287. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to the Assistant
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)0
Washington, June 9, 1948.
Dear Jimmy: The attached
represents our general thinking about the new draft.1 I should like to suggest that, since State evidently
will not go along with CIA operating this political warfare thing in any
sane or sound manner, we go back to the original concept that State
proposed. Let State run it and let it have no connection at all with us. It
seems to me
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that this is the only
thing that will satisfy State in any way and rather than try to keep a
makeshift in running order, subject to countless restrictions which can only
lead to continued bickering and argument, I think maybe the best idea is to
go back and make the OSP work for State alone.
I am sending this letter for your own information and, of course, for
Admiral Souers and have made it
separate in order that it need not be forwarded with our comments on the
last draft.
Sincerely,
Attachment3
Washington, June 9, 1948.
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Hillenkoetter to the
Assistant Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council(Lay)
SUBJECT
- 1.
- The draft directive of 8 June 1948 is considered much weaker and
less satisfactory than that of last Friday, 4 June.4 Further, the latest draft is much more
inconsistent and much less organizationally sound than the 4 June
paper.
- 2.
- For example, in para. 2 of the draft of 8 June, reasons are stated
why the new office should be placed under the Central Intelligence
Agency—then along in para. 3c are stated a number of restrictions on
what can and cannot be done, all of such restrictions leading to
confusion and chaos. Suppose the Director of Central Intelligence is
out of town, then does the work of the Special Projects stop, does
it “free wheel”, or does it work with the Acting Director of Central
Intelligence? All of this
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remains in doubt by the statement “the head of the Office of Special
Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence.”In the present set-up of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the head of any branch can see the Director of Central
Intelligence any time desired—the door is always open. It would seem
that a new branch should come in, in a similar manner. The need for
special measures, security or otherwise, exists as much for our
present Office of Special Operations as it would for the new Office
of Special Projects, and the present set-up does not seem to hamper
the Office of Special Operations, nor can I see why a similar set-up
should hamper the Office of Special Projects.
- 3.
- Also, what is meant by “to the maximum degree consistent with
efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate
independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency”?
Does this mean that the Office of Special Projects will have its own
administrative staff, its own budget staff, its own communications
net, its own services, etc. and etc? And, who is to decide what is
the “maximum degree consistent with efficiency”—the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Chief of Office of Special Projects, the
National Security Council, or who? This paragraph cannot be accepted
as is. I should much prefer the working of the corresponding
paragraph (3b) in the draft of 4 June.
- 4.
- It would seem that either the National Security Council has
confidence in the operation of the Office of Special Projects by the
Central Intelligence Agency or it has not. If such confidence
exists, then the Central Intelligence Agency should be directed to
operate the new office subject to a general declaration of policy by
the National Security Council. If such confidence does not exist,
then the Central Intelligence Agency should not be expected or
directed to operate the Office of Special Operations in any
manner.
