Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

710.61/3

Memorandum by Mr. Marion Parks of the Office of American Republic Affairs

[Washington,] March 28, 1944.

Activities of Soviet Diplomatic Representatives in the Other American Republics

Diplomatic relations have been established with the USSR by four of the other American republics: namely—Mexico, Cuba, Colombia and Uruguay. The Soviet Legations were opened in Mexico City and Habana in April and July 1943, respectively. The Soviet Minister to Colombia⁵ arrived in Bogota on February 8, 1944 and the Minister to Uruguay⁶ arrived in Montevideo on March 6.

Up to January 18, 1944, the American Embassy at Moscow had issued visas for 72 prospective Soviet officers and employees at these four missions. Fifty-six additional visas were issued for wives.^*

The Soviet Union at present has practically no economic interests and very few citizens residing in the four republics with which relations have been established. Yet the Soviet Embassy staff in Mexico is believed to number 47, and there is a personnel of about 17 at the USSR Legation in Habana, although there is but one Soviet citizen outside of the Legation staff residing in Cuba. The Minister, two Secretaries, two Attachés and seven or eight employees have been designated to Montevideo. Part of them have arrived there. The staff of the Soviet Legation in Bogotá is believed to include five or six officers in addition to the Minister. The new Russian missions thus appear to be quite large for the work they normally would be expected to perform in connection with existing Soviet interests.

The extent of the activities of the Soviet diplomats in Mexico and Cuba has been the subject of much rumor and conjecture.⁷ Undoubtedly the Russian representatives have been doing all possible to promote friendly relations and extend the influence of their country in Latin America. It seems evident that they are spending money rather lavishly in Mexico in order to make a favorable impression locally and on the diplomatic representatives of the other republics of Central and South America. This program might account in part for the large staffs maintained. It also has been observed that these missions, especially the Embassy in Mexico, may be in use for the purpose of training officers who are expected to be transferred to other Latin American posts as and when relations are established. A Santiago radio broadcast of March 7 declared that the Soviet Legation in Colombia was organizing a “Seminary to prepare Soviet diplomatic personnel for service in Latin America”.

Sergei Alexe[ye]vich Orlov, the new Minister to Uruguay, told American officers at Miami that the USSR was selecting high Russian officials as diplomats to interpret the new Soviet government. They are given military rank equivalent to their diplomatic status and are authorized to wear the insignia of such rank at all public functions. Ambassadors have the rank of Field Marshal or General. Minister Orlov is a Colonel General. He said the Soviet diplomats are required to take their wives and children with them and to set up a social position. They must study the most appropriate way to make a good impression on Latin Americans and must entertain with dignity and effectiveness.

There is no direct proof at present in evidence to show that the Soviet diplomatic missions are attempting to influence the internal affairs of the countries where they are established. There are many reports of collusion between the Soviet diplomats and local Communists but there is little or no conclusive evidence of directly subversive activities.

The new Soviet missions have an aggressive and well-financed program for the dissemination of trade and cultural relations propaganda, and for interpreting the new Soviet foreign policy—as divorced from spreading Communism—as well as the power shown by Russia in contributing to the defeat of Germany, in such a way as to win respect for the Soviet Union in Latin America. The role which the Soviet Union will play at the peace conference has already become the subject of much interested press comment in these countries, and leftist spokesmen and writers can be expected to render substantial assistance in laying the groundwork for Latin American support of Russia in a position of leadership at that time, as they believe their own future depends upon it.

The following observations on the activities of the Soviet missions in Latin America have been reported to date:

1. Dissemination of Propaganda Preparing for Post-War Economic Penetration of Latin America.

A recent example of Soviet commercial propaganda emanating from diplomatic sources is given in a report from our Embassy in Mexico. It shows that an officer of the Soviet Legation has asserted that Russia will be prepared almost immediately to ship low cost farm machinery to Mexico, taking Mexican products in return and using Russian ships for transportation. It has been reported that a catalogue of such Russian farm machinery is already available in Mexico. The latter statement has not been verified.

While the USSR is hardly likely to be in a position to make good these promises at an early time, the idea is one that might make a deep impression on certain Mexican officials and part of the Mexican public which has been sharply critical of the United States due to its inability to supply large quantities of farm machinery at present needed by Mexico.

