740.00119 E.W./1–1545: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 17—4:40 p.m.]
142. Molotov, Balfour and I met this afternoon with the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Ambassadors7 to hear the comments of the latter with respect to the draft Hungarian armistice terms which had been sent to them yesterday for their consideration.
[Page 977]1. The Czechoslovak Ambassador had four points to make. They were as follows:
(a) He considered that Article II should set forth the principle that Hungarians who had formerly had Czechoslovak citizenship and who might be deprived of the same would be recognized by Hungary as Hungarian citizens and admitted to Hungary, that Hungary would look after them from the moment of their crossing the Hungarian frontier, would see to their resettlement and would take all appropriate measures of a legislative and administrative character to this end. He explained that there would be many of these Hungarians, members of the former Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia who would be regarded as collaborationists by the loyal Czechoslovak population and that the Czechoslovak Government for humanitarian reasons wished to be able to get rid of them promptly and avoid bloodshed.
Balfour stated that in the opinion of his Government this related to the movement of populations and was therefore more suitable for treatment in the peace settlement. After some discussion in the course of which it developed that there was no telling how many people this might affect it was agreed that the proposal was too vague for inclusion in the armistice agreement but might well be the subject of further discussion between the governments concerned and authorities at a later date. The Czechoslovak Ambassador asked that our Government be informed of the interest of his Government in this question, not only with respect to Hungary but with respect to Germany as well.
(b) He asked that there be added to the agreement the additional phrase which appeared in Article II of the Bulgarian agreement and which read as follows: “and to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation in Bulgaria of Greek or Yugoslav territory.” This proposal was accepted. In the present agreement it will of course read “incorporation in Hungary of Yugoslav or Czechoslovak territory.” The words will follow immediately on those of Article II as part of the same sentence.
(c) He asked that there be stipulated in the agreement the exact moment from which Czechoslovakia has been at war with Hungary and proposed in this connection either October 7, 1938, on which date the first act of Hungarian aggression had been committed, or November 3, 1938, the date of the first Vienna Award. He explained that his Government was afraid the Hungarians might dispute the legal existence of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state at the time of Hungary’s actual entry into the war on the side of Germany and would therefore plead that Hungary could not have been at war with Czechoslovakia.
Balfour’s instructions did not permit him to agree to this proposal. [Page 978] He suggested tentatively however that the difficulty might be solved if we were to add to article I (a) after the words “other United Nations” the words “including Czechoslovakia.” This proposal commended itself to the rest of us and Balfour undertook to ask his Government whether he might agree to it formally.
(d) He asked that Czechoslovak representatives be admitted to the Control Commission in Hungary. Molotov stated that his Government had no objection to this. Balfour and I both stated that our instructions permitted us to agree that Czechoslovak and Yugoslav representatives should have access to the Commission. We were not sure that we could agree to their being actually a part of it. It was finally agreed that nothing should be put into the armistice to this effect but that Molotov should address a letter to the two Ambassadors assuring them that their representatives would enjoy access to the Commission in questions of interest to their respective Governments.
The Yugoslav Ambassador then explained that while he had instructions from Subasić8 he was not quite sure whether that went for Marshal Tito as well.9 He was waiting to find out. Molotov took occasion to point out that this was an excellent object lesson of the need for greater unity in the Yugoslav Government.
Acting on his incomplete instructions, the Yugoslav Ambassador then advanced two proposals. The first was that the armistice should include an obligation of [on?] the part of Hungary to renounce once and for all her aspirations to the Yugoslav territory occupied by her during this war. This proposal met with no one’s approval and was rejected. The second proposal related to the obligation of Hungary to deliver up war criminals who had committed crimes on Yugoslav territory. To meet this proposal, Molotov suggested that article VI be slightly amended, to read as follows: “Hungary will cooperate in the apprehension and trial, as well as the surrender to the governments concerned, of persons accused of war crimes.” This suggestion was accepted.
The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Ambassadors then withdrew and we proceeded with the tripartite discussion of the armistice terms and protocol. Molotov began by stating that the Soviet Government had decided to accede to the wish of the British Government that the character of the prices for evaluation of reparations deliveries be specified in the agreement.
[Page 979]It was agreed that a suitable clause should be included in the annexes. The exact wording is to be worked out tomorrow, and I shall wire it as soon as we know it.
Proceeding to the statutes of the Control Commission, Molotov then inquired whether, if the Soviet Government would accept the wording for the first paragraph of Article IV which I had proposed at the last meeting (see Department’s 82, January 12, 9 p.m.) (second paragraph), and agree to omit entirely the further paragraph relating to the second period we would then be able to dispense with written reservations. I told him that I would not be obliged to make any written reservation with respect to the first paragraph, although I would still have to give him a letter similar to that which Mr. Winant had addressed to his colleague on the ETC [EAC]10 in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice. Molotov found this satisfactory, and it was agreed that it should rest this way, subject to the final approval of the British Government, which Balfour was not yet able to give. (In connection with this gratifying concession on the Soviet side, I think I should explain that although Molotov, as already reported in my 127, January 14, 4 p.m., declined to agree to our proposed wording when it was first presented to him, I asked him at that time to take it away with him and give it further study, expressing my belief that if the Soviet Government would examine it carefully they would see that it took full account of the needs and interests of the Soviet Commander. I believe that this may have accounted for the reconsideration of the proposal on the part of the Soviets.)
Turning to the question of the privileges of the American and British representatives, Molotov said that the Soviet Government had decided to accept the principle, embodied in our original draft, that each of our representatives should be entitled to determine the size and composition of its staff and that they would not insist on this being agreed with the Chairman of the Control Commission. He likewise accepted our redraft of point 5 (h), concerning privileges of communication, which now envisages courier as well as code communication and gives our representative the specific right to receive and despatch diplomatic couriers by air, at regular intervals, in agreement with the Soviet Commander. Balfour was still not able to agree to the statutes; but he was, like myself, highly gratified at Molotov’s last minute concessions, and I think his Government should not now find it difficult to agree to the remaining points at issue.
As soon as final agreement has been reached with the British Government, we will arrange for presentation of the terms to the Hungarians.
- Zdenek Fierlinger and Stanoje Simić, respectively.↩
- Ivan Subasić, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, at London.↩
- In November 1944, Prime Minister Subasić and Marshal Tito reached agreement on the establishment of a united government in Yugoslavia. For correspondence, see vol. iv, section under Yugoslavia entitled “Concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia”.↩
- For text of letter, see telegram 9077, October 22, midnight, from London, p. 472.↩