Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

861.20211 Amtorg/7–2844

Memorandum by Mr. Auguste Richard of the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs

[Extract]

[Washington,] July 15, 1944.

Extent of Dispersal of U.S. Technical Information to Foreign Countries During World War II

. . . . . . .

The U.S.S.R. has ranked second to the British, both in the dollar amount of Lend-Lease aid and the extension of technical information. As to the latter, the disclosures under the heading of research and developmental information have been limited. For instance, OSRD⁹⁵ has not extended any to the Russians except in the area of medical science. Neither has the machinery been set up for an interchange of patents for the obvious reason that under the present Russian patent system mutuality is impossible. The amelioration of this situation for post-war is something for our Government to undertake for the benefit of American business.

However, in the second and third categories, i.e., industrial “knowhow” and information relating to the operation, servicing and repair of equipment and implements of war, we have been increasingly liberal in 1943 and 1944. The policy for the release of such data has been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and implemented by the armed services. The War Department has handled the lion’s share of such releases. They have been made by the individual services of the Army Service Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and the Navy Lend-Lease Office, through the medium of lists prepared by a Subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Disclosure of Technical Information. The established policy is to release all unclassified items, those on the restricted list, and those items classified as confidential, secret and top secret equipment “intended to assist the Soviets to kill Germans or to be used from Soviet bases” (as in the case of shuttle bombing).

While it is difficult to give any exact measures of the relative contributions made to the British and U.S.S.R. it can be stated that although the British had a long head start, the Russians are rapidly catching up, particularly in category (3). In addition engineers and inspectors connected with the Soviet Purchasing Commission have had rather free access to war plants producing their Lend-Lease equipment. Through this medium they have undoubtedly secured a great deal of technical information of which no U.S. Government agency has any record.

The discrimination mentioned above in category (1) is, however, notable, and will probably continue. While OSRD claims to have received no contributions from U.S.S.R. in their sphere, the Surgeon General’s Office has benefited to some extent from information supplied concerning field medical aid.

Consideration must also be given to releases to U.S.S.R. via FEA on items other than those classified as military. So far only one major transfer has been arranged, i.e., plans and full technical information for the erection in Russia of six Hi-Octane gasoline refineries (with the collaboration of the Petroleum Administrator for War⁹⁶). Substantial sums were paid by our government to the American owners on the understanding that the payments covered only wartime use of such data and that the U.S.S.R. would recognize the peace-time rights should manufacturing be continued.

While FEA has furnished some other technical data of a nonmilitary nature to U.S.S.R. they have not been of major importance and were generally limited to patents or processes on individual items. FEA conducted the negotiations with the owners and paid for the release thereof, sometimes merely “for the duration” and in other instances for permanent transfer.

The case of synthetic rubber has peculiar significance because there was an opportunity here for an interchange of data since U.S.S.R. had made important progress in the field prior to our rubber crisis after Pearl Harbor. It is one of the few instances in the industrial field—perhaps the only one of real importance—where governmental negotiations with U.S.S.R. have proceeded on a give and take basis. For that reason it is worthwhile to outline some of the details of this enlightening story furnished by Col. Bradley Dewey, Rubber Director. Attached Exhibit A gives the highlights. While the inference should not be drawn that all the blame for the delays lay on the Russian side it is obvious that when the U.S.S.R. had something that we badly needed they did not hesitate to bargain to the limit in spite of our Lend-Lease and other favors. Precious months were lost in these maneuvers at a time when our whole war production effort hung in the balance because of the threatened rubber shortage. This experience certainly merits close attention for the future. The Russians are good traders and they respect others who look out for their own interests.

A very large quantity of machinery and equipment has been furnished to the U.S.S.R. via Lend-Lease. The Fourth Protocol is now under consideration. The value of machinery and equipment requested therein exceeds one billion dollars (this includes some carryover from the Third Protocol). Approximately $617,000,000 falls in the Lend-Lease classification of “within 18 months” and some $434,000,000 in the long-range classification which will require some special financing by the U.S. Both new equipment and surplus war plants are wanted. Involved in the release of such plants is the technical information that would go with them. There is at present no one agency or group in Washington that can speak authoritatively on the policy matters involved in the transfer of the technical information.

