Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

835.01/168: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, March 1, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received 9:40 p.m.]

605. Farrell and Perón (the latter is, of course, directing affairs) are obviously maneuvering to meet situation created by question of recognition and are presenting their case along following lines:

1. That Ramírez is still President; that delegation of power to Farrell was voluntary on Ramírez’ part and merely internal affair not involving question of recognition by foreign powers. Statement by Martín Gras⁸⁴ on arrival La Paz was evidently carefully prepared to this end. In order to preserve this fiction, they are making every effort to prevent statement or intimation from Ramírez that action was taken under pressure. In this they have apparently succeeded thus far.

2. Insisting that Ramírez’ policy as to implementing break in relations is being followed, to wit Mason and Farrell announcement new arrests of Axis spies,⁸⁵ et cetera.

3. Appointments to Cabinet of men who they feel on their previous records would be acceptable to United States and other Republics as well as British. Teisaire⁸⁶ is a case in point and I was informed last night by Alonzo Irigoyen⁸⁷ who came with warm invitation from Perón for a conference with me that further Cabinet resignations will eventually be forthcoming and intimation that successors will be entirely satisfactory to United States.

By these methods they hope to make it difficult for Brazil, Chile and other neighbors particularly to withhold recognition and thus in event United States and certain other Republics decide on non-recognition to secure break in United-American front.

This analysis is, of course, based on conjecture but I present it for Dept’s consideration with suggestion that until we know attitude other Republics, particularly Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Chile propose to take, it may be advisable to proceed carefully in indicating what our own position will be.

I presume the point the Department wishes particularly cleared up is whether Ramírez’ action was taken under pressure. See Embassy’s telegram 591, February 29, 10 p.m.⁸⁸

While all evidence points to pressure, absolute proof in form of first-hand statement from Ramírez himself is proving extremely difficult to secure but we shall do our best.

In the meantime if there are other points on which Dept. desires further information, we shall endeavor to furnish it.

Armour

84. Gen. Martín Gras, Argentine Ambassador in Bolivia.
85. For correspondence regarding United States concern with Axis espionage in Argentina, see pp. 377 ff.
86. Rear Adm. Alberto Teisaire, Minister of Marine.
87. Presumably Under Secretary of Finance.
88. Not printed.