893.00/7–2744: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

1301. Sun Fo asked Atcheson to his residence again last evening for lengthy conversation on various subjects (our 1158 and 9 [1159] July 4). As regards military situation, Sun was gloomy, did not expect Hengyang would hold out and indicated one of principal difficulties was that the various Chinese commanders operating in the area did not cooperate and in some instances did not even communicate with each other (identical report received from Life correspondent White, just returned from Hengyang front). Sun said that his suggestion to Chiang that American officers be used for actual command purposes had been well received by Generalissimo but he indicated that Chiang had not so far as he knew taken any steps in this direction or had indeed taken any forthright measures to pull situation together militarily or politically but on the other hand had issued contradictory orders to the various commanders which had increased confusion at the front.

As regards questions of Sino-Soviet and Kmt-Communist difficulties, Sun said that while Chiang had come to realize necessity of improving relations with Soviets he had not yet come to understand need of making reasonable realistic settlement with Communists or to understand that relations between Chinese and Soviet Governments could not improve as long as those difficulties remained unsettled. He said that conversations had been refused with the Chinese Communists; he did not yet know details but was still hopeful of compromise and he felt strongly that position taken by Communists was not unreasonable as it was obviously taken to ensure their two main objectives for neither of which they could be well criticized (a) Cooperative effective effort [Page 136] against Japs and (b) Prevention of their own liquidation. (Government spokesman announced yesterday that Kmt-Communist relations had improved.)

As regards direct affirmative measures toward improving Sino-Soviet relations, Sun said Generalissimo had suggested to Soviet Government that Soong go to Moscow for conversations (our 1288, July 25) but suggestion had been coldly received, reply being made that all Russian effort was presently concentrated on the war and it would be preferable for Chinese Foreign Minister to wait until winter to visit Moscow.

Sun Fo said President Roosevelt had great influence with Chiang Kai-shek and suggested that if President would take advantage of Kung’s presence in U.S.A. to give Chiang Kai-shek strong advice in these matters there would undoubtedly be beneficial results. We believe this suggestion well taken and that it would be helpful if the President could in conversations with Kung reinforce for example his recent message (Department’s 955, July 1445) to Chiang Kai-shek.

Gauss
  1. Post, p. 245.