Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

740.00112 European War 1939/7–2844: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, July 28, 1944—midnight.
[Received July 29—1:20 a.m.]

6027. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. In accordance with Department’s 5852, July 26, 8 p.m. (repeated to Bern), we have concerted with MEW the desirability of representations with respect to Swiss transit facilities. MEW is instructing your⁸³ British colleague to make immediate representations to P. Golaz in the sense of 3(A), 3(B) and 3(C) (the phrasing has been sharpened somewhat to avoid a possible subterfuge). Please carry out parallel action. MEW is also instructing its Minister to inform P. Golaz that they attach great importance to (1) immediate and satisfactory response to our letters of July 15 and (2) that they do not wish to be committed to any particular form of escape clause which the Swiss may arrange with the Germans, but must be satisfied that the clause does in fact meet the conditions of our letter. We have no instructions on this point but you will possibly wish to associate yourself with your British colleague in the above sense.

2. MEW did not feel authorized to make representations in terms of 3(D) without approval of United States 15th Air Force and the Air Ministry in as much as such a warning might coincide inadvertently with a planned action, in which case strong security objections would prevail. Paragraph 4 of reference telegram is being discussed with Air Ministry.

3. Information received from Bern subsequent to sending of reference telegram indicates that Swiss are preparing to accept our proposals. Therefore, subject matter of paragraphs 1 and 2 of reference telegram are less acute. MEW agrees that in event Swiss do not meet our proposals sanctions should be considered. They also favor resort to the listing sanction in preference to the withholding of supplies, particularly in view of current relief and refugee problems. They do not agree, however, to immediate approaches to Swiss firms as suggested in reference telegram. They feel such immediate approaches might be construed as breach on our part of December agreement. Instead they would favor informing Swiss Government that (1) failure to implement escape clause of December agreement and/or (2) failure to agree on new and lower ceilings for latter half of 1944 had restored to us our freedom of action with respect to our commitments under the agreement, particularly our commitment not in general to approach Swiss firms in the metallurgical industries for undertakings. They feel that the announcement of this threat to the Swiss Government would produce the desired result. In view of rapidly changing circumstances at the present time they do no [apparent omission] irrevocably and automatically to implementation of this threat.

Above message sent to Bern as 229, July 28, midnight. Following sent to Washington only;

4. The above summarizes MEW’s present position. We have not yet received accompanying telegram on tactics to be employed referred to in paragraph 2 of reference telegram.

5. With respect to [apparent omission] in paragraph 3(D) of reference telegram to the effect that total enemy traffic should not exceed pre-war levels, MEW, in interest of speedy representations, have accepted wording suggested by you. They point out, however, that coal constitutes by far the largest volume of this traffic and that the Germans may again, as during a short period following the Italian armistice in 1943, drastically restrict coal deliveries to Italy. In such an event a total overall ceiling in terms of pre-war volume would defeat our ends. They would prefer, therefore, that the demand be redrafted to read “the limitation of total enemy traffic (other than coal) to prewar level”. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

Winant

83. Reference is to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison).