740.0011 Pacific War/3941: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 9—1:05 p.m.]
1007. Soviet Military Attaché91 commented to Second Secretary Service June 3 regarding general situation in China as follows: Japs have no intention of taking whole of Canton–Hankow Railway, and Chinese reports are deliberately covered by political and other considerations. Chinese intelligence was consistently wrong in Honan campaign first by minimizing Jap forces and after mistakenly assuming Japs were after Pinghan Line, disposing troops to meet such drive. Jap objectives were seizure agriculture area, destruction Chinese armies, training and victory for home front, all successfully achieved. Chinese intelligence having minimized Honan drive is taking no chances with Hunan campaign. To explain failure Chinese armies, they are spreading stories large scale Jap withdrawals from Manchuria into China. Chinese have produced no confirmation of such stories and do not give Russians details which can be checked. It is inconceivable Kwantung army divisions (twenty to twenty-two thousand men) could be moved without Russian knowledge. Chinese have admitted no Kwantung troops used in Honan and so far have not shown any being used in Hunan. Present Chinese claims of Jap strength in Central and South China are excessive. Chief Jap aims in present drive are destruction Chinese armies and American air bases, plunder, victory for home consumption and prevention development American air bases.
He confirmed Soviet Ambassador’s92 conversation with Generalissimo prior to former’s departure for Moscow (Embassy’s 941, May 3193) during which Ambassador said Russians desired Jap defeat but were unable to give China more aid because of war for survival against Germany.
He expressed bewilderment at present Chinese policy of deliberately ruining relations with Soviets and at same time failing to cooperate [Page 97] with Americans and British. He was pessimistic about value of American training program unless it could be concentrated on better Chinese special reserve forces which are kept at rear while provincial and troop units sent to front and spoke bitterly of Chinese failure to utilize services of Soviet military advisers including 25 divisional commanders with experience on Russian front who are now being withdrawn.