835.01/8–444
The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Ronald Campbell’s note No. 487 of August 4, 1944 transmitting the views of your Government with respect to Argentina.
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6. Although the reservations of the British Government with regard to recognition may be well taken in ordinary circumstances, there can be no doubt that recognition by the United Nations of the Farrell regime in the present circumstances would strike a deadly blow at the system of cooperation which the United Nations have undertaken to develop for the effective attainment of their common objectives. [Page 346] Recognition would be everywhere interpreted as the approval of conduct which has repeatedly involved the disregard of solemn international obligations. Unless we now demonstrate a capacity to develop a tradition of respect for such obligations among civilized nations, there can be little hope for a system of international security, theoretically created to maintain principles for which our peoples are today sacrificing to the limit of their resources, both human and material.
7. In numbered paragraph 8 of the communication under reference, Your Excellency’s Government refers to the desirability of consultations with Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. The same paragraph refers to the “prevalent uneasiness (among the American republics) as to the effect upon Argentina of further pressure, such as public remonstrance or embargo”.
The Government of the United States has consulted with the Governments of the countries named, as well as with all the other American republics at every stage of the present problem. Without exception, the other American republics have unqualifiedly approved our statement of the facts and basic issues. In expressing agreement with the position of this Government, the American republics have also recognized that it would be incongruous for any one of them to mediate between Argentina and any other republic. They recognize that the problem is one of equal concern to all.
My Government has received no official expression from the other American republics, and has seen very little evidence that would support the view that there is a body of opinion in this Hemisphere which would counsel against “further pressure” on Argentina. Any information to the contrary which may be in the possession of the British Government would, of course, be given great weight in our deliberations with respect to possible future action.
8. Although “the effect on the Latin American temperament of the Argentine nation of ostracizing that country’s Government” may give rise to “misgivings”, this Government considers that recognition of the Farrell regime would inevitably induce the belief among the people of Argentina,—as well as among peoples of the United Nations—that solemn international obligations may, notwithstanding the disastrous experience of recent years, be disregarded with impunity. If collective action in support of the interests of a community of states is ever to be effective, we must be prepared to run the risk that patriotic sentiment will induce the people of a recalcitrant nation deeply to resent such action against its government, however little they may otherwise respect that government. Such a resentment is perhaps deplorable, but seemingly inevitable. Only by persisting in a firm collective policy can we develop a real and practical [Page 347] sense of international responsibility, not only among governments but also among peoples.
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10. Consistently with the desire of the Government of the United States to consult fully with the British Government prior to taking new action with relation to Argentina, this Government has resorted to various channels to bring its views with regard to a possible next step fully to the attention of the British Government.
On August 9 the Acting Secretary of State met with Sir Richard Law, Sir Ronald Campbell, and Mr. Robert Henry Hadow, and stated that while the Government of the United States fully appreciates the British desire to obtain adequate meat supplies, it trusts that the negotiations with Argentina can be so handled as to reinforce our common political position. The Acting Secretary urged that the negotiations be prolonged and that any contract which may eventually be concluded be for a short term. Mr. Stettinius also emphasized the hope of this Government that the meat purchase may be treated as an isolated commercial transaction dictated by special war needs and, therefore, entirely separate from fundamental political and economic policies. In the same meeting, Mr. Stettinius informed the representatives of the British Government that we are considering a cut in our purchases from Argentina by from 40% to 60% and that serious consideration is being given to the freezing of Argentine funds.
On August 2 and again on August 11, Ambassador Winant was instructed to inform the Foreign Secretary of our views both with respect to the meat contract and with respect to possible reduction of purchases and freezing of Argentine funds.
In connection with the proposed reduction of purchases, Ambassador Winant was instructed to express our hope that the British Government may be prepared to take parallel action, thus eliminating all purchases of Argentine products not essential for the satisfaction of immediate needs.
Ambassador Winant has now informed the Department of State that he has received a letter from Mr. Eden dated August 25,80 in which the Foreign Secretary states that the British Government is fully alive to the issue raised by our messages relative to the meat contract. In his letter, Mr. Eden also recognizes the reasons why we propose to discontinue non-essential purchases at the present time and states that he is consulting the Ministry of Supply with respect to possible reduction of British purchases. With respect to the matter of freezing Argentine funds, the Foreign Secretary assumes that the action of our Treasury Department in recently prohibiting the [Page 348] export of two shipments of Argentine gold is tantamount to the freezing of funds and adds that the British Government has already applied “similar restrictions to Argentina as a neutral”.
It has been the opinion of this Government that these economic steps constitute a necessary implementation of the nonrecognition policy. In view of Mr. Eden’s recognition of the reasons which have induced that opinion, we are considering taking the indicated action at an early date. However, having in mind the thought expressed by Mr. Eden, we hope so far as possible to avoid undue publicity.
Accept [etc.]
- Copy transmitted to the Department in telegram 6927, August 25, 10 p.m., from London; neither printed.↩