and personalities and to cooperate with the French in the relief and rehabilitation of the county—these do not seem to satisfy.

I also referred to fact that in London de Gaulle has access to General Eisenhower who has the President’s confidence and authority, as well as Ambassadors Winant and Phillips on the civil side both of whom surely have adequate rank and prestige to satisfy General de Gaulle’s sense of the proprieties. Should General de Gaulle decide to proceed to Washington after London he would unquestionably receive a dignified and appropriate reception. But the difficulty in all this, my contacts agreed, is that de Gaulle insists on American recognition of himself as head of Government of France. At that point his ideas and American policy seem to clash. Is the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs that one man seeks to dominate the French picture and if not permitted to have his own way in all things he proposed to gain his points by employing a technique of blackmail and threats on the slightest provocation? Frenchmen who disagree are ruthlessly suppressed as witness yesterday’s order consigning Senator Mallarmé at 70 years of age to forced residence in Algeria. We know that de Gaullist elements in North Africa for months have carried on a subtle campaign against Americans casting suspicion on American motives for example the whispering campaign that the United States intended to keep Morocco and that American troops would never leave there. When our troops left Morocco the same circles commenced stories that the Americans were buying up railways and public utilities and intended to dominate the economic life of French North Africa. The press under de Gaulle’s influence frequently maintains a subtle anti-American line and has done so for a long time. We fared at least as well under the Vichy press as rotten as it was. Under the present system of course we are permitted to supply the newsprint.

[Page 699]

Men like Massigli and Puaux are fully conscious of these things. They advance the reason, which I believe correct, that the French are torn by anxiety regarding their homeland, who suffer from the tortured mentality of exiles whose nerves are frayed as a result of humiliation and fears of uncertainty and privation. They suggest that even de Gaulle once his feet are planted again on French metropolitan soil will relax. Right now Franco-American relations suffer and it is to be recommended that we be as tolerant and kind as is our tradition.

Repeated to London. By courier to Tangier, Beirut, and Rabat. [Murphy.]

Chapin
  1. Infra.