2. Dissemination of Pro-Russian Propaganda as Distinguished from Communist Propaganda.

At the present time in Mexico, the Soviet Embassy is paying for transmission of news given nightly on a 15-minute radio program called “Today on the Soviet Front” broadcast over a national network, headed by two government-sponsored stations. The program is based on news received directly from Moscow by Ambassador Oumansky and the reported daily cost of transmission is about $285.00 (U. S. cy.⁸). The broadcasting costs, it is alleged, are borne by the Mexican government-owned Petroleos Mexicanos.

(It is interesting to note in this connection that in addition to the Russian news broadcast, Mexican government stations at present carry nine daily broadcast programs sponsored by European organizations. The programs are given in the interest of Free Germany, Free Hungary, the Liberty of Italy, the Third Spanish Republic and the Fourth French Republic, all representing organizations believed to have been subject to Communist influence. There is also a Tribunal of Youth program backed by Spanish Students, and of special interest, a radio talk by Andre Simone. Simone is in reality Otto Katz, an important figure in the Communist Party. In Europe he reputedly was assigned to check up on the loyalty and performance of Soviet diplomatic officials and other Russian operatives outside of the Soviet Union. He has been in Mexico for about three years, writing for the leftist newspaper El Popular, organ of the Confederation of Mexican Labor. He is a close collaborator of Vicente Lombardo Toledano.⁹

In February, an official organ of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico made its appearance under the name “Boletín de Información”. The 8-page illustrated pamphlet contained such material as articles on the Red Army and the rehabilitation of liberated regions (after Russian occupation). It carried a notice permitting reproduction of the material in it.

It also has been reported that the Soviet Legation in Mexico recently took a three-year lease on a moving picture theater, where Russian films will be shown.

3. Use of Diplomatic Privileges to Promote Ideological Penetration.

There is no direct evidence that any of the Soviet missions in Latin America are acting in collusion with the Communist Party as such, but connections are generally believed to exist between the missions and local Communist groups. The following points have received consideration in this connection:

Despite the dissolution of the Third International, the Communist movement seems to be continuing along the same lines as before, throughout Latin America. It is often asserted that Soviet diplomatic channels are being used for the exchange of directives and communications between Communist and left-wing labor groups in the United States, Mexico and Cuba, and it may perhaps be logical to conclude that censorship intercepts appear to be few in number compared with the volume of communication which, all other evidence indicates, must be going on continuously between key members of these groups.

Another fact which should not be overlooked is that numerous Moscow-trained Latin American Communists as well as certain Spanish Communists are now actively working in the other American republics. An outstanding example is Jesus Hernandez Tomas, a Spanish Communist who proceeded from Moscow to Mexico in the fall of 1943 and who is at the present time reported to be working in the Soviet Embassy. While the Soviet missions may be used to channel communications from Moscow to these leaders, only a minimum of contact with them would be necessary in view of their training and experience along Party lines. The Soviet missions could thus take advantage of the voluminous pro-Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda which is persistently generated by local Communist groups without running the risk of becoming involved in direct proselytizing.

For example, Pablo Neruda, until recently Chilean Consul General in Mexico City, made the Consulate General virtually a Communist headquarters. He was recalled because of his participation in public demonstrations demanding the release from prison in Brazil of Luis Carlos Prestes.¹⁰ Ambassador Oumansky had been more often in contact—publicly, at least, with the Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Oscar Schnake, a Socialist whose record is one of hostility toward Communism. Thus the rumors which circulate to the effect that Schnake transmits Soviet directives from Oumansky to Chilean Communists cannot be regarded very seriously. No one can say, however, at present, what connections privately exist between the Soviet Embassy and such thorough-going Communists as Neruda.

The Soviet missions do supply propaganda material to Communist Party representatives but there is no proof that the material delivered is other than the straight pro-Soviet Russia propaganda currently available for distribution to any agency which cares to take it. Nora Chegodaeva, Press Attaché of the Soviet Legation in Habana, is exceedingly active. She is believed to be in close touch with the Communist newspaper Hoy, with the Frente Nacional Anti-Fascista, with the headquarters of the Communist-dominated Cuban Conferation of Labor and with members of the Servicio Feminino de Defensa Civil which has Communist connections. Miss Chegodaeva was a Political Commissar in Russia. She was trained in Komintern schools and speaks fluent Spanish.

A report from Uruguay suggests that Communist Party members there are working for the new Soviet Legation. Eugenio Gómez, head of the Party, is known to be compiling information on economic and intelligence matters. It is asserted that he began work some time ago on orders from Moscow and that he will transmit the information obtained to the Soviet Minister.

