Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)17
CFB 25886. 1. There can be no doubt that the immediate situation in China is serious and continues to deteriorate. Kweilin is practically surrounded and the fall of Liuchow is imminent and the disorganization and muddled planning of the Chinese is beyond comprehension. We are taking steps to stabilize the situation and are striving to collect and dispose appropriate forces for that purpose. We have emphasized to the Generalissimo the serious implications of the loss of the Kunming area pointing out that we would lose important air bases and vital supply terminal. What I did not tell him but presume he realizes, and what we must bear in mind, is the fact that the loss of the Kunming area may result in the disintegration of China politically and militarily. If this should come to pass the approximate 25 Japanese divisions as well as massing air formations now contained in central and south China might be released for employment elsewhere including the Philippines and SEAC areas.
[Page 192]2. I agree in general with Hurley’s message to the President relative to the existing situation in China, however, desire to submit the following specific comments on points raised in that message.
(a) The statement that the Chinese armies have the manpower but lack equipment and supplies should be considered in cases of following:
Back in the States one visualizes greatest reservoir of manpower available in China for military service. This should be so in a population of approximately 420,000,000 people. The fact that the country is not highly industrialized results in the use of a disproportionate number (by our standards) of able-bodied men in agriculture, industry and communications, all of which absorb enormous numbers of men. The enemy controls vast areas of China precluding altogether or restricting recruitment in such areas. Malnutrition, lack of hygiene, poor sanitation and deplorable medical service all contribute to reduce the number of men physically able to perform military service. Finally a sound replacement program simply does not exist for there are so many officials involved with their narrow and unscrupulous self interest that it has not been possible to mobilize forces in an efficient manner. General Hurley is correct when he states that the present Chinese military forces lack equipment and supplies. I should also add training.
(b) With reference to allocation of tonnage to the 14th U. S. Air Force and the role of air in the theater, I desire to state the following:
(1) The 14th U. S. Air Force has been allotted 14,170 tons for this month (November). Past allocations allowed:
| October | 11,876 |
| September | 8,426 |
| August | 10,456 |
| July | 12,180 |
| June | 12,537 |
It is not correct that VLR17a has received bulk of tonnage. General Hurley’s suggestion to abandon all VLR operations here is too drastic. I suggest that theater commanders should be directed to make recommendations in the premises.
(2) Experience in China and other battle areas proves irrefutably that air operations strongly assist but do not stop enemy advances unless the conditions created by such air effort are promptly and vigorously exploited by ground forces.
(3) Allotment of tonnage to VLR bombing for month of November is 7, 197 tons. Before recommending abandonment of all VLR operations in this theater, I should like to give the subject further study.
3. I would like you to consider the employment of VLR against less remote objectives for example 100 VLR’s carrying maximum load could practically destroy and certainly seriously disrupt the focal point of Jap communications in Hankow. A similar strike might [Page 193] very profitably be directed against Shanghai and yet another feasible objective would be Canton.
4. I agree with General Hurley that we must bring about concerted effort by nationalized Communist troops and believe that we should include the special provincial armies and prima donna war lords and governors of provinces. Whether this can be accomplished I am not now in a position to state. You may be sure the effort will be made to cut through red tape, circumvent intrigue and bring about the effective and concerted employment of any and all available means. We must not only stabilize the present situation and insure the retention of effective air bases remaining in areas under our control but we will plan operations air and ground that will contribute to our Pacific effort in consonance with my directive.