740.00119 E.W./1–1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

127. Preliminary discussions on the Hungarian armistice were resumed yesterday afternoon. The Department’s 82, January 12, 9 p.m., was fortunately received just prior to the meeting.

The results of the discussion were as follows:

1. Preamble. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government wished the armistice to be signed not by Malinovski but by Voroshilov5 who he said would also be chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. I would appreciate receiving specific authorization to address a letter to Marshal Voroshilov authorizing him to sign the armistice for the Government of the United States. The Department will note that according to the Soviet plan, of which I approve, there will be only two signatures to the document, that of Voroshilov and that of the Hungarian representative. This will make it possible to avoid the cumbersome procedure of the alternate.

2. On the first 11 articles there were no further differences of opinion.

3. With respect to second paragraph of Article XI to satisfy the British the final reading of the second part of the paragraph was agreed as follows: “… will in case of need ensure the use and regulation of the work of industrial and transportation enterprises, means of communication, power stations, enterprises and installations of public utilities, stores of fuel and other materials in accordance with instructions issued by the Allied (Soviet) High Command or the Allied Control Commission.” The Department will note that the words “on Hungarian territory” have been dropped.

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4. Molotov agreed to the British proposal to include in the annex, with reference to Article XI, a clause about assets, to read as follows: “The Government of Hungary will not permit the disposal of external Hungarian assets or the disposal of international Hungarian assets to foreign governments or foreign nationals without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command or the Allied Control Commission.” I accepted this proposal.

5. With respect to Article XII:

(a)
Balfour questioned the wording of the additional paragraph which the Soviets, at my request, had undertaken to restore (reEmbs [reDepts] 37, January 6, 7 p.m., paragraph 3). After some discussion we agreed that the wording would follow that of the Bulgarian agreement. The sentence will thus read as follows: “Compensation will be paid by Hungary for loss and damage caused by the war to other Allied States and their nationals in Hungary, the amount of compensation to be fixed at a later date.”
(b)
On the question of having it specified in the armistice that reparations should be valued at 1938 prices plus agreed percentages, disagreement continued between the British and the Russians, Balfour maintaining his Government’s position that this should be clearly stated in order to avoid ambiguity and misleading of public opinion, Molotov on the other hand being reluctant to depart from the Rumanian and Finnish precedents. Molotov grudgingly agreed at my suggestion that the Hungarians should be informed verbally of this intention before signature of armistice. Balfour undertook to report this to his Government.
(c)
It was agreed that Article I of the protocol should go into the annexes where it will form the third paragraph of Annex D to Article XII. The wording of this provision, however, has been modified as follows. It will now read: “… make available certain food and other supplies required for relief and rehabilitation of the population of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, et cetera.” I agreed to this modification.

6. Articles XIII to XVII, inclusive, produced no further comment.

7. With respect to the Control Commission the discussion of the rights and privileges of the American and British representatives was continued at length and grievances were freely aired on both sides. In discussing the analogy with Italy, Molotov was [at] pains to point out that the Soviet Government had learned from the press of the recent announcement by the President and Prime Minister to the effect that the word “control” should be dropped from the designation of the Allied Control Commission in Italy.6 The upshot of the discussion of the rights of our representatives with respect to policy directives in [Page 974] the two periods was that Molotov refused to depart in any way from the position set forth in the Soviet draft. I consequently agreed to the first part of Article IV of the proposed statutes as set forth in the Soviet draft but emphasized in the strongest way our desire to avoid a situation where our representative would learn only after their promulgation of decisions taken in the name of the Allied Governments and would be then obliged to disassociate our Government from these decisions. Balfour likewise stated that his Government would agree to this point but only with a reservation which he would embody in a letter of the right to disassociate itself from any action of the Commission with which it might disagree. His Government hoped that there would be no occasion to express such disassociation but felt it necessary to reserve the right to do so. With regard to the second part of Article IV dealing with the second period, since Molotov was unwilling to admit any formula envisaging our prior approval of or concurrence with policy directives, Molotov proposed that this paragraph be omitted entirely, to which I assented with the understanding that the entire subject was thus left open for future discussion. To this Molotov agreed. Balfour was unable to agree to this and undertook to go back at his Government.

With respect to the privileges, Balfour had stronger instructions than I and we both pressed these points energetically. We obtained from Molotov firm assurances that the provision concerning freer movement of our representatives would be interpreted as liberally in Hungary as in the case of the Soviet representative in Italy, and we would be able to determine the size of our own staffs during the second period. We also obtained his agreement that there should be added to section 5 (h), which accords to the American and British representatives the right to communicate directly in code with their respective Governments, a further phrase which would recognize their right to courier communication by air by arrangement with the local Soviet commander.

On these points, too, Balfour was obliged to reserve the position of his Government. I stated that while we would prefer to see these points covered with greater clarity in the statutes, I would not insist thereon. I made it clear that I was taking this position in the belief that the Soviet authorities would be generous in their interpretation of these points and would see that due respect was paid throughout to the needs of our representatives. Molotov gave definite assurances on these lines. I said that I felt considerable relief on this score since learning that Marshal Voroshilov was to be the chairman of the Commission and I was sure that our representative would be able to work out all difficulties satisfactorily with him. While I did not say this to Molotov it is my expectation that Voroshilov will have greater [Page 975] independence of action and a wider view of his responsibilities towards us than the chairmen of the Control Commissions in Rumania and Bulgaria. It may well be that his appointment at this late date was due to my strong protest a week ago over our treatment in Sofia and Bucharest.

8. Balfour proposed two new wordings for Article XIX of which the second was finally accepted by all of us. It reads as follows: “The Vienna arbitration award of second November, 1938, and the Vienna award of thirtieth August, 1940, are hereby declared to be null and void.” This wording should therefore be substituted for the wording of Article XIX as previously telegraphed.

9. With respect to the question of making available to all three Allied Governments military information obtained from the Hungarians, Molotov agreed at a previous meeting that although he did not wish to see this stated in the protocol he would be willing to give me a letter at the time of signature of the armistice containing this undertaking on the side of the Soviet authorities.

10. It has been agreed that we will present the terms of the armistice (please note that this does not include the protocol) to the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs tomorrow, January 15.

11. As the Department will see we are now in agreement with the Russians on all points of both armistice and protocol subject to the submission of my two letters of reservation on the reparations and Control Commission questions, respectively. There remains only the clarification of the British attitude on the question of specifying the [19]38 prices and on certain points of the statutes of the Control Commission. For the Department’s convenience, I shall soon send a complete text of the draft statutes as now agreed by the Russians and ourselves.

Harriman
  1. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Assistant Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.
  2. For statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, September 26, 1944, see Department of State Bulletin, October 1, 1944, p. 338.