4. Relations with Latin American Labor Organizations.

It has been surmised that diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet Embassies in Washington and Mexico is used to convey directives and information linking the CIO¹¹ and some elements of the AFL¹² with the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). The latter leftist labor organization is well entrenched among the proletariat of many Latin American countries and includes strong Communist elements. Its President is the Mexican Vicente Lombardo Toledano. He is an avowed Marxist, atheist and friend of Soviet Russia but has never admitted belonging to the Communist Party.

There are persistent rumors that Ambassador Oumansky is in contact with Latin American labor groups through Lombardo Toledano. There is evidence that Lombardo is interested in the formation of a new international political organization paralleling the CTAL. Communist leaders, many with close Moscow connections, are active in this movement and in seeking to control the Latin American labor movement.

Whether the leftist Latin American labor groups are receiving directives from the Soviet diplomatic missions or not, the line of propaganda used in their periodicals, speeches and meetings will be of value to the USSR by helping to create a state of mind among Latin American masses which is friendly to the Soviet Union, which may tend to look more and more to the Soviet Union for guidance and example, and which is being prepared to welcome a dominant, powerful Russia in post-war world reconstruction.

5. Soviet Funds.

Several rumors have been reported but not verified to date, regarding funds used by the Soviet diplomatic missions under review. One informant stated that a large amount of the Russian gold entering the United States through Amtorg¹³ and Corporation Carp¹⁴ allegedly for purchase of merchandise for the war effort, is diverted to finance Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere.

A strictly confidential report from Mexico City shows that from July 1943 through March 10, 1944, the Soviet Embassy deposited 1,575,515 pesos in a Mexican bank. This was believed to be the only bank handling the Embassy’s transactions. The balance on March 10 was 70,867 pesos, showing that 1,504,648 pesos were disbursed in eight and a half months. All disbursements were on the basis of bearer checks, and the largest individual withdrawals amounted respectively to 100,000 pesos, 400,000 pesos and 177,000 pesos.

A large part of these disbursements, it is pointed out, may have related to the purchase of the handsome property occupied by the Soviet Embassy. It also was reported that in leasing a theater for the showing of Russian films, the Embassy paid three years’ rent in advance.

The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

The selection of Constantin I. [A.] Oumansky as Soviet Ambassador and the elaborate arrangements made for his tour of duty in Mexico have been the subject of much comment.

One of the largest private residences in Mexico City was purchased for the Embassy, and there has been much comment regarding the dazzling impression made especially on Mexican Senators and Deputies, by the elaborate receptions held there.

Rumors have circulated to the effect that the personnel of the Soviet Embassy numbered into hundreds. Oumansky personally informed our Embassy that he believed the rumors were manufactured by the Polish Minister and certain Catholic elements. He asserted that the staff comprised 7 officers, the remaining personnel (of about 40) consisting of clerks and two Tass Agency representatives.

It would be difficult to determine whether Oumansky’s mission goes beyond Mexico. He apparently outranks the present head of the Soviet mission in Washington¹⁵ and it has been asserted that he is chief of the entire Soviet diplomatic service in the Western Hemisphere, He formerly was Ambassador to the United States and afterward served as Soviet Minister of Propaganda, The New York Times writer Cianfarra declared that Oumansky holds two positions simultaneously: that of Ambassador to Mexico and that of Chairman of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The latter, said Cianfarra, is composed of a group of men who are experts in foreign policy, who study specific questions and recommend policies to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In the opinion of Ambassador Messersmith¹⁶ Oumansky undoubtedly considers himself to be in a strategic position. Mrs. Oumansky is reported to have said that he at first was disappointed to be sent so far from the “home front” but accepted the post as a place where he could “do the most good” since Latin America was important now and would be even more so in the post-war period. Mr. Oumansky is aggressive and readily accepts opportunities to appear in public. It has been commented, however, that his desire to make himself persona grata may be influenced by the fact that he is the first diplomatic representative of his government in Mexico after a long break in relations which occurred in a manner unfavorable to the USSR.

Oumansky gave an impression of being indiscreet last November when he made a speech in which he implied that Russia intended to occupy Poland as far as the 1939 frontier, but later it became evident that he had only given advance expression to a pre-determined policy of his government. As a matter of fact, three months previously in Habana, Chargé d’Affaires Dimitri Zaikin¹⁷ had made the same statement, but without arousing the attention given Oumansky’s speech.

