Moscow Embassy Files: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
4913. (Secret for the Secretary)
I am somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Government in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.
[Page 220]The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should have East Prussia except the Koenigsberg area and an expansion of her western frontier perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly including the cities of Stettin and Breslau. Subsequently the Soviet intention appeared fixed that the western boundary should be the line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions with De Gaulle, Stalin now proposes the line of the Oder to the confluence of the lower Neisse and then south along the Neisse to the Czech border near the city of Gorlitz. (This proposal was confirmed by the recent Pravda article.) In this connection Stalin indicated to De Gaulle that the Czechs might wish to expand their boundaries to the north somewhat into Silesia, although this suggestion was not defined precisely. Benes, in talking with me a year ago, did not appear to be interested in taking German territory which would increase his problems.
When Mikolajczyk was in Moscow he indicated that he was not at all certain that it was wise for the Polish boundary to go as far as the Oder and particularly to include the cities of Stettin and Breslau, as these cities and certain of the area were almost completely German. The Lublin Poles, however, showed complete readiness to assume these new responsibilities. Churchill indicated that he was willing to have the Polish frontiers go as far as the Poles wished, but I believe that at that time he had in mind only the line up to the Oder, but not beyond. What the British position is on the question of the lower Neisse line I do not know.
Both the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk indicated in the October talks that they did not wish any German population to remain within Polish territory because of the acute minority problem that this would create. The Russians and British accepted this principle. Churchill in his recent speech mentions the transfer of six million Germans out of territory to be given to the Poles. The new suggested boundary to the Neisse would evidently necessitate the transfer of several million more Germans.
Stalin also agreed with Benes in December 1943 that some if not all of the Sudeten Germans should be transferred.
We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be re-established within Germany. We have little information to appraise the consequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts incorporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the technical skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed and industrialized areas.
[Page 221]The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of territory in the West at the expense of Germany.
I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary questions until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind however is whether, if we have reservations in the present case, they should not be registered on an appropriate occasion with the British and Soviet Governments before these concepts become so fixed that they are virtually a fait accompli.