793.94/8–2144

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 2894

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Kweilin Consulate’s despatch to the Embassy no. 129, August 10, 1944, entitled “Political Aspects of Present Japanese Campaign in China”, containing allegations which the Consulate describes as “reasonably accurate” of an understanding between the Generalissimo and the Japanese. According to a notation at the end of the despatch, a copy was sent forward direct to the Department.

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The Embassy believes that the Consulate’s statements and opinions in this respect were not well-considered and that they should be treated with the greatest reserve. There is, of course, little doubt that tacit understandings have arisen between (or with the connivance of) individual Chinese and Japanese commanders or units in various places where the “front” has become static and trade has developed across the lines between the Chinese and Japanese forces. But we have not received any indication that an understanding such as that alleged or implied by Mr. Ringwalt exists or has possibility of coming into being. It seems to us that from the Chinese point of view such understanding would be pointless, except possibly as a makeshift temporary expedient, and would also be without material benefit to the Japanese military whose occupying forces have in any case little to fear from possible (if improbable) Chinese attack and who would not likely be trusting enough, if such understanding did exist, to seek the benefit of withdrawing garrisons for use elsewhere. From the political point of view the entering into such understanding would be suicidal for Chiang Kai-shek whose hopes not only for power in world affairs but for the survival of himself and his regime in China depend more and more as time goes by on the support of the United States and the other principal Allies.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss
[Enclosure]

The Consul at Kweilin (Ringwalt) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

No. 129

Sir: I have the honor to submit hereunder a report on certain political aspects of the present Japanese campaign in China. As indicated in the context, much of the material has been obtained from associates of Marshal Li Chi-shen and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and may therefore be colored by their political views. It is needless to say that this Consulate can produce no evidence of certain allegations derogatory of the Generalissimo and his part in the present campaign. It is believed, however, that the report is reasonably accurate except perhaps for certain military phases of the campaign; it was written without benefit of source material, all records of this Consulate having been either destroyed or sent to Kunming when the Japanese threat to Kweilin appeared imminent.

Summary: In their campaign in China this year, the Japanese had the following objectives: the establishment of through north–south land communications to Canton and Indochina, the destruction of Chinese military forces along these lines of communications, the continued [Page 151] maintenance in nominal power of the present government in Chungking, and the incidental elimination of advance American air bases. In preparation for the campaign, the already substantial garrisons were reinforced by units from Manchuria and the South Seas, espionage schools were established in South China, and agreement favorable to Russia over Sakhalin was reached, and an understanding is said to have been obtained from the Generalissimo who was guaranteed security in the northwest provided he did not interfere in the Japanese campaign outside his sphere of influence. The Honan campaign was opened the last week in April and resulted in the speedy defeat of Chinese forces in that area, although the Japanese employed only about 20% of their available forces. In the south, Marshal Li Chi-shen had been making rapid strides in uniting all dissident elements against the Central Government. The Generalissimo, alarmed at this threat to his reign, is reported to have asked the Japanese to destroy the troops of the Ninth War Zone under Hsueh Yueh, who be [he] believed was in the plot against him. The campaign in the south opened late in May, and by the end of June the Japanese had reached the gates of Hengyang. Here from entrenched positions, they destroyed seriatim the Chinese provincial armies which the Generalissimo ordered hurled against them. Central Government units reached the front in only token force. The siege of Hengyang lasted until August 8, although it is generally agreed that it could have been taken at any time. Political as well as military considerations were responsible for the holdup of the Japanese offensive. The Japanese in conjunction with the Generalissimo are said to have delivered an ultimatum to Marshal Li and his clique that unless he dropped his plans for the consolidation of the opposition against Chungking, the Japanese would destroy his clique and all of south China. It is believed, however, that Marshal Li will not be intimidated; whether the Japanese will wish at this critical period to expend the necessary troops, equipment and supplies to carry out their threat is problematical.

[Here follows detailed report.]

Ever since the outbreak of hostilities in Lukouchiao over seven years ago, the Japanese have been hoping against hope that they can finally force a negotiated peace with the Generalissimo, but however much he personally may wish for a truce with Japan, the march of events and the force of public opinion in China is proving too much for him. It seems probable that Marshal Li’s clique, which has the warm support of the Federation of Democratic Parties and the potential cooperation of the Communists and the dissident elements generally, and is far more representative of Chinese public opinion than is the present government at Chungking, will soon come out into the open notwithstanding threats from the Generalissimo and the Japanese alike. If, in consequence, the present regime in Chungking collapses, the result may not be an unmitigated evil to China and to the cause of the allied nations.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur R. Ringwalt