Last November the magazine of the Monterrey Chamber of Commerce devoted an article to Ambassador Oumansky. He is well qualified, it said, to overcome prejudices against the Communist regime; and his appointment to Mexico was a bold and clever maneuver by the Soviet government, for it placed a diplomatic officer of great ability in a country where he will perhaps enjoy greater freedom of action than he could have in the United States, while the prestige Mexico now enjoys in Latin America may be advantageous to his efforts in the other American republics.

It was also asserted in this article that Oumansky appeared to be openly striving to win a position of prestige and influence for the Soviet Embassy in Mexico which would surpass that of the Embassy of the United States. Several stories were quoted which, it was said, were being circulated in Mexico tending to build up Soviet prestige at the expense of the United States. The writer also held the view that Oumansky would direct from Mexico the Soviet diplomatic activities in other Latin American countries.

The uncertain scope of Oumansky’s activities together with his aggressiveness has caused concern to Mexico’s Foreign Secretary Padilla.¹⁸ The latter surmised that a connection existed between Oumansky and a trip to Chile last November made by Narciso Bassols, leader of Acción Política, a Mexican leftist group probably affiliated with the Communist Party, which was very active in the campaign for renewal of Mexican relations with the USSR. Another source reported that Bassols acted as courier for Ambassador Oumansky on this trip. In Chile Foreign Minister Fernández¹⁹ said that he suspected Pablo Neruda, former Chilean Consul General in Mexico, of conveying directives from Oumansky to Chilean Communists.

There are reports from several sources indicating that Spanish Republicans are turning for help and directives to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. One observer stated that the Spanish Republicans had been disappointed in their hope of receiving backing from the United States and Great Britain and were therefore now looking to the Russians.

The Soviet Legation in Habana

The Soviet Legation was established in Habana in July 1943, and occupies a palatial residence at a rental cost of $650.00 (U.S. cy.) per month. Diplomatic relations were established between Cuba and the USSR in October 1942. Maxim Litvinoff²⁰ was appointed the first Soviet Minister. After presenting his credentials, in April 1943, he returned to Washington and left Dimitri Zaikin as Chargé d’Affaires in Habana. Zaikin formerly was the Soviet Consul General in New York. His staff includes four Secretaries, a Commercial Attaché, a Press Attaché, five male and five female employees. All of the men are accompanied by their wives.

The few receptions which have been held at the Legation are reported to have been more lavish than affairs ordinarily given by representatives of other nations in Cuba.

The discrepancy between the amount of discernible Soviet interest in Cuba and the relatively important standing of Zaikin and large size of the Legation seems rather striking. As noted above, the Soviet Union has at present no economic interests in Cuba and outside of the Legation but one Soviet citizen resides in the Cuban Republic.

Offsetting these facts are the well-known advantages of Cuba as a listening post for Latin America and a center for the receipt and transmission of information and propaganda as well as for the exchange of travelers.

Moreover, the position of the Communist Party is stronger in Cuba than in any of the other American republics. While not the largest of the Cuban political parties, it has power and cohesion due to its strong organization and disciplined membership. It is a legal political party, included in the government coalition. There are ten Communist Party members in the Cuban Congress and the Communist Juan Marinello is Minister without portfolio in the Cabinet. The Party owns a radio station, a daily newspaper, a publishing house and will soon have a moving picture theater. The Party dominates the Cuban Confederation of Labor. Among Party leaders, Fabio Grobart (alias Abraham Sinovich), the Instructor-General of the Cuban Communist Party, and Bias Roca, Secretary-General, were trained in Moscow.

Habana has been regarded as a sort of Caribbean regional headquarters for the Communist Party. Close contacts are known to exist between leaders in Cuba, Mexico and Colombia. Cuba also has for some time been an important center for the publication and distribution of Communist literature. Propaganda pamphlets disguised as Catholic religious booklets and bearing the imprints of Spanish publishers, for use in Spain, are known to have been printed in Habana. Communist propaganda printed there also finds its way to Puerto Rico, and scattered leaves of such imprints have been found on the decks of ships unloading in Venezuela.

It is evident that the Soviet government placed a high value on establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, for Dr. Concheso,²¹ first Cuban diplomat accredited to Moscow, was personally received by Marshal Stalin. It was Dr. Concheso’s belief that he was the only foreign diplomat other than the American and British Ambassadors to whom Stalin had accorded this distinction. By conduct of Concheso sealed letters were exchanged between Stalin and President Batista.²² Cuba’s attitude of friendship and respect for Soviet Russia has been indicated in many ways. A pointed instance was the celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in November 1943. The observance was given government support, according to our Embassy, lending it a significance “which in recent years has been accorded only to the observance of either Cuban or American Independence Day.”

