Office of the Historian

860H.01/11–744

The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State

Caserta, November 7, 1944—midnight.
[Received November 8—2:45 a.m.]

1207. In Medcos85 208 SAC has strongly recommended to British Chiefs of Staff for operational reasons86 early recognition by United States and United Kingdom Governments of joint Yugoslav Government brought into being by recent agreement between Subasic and Tito.87

Kirk
  1. Medcos was the message series indicator for messages from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to the British Chiefs of Staff. Traffic in the opposite direction carried a Cosmed indicator.↩
  2. For some time General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, had been planning to introduce a sizeable British force into Yugoslavia, but he had found Marshal Tito unwilling to cooperate. Mr. Kirk reported from Caserta in telegram 1419, November 20, 1944, that General Wilson had told Prime Minister Churchill that Tito appeared to be using blackmail methods to hasten his recognition as head of the Yugoslav Provisional Government. At the same time General Wilson suggested that irrespective of political developments nothing should prevent the immediate introduction of British forces into Yugoslavia to ensure the isolation and destruction of the retreating Germans. (740.0011 European War 1939/11–2044)↩
  3. Mr. Kirk reported from Caserta in telegram 1234, November 8, 1944, 8 p.m., that he had been told by Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor that although the British Government had accepted in principle the recognition of the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia, he anticipated a delay of some two or three weeks before an actual statement would be published (860H.01/11–844).↩