To summarise regarding the U.S.S.R. it appears that although a substantial amount of technical information has been supplied by the armed services the disclosures of industrial technology have not been so complete as to seriously weaken the present trading position.

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A. Richard

[Annex]

“Exhibit A”

[Washington,] July 15, 1944.

Interchange of Technical Information with USSR on Synthetic Rubber

The Baruch report, issued in September, 1942,⁹⁷ strongly criticized the officials responsible for the rubber program for not having availed themselves of the Russian offer made some months prior thereto to exchange technical information with the United States on synthetic rubber.

Accordingly, when Mr. Jeffers⁹⁸ was appointed Rubber Director and Col. Bradley Dewey Deputy Rubber Director⁹⁹ one of their first acts was to appoint a rubber mission to visit Russia under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest Pittman, President of InterChemical Corp. After spending two months assembling the most recent and important data available in this country the mission proceeded to Russia by plane in December, 1942. The mission was authorized to exchange this data.

In Moscow a mutual exchange of very general information—without any discussion of details of equipment, operating conditions, etc., consumed several weeks. A visit to three rubber plants was then arranged. During this trip the mission was toured through the plants for a general inspection but were not given any detailed information covering the important practical features of the equipment, methods of production, introduction of catalyst and techniques used for polymerization control. At the factories they were told that this data could only be made available in Moscow.

Some time after their return to Moscow, i.e. on February 20, 1943, the mission was advised that the desired information would not be given them but might be disclosed by a Soviet Rubber Mission which had meanwhile been dispatched to the U.S. without notifying our mission that they were leaving. The Russian Mission arrived in this country on February 16.

Since there was no longer anything which our mission could accomplish in Moscow they formally withdrew their offer to exchange information and applied for return transportation. Only after the strong intervention of Admiral Standley¹ did our mission get away some five weeks later.

The Russian Mission on March 22nd notified Col. Dewey that they were not prepared to begin the exchange of information until, as a prerequisite, we agreed to furnish equipment plus technical assistance in the design, installation and initial operation of plants for the production of butadiene, styrene, Buna S, neoprene, ethyl alcohol and butyl rubber.

Col. Dewey replied that the provision of equipment was outside the jurisdiction of the Rubber Director’s office and that he could not meet the request for data on neoprene and ethyl alcohol as these processes were owned respectively by Dupont and Standard Oil of New Jersey. As a result the negotiations temporarily broke down while the Russians started conversations with the two private companies.

In July 1943 the Russians came back to Col. Dewey with the suggestion that negotiations be reopened on the basis originally proposed by Mr. Pittman in Moscow, i.e., the U. S. would furnish all data for the government controlled processes and plants. By that time a large number of our newly constructed plants were in production and many of the technical questions which earlier had troubled us had been answered in operation. As a result what Russia now had to offer would be largely matters of refinement in quality, cost or yield, some of which could not be introduced without basic equipment changes which would only slow up our production program. As a result, Col. Dewey stated that the offer made by Mr. Pittman in Moscow and withdrawal prior to his departure could no longer form the basis of negotiations. However, so as to return the courtesies extended to our Mission, the Russian group were taken on a tour of factories in this country. Months went by without further progress and the Chief of Mission, Mr. Makeev,² returned to Russia. A new chief, Dr. Petrenko, arrived here in March, 1944.

The principal Russian development had centered around the production of butadiene from alcohol. In this process they had achieved excellent results with a high yield which was still of interest to us. Ever since last April communications and correspondence have been going back and forth without concrete results. On June 29, 1944 Dr. Petrenko notified Col. Dewey that he was prepared to exchange information on everything except the production of butadiene from alcohol on which matter “we are awaiting instructions from Moscow.”

The above summarises a year and one half of futile negotiations.

A. Richard

95. Office of Scientific Research and Development.
96. Harold L. Ickes.
97. This report, dated September 10, 1942, is printed in the New York Times, September 11, 1942, pp. 1, 15.
98. William M. Jeffers, Rubber Director, 1942–1943.
99. Col. Dewey became Rubber Director in 1943.
1. Adm. William H. Standley, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, February 1942–October 1943.
2. Apparently intended is Vasily Vasilyevich Zhmayev.