Since its establishment in Habana the Soviet Legation has engaged in various efforts to promote friendship for the USSR, These efforts have included public appearances of the Minister, cultivation of good relations with other diplomats and dissemination of propaganda, especially regarding the courage and power of the Soviet Union as shown in the war.

An indication that progress is being made in Soviet plans looking toward economic penetration of the Western Hemisphere after the war was seen in the statement made by a Communist Cuban Cabinet member that “due to opposite climates the Soviet Union and Latin America produce different and equally necessary products. A Cuban Foreign Office spokesman said publicly that “Cuba does not have to sell her sugar to the United States in the future.” (It has been suggested that possibly in consideration of the free hand President Batista has given the Communist Party in Cuba, the Soviet government may have promised future trade agreements which would give Cuba economic independence of the United States. Russian wheat and oil, for example, might be promised in exchange for Cuban sugar, tobacco and coffee.)

In the line of propaganda activities, the Legation is furnishing photographs and articles for the Cuban Army publication, El Cuatro de Septiembre. Also, according to the Cuban press, a program for the promotion and development of cultural relations between Cuba and the USSR is being jointly undertaken by the Soviet Legation and the Cuban Ministry of State.

Recently it was understood that orders were given to intensify the activities of the Unión Sionista de Cuba, and it was alleged that the directive emanated from the Soviet Legation. Since December material for editorials has been transmitted from Moscow to the Zionist publication Palabra Hebrea over the Cuban Press Wireless. The cost of transmission, which amounts to more than $100.00 daily, is being paid at the source, possibly by the Soviet government. The messages contain propaganda on the activities of the Jewish antifascist committee, atrocity stories of Nazi terrorism and material showing that Jewish peoples are fighting side by side with the Soviet peoples against Hitler.

Possible Renewal of Soviet Relations With Other American Republics

No official gestures looking toward establishment of relations with the Soviet Union have been made in any of the other American republics besides Cuba, Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay, but labor and leftist elements are constantly bringing pressure to that end on the governments of Chile and Costa Rica, and there is evidence that the question is receiving serious consideration in Brazil.²³

It is interesting to note that both Chile and Brazil apparently wish to avoid acting independently. President Rios²⁴ said in a recent public statement that if relations were to be established between Chile and the USSR, the initiative should come from a third friendly nation. President Vargas²⁵ has said publicly that Brazil will establish relations “in due course” and privately to our Ambassador²⁶ that if President Roosevelt wished him to take pertinent action in the matter at any time, he was prepared to do so. Recent favorable references in the Brazilian press to the Soviet government and war successes suggest that the public is being prepared for possible developments in this direction.

M[arion] P[arks]

5. Grigory Fedorovich Rezanov.
6. Sergey Alexeyevich Orlov.

7. Visas Issued:

   Mexico	20	diplomatic	33	official	total	53
   Cuba	7	“	20	“	“	27
   Colombia	6	“	16	“	“	22
   Uruguay	16	“	11	“	“	26
   						138
   Wives						56
   						72

   (Minor Children traveled on mother’s passport).

   [Footnote in the original.]

7. In connection with the appointment of Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky, formerly Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, 1989–1941, as Minister to Mexico in 1943, and speculation that it was in connection with Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere centering in Mexico, see the memorandum of May 19, 1943, by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, p. 530.
8. Currency.
9. Leftist Mexican labor leader with influence throughout Latin America.
10. A Brazilian Communist leader who had spent several years in the Soviet Union, and had been arrested in Brazil for attempting a coup d’e’tat.
11. Congress for Industrial Organization.
12. American Federation of Labor.
13. Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York, N.Y., the official purchasing and sales agency in the United States of the Soviet Union.
14. The Carp Export and Import Corporation, New York, N.Y., whose president was Sam Carp, a naturalized American citizen and brother-in-law of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.
15. Ambassador Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.
16. George S. Messersmith. American Ambassador in Mexico.
17. Dmitry Ivanovich Zaikin. With regard to some difficulties which he experienced when entering at New York in 1939, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 857–868, passim.
18. Ezequiel Padilla.
19. Joachim Fernández Fernández.
20. Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1941–1943.
21. Aurelio Fernández Concheso, Cuban Minister to the Soviet Union.
22. Col. Fulgeneio Batista.
23. See vol. vii , bracketed note in section entitled “Attitude of the United States with respect to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the American Republics and the Soviet Union.”
24. Juan Antonio Rios Morales.
25. Getulio Vargas.
26. Jefferson Caffery.