865.01/2186: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
602. Your 836, March 13, midnight. You should see Molotov if possible and if not Vyshinski concerning the Italian recognition. You should explain that the entire machinery of control in Italy, including the Allied Control Commission, the Advisory Council for Italy, and, of course, Allied Military Government, was carefully designed, worked out, and developed as a military instrument and necessity. This whole structure and development is designed to implement the supreme authority of the Allied Commander in Chief and to protect the Allied military operations in Italy against the Nazi enemy. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean theater, is the supreme authority in liberated Italy. As the Soviet Government knows, General Alexander, as a result of delegation of authority by General Wilson, is the President of the Allied Control Commission and Military Governor of those areas under Allied Military Government in Italy. In the territories under Allied Military Government the authority of the Italian Government is temporarily suspended. In Sicily, Sardinia, and the Southern provinces which have been restored to Italian administration, the Italian Government functions only under the control and supervision of the Allied Control Commission. It is not in a position to enter into any agreements or relations with United Nations or neutral powers without the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief. It is evident that all of the complicated machinery of control for Allied Government in Italy is designed to support and secure the supreme authority of the Allied Commander in Chief or his deputy.
Consequently, the introduction of any new element into this carefully worked out plan, such as direct and separate relations between [Page 1058] a United Nations Government and an existing Italian Government is contrary to the arrangements providing for military security. It must be constantly kept in mind that Italy is a combat zone, and every decision and every action is taken in the first instance with reference to military considerations. Any development, therefore, outside the established machinery of control over Italian administration, economy, and resources must be brought into relationship with the Allied military authorities responsible for that major theater of operations.
You should recall that at the Moscow Conference the United States and Great Britain, in accordance with Soviet desires, welcomed and agreed to full Soviet participation in all matters of policy in regard to Italy. The Moscow Conference, thus, established the principle of Allied as against individual approach to particular questions in the liberated areas of Italy, including relations with the Italian Government. There has been up to the present no indication from the Soviet Government that these arrangements were in any way unsatisfactory, and it is a fact that Soviet representatives on the Advisory Council and on the Control Commission were afforded means of contact with the Italian authorities identic to those enjoyed by the American and British representatives.
The entire purpose and underlying aim of the arrangements established by the Moscow Conference were precisely to avoid the seeking by individual members of the Allied nations of special advantage or influence through bilateral arrangements with the Italian Government signing the armistice and to insure unity of action among the Allies in dealing with the political aspects of the Italian problem. It should be added that in an area where the responsibility for military operations rests on the Governments of the forces operating in that area, the Moscow decisions, to permit the participation of representatives of governments not directly connected with the military operations, represented an important contribution to the principle of cooperation and collaboration between the Allies in the political aspects of the prosecution of the war. It is, therefore, difficult for this Government to understand why, without prior consultation or even notification, the Soviet Government should have proceeded to negotiate a special arrangement with the Italian Government with no attempt to ascertain in advance the views of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, upon whom rests and continues to rest the primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Italian theater of operations. Had the Soviet Government made known to the Allied Commander-in-Chief or to this Government its dissatisfaction with the possibilities of contact with the Italian Government in areas under Anglo-American [Page 1059] control, every effort would have been made to meet the Soviet Government’s wishes in this respect.
In conclusion you might state that this Government desires to point out that the supreme responsibility for matters relating to the Italian theater continues to be vested in the Allied Commander-in-Chief and that no special arrangement between the Italian Government and one of the Allied Governments can modify in the slightest degree that responsibility. This Government therefore proposes, without giving publicity to the proposal, that the relationship of the Soviet representative to the Italian Government be worked out in the Advisory Council with a view to bringing him and his functions into the framework of the existing Allied Control machinery.
Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Algiers and London.