Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt 1
President Roosevelt from Prime Minister. Number 890. Personal and Top Secret.
1. One of the questions which I think should be discussed at our meeting with Stalin, or between the Foreign Secretaries, is that of Persia.
[Page 337]2. In the declaration about Persia which we and Stalin signed at Teheran in December 1943, it is stated that “The Governments of the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.”2
3. You will have seen reports of the recent attitude of the Russians in Persia. We here feel that the various forms of pressure which they have been exerting constitute a departure from the statement quoted above. They have refused to accept the Persian decision to grant no concessions until after the war: and they have brought about the fall of a Persian Prime Minister who, believing that there could be no free or fair negotiations so long as Russian (or other foreign) troops were in Persia, refused the immediate grant of their oil demands. The new Persian Prime Minister, supported by the Parliament, has maintained his predecessor’s attitude on this question. But the Russians have indicated that they do not intend to drop their demands.
4. This may be something of a test case. Persia is a country where we, yourselves and the Russians are all involved: and we have given a joint undertaking to treat the Persians decently. If the Russians are now able not only to save their face by securing the fall of the Persian Prime Minister who opposed them, but also to secure what they want by their use of the big stick, Persia is not the only place where the bad effect will be felt.
5. Please let me know whether you agree that this should be taken up with the Russians: and if so, whether you feel that it should be handled by ourselves with Stalin (as signatories of the Teheran declaration) or by the Foreign Secretaries. I think it should be our object to induce the Russians to admit that the Persians are within their rights in withholding a concession if they wish to do so. We could agree, if necessary, that the oil question should be further reviewed after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia.
6. We do not wish the Russian Government to represent that they were not warned in time of the strength of our feelings on this matter. If, therefore, you agree generally with my suggestion, I propose that we should separately or jointly let Stalin know now that we think Persia should be discussed at our next meeting (or by the Foreign Secretaries).
7. Before replying to this telegram, I think that you should see Soviet note of December 29 to Foreign Office, which we have communicated to State Department.3