Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes³

January 30, 1945

top secret

1. Agenda for Next U. S.-British Staff Conference
(C. C. S. 765/8)⁴

General Marshall said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions at Cricket . He drew attention to the following changes which it embodied: paragraph 1 (E), the Combined Bomber Offensive; paragraph 1 (F), Planning Date for the End of the German War; paragraph 2 (D), Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War; and paragraph 4. He recommended approval of the paper as presented.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve C. C. S. 765/8.

2. Overall Review of Cargo Shipping
(J. C. S. 1205/3)⁵

General Marshall said that this subject was on the agenda in order to determine the status of the study. J. C. S. 1205/3 contains the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.

Admiral King recommended approval of the paper as presented.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 746/7)⁶

3. Strategy in Northwest Europe
(J. C. S. 1237 (Argonaut ))⁷

General Marshall said this subject had been placed on the agenda for examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand thereon. He called upon General Smith to discuss the present intentions of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with future plans submitted in SCAF 180.⁸

General Smith said that timing is the important consideration at present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is under way. Our present operations were making good progress, and with the withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been relieved. The plan outlined in General Eisenhower’s message had envisaged the disposal of certain operations such as the elimination of the Colmar pocket while proceeding with the necessary build-up for the main effort. It was estimated that a period of one week would be required to remove U. S. divisions engaged in operations in the south after which mopping up operations could be turned over to the French.

There were three distinct phases in General Eisenhower’s plan: (a) operations to the west of the Rhine, (b) operations involving the establishment of bridgeheads, and (c) operations to the east of the Rhine.

In the first place, the logistics implications of operations north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could be maintained in the area of main effort in the north. This size force was insufficient for the main drive, and the Supreme Allied Commander had taken an arbitrary stand that a force of at least 30 divisions, ultimately increased to 36, would be used in the main effort.

In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take place, there were three good and two possible points for establishing bridgeheads. General Smith desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There is no foundation in the British analogy between the cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General Eisenhower feels that if we employ everything in one effort at this point, the enemy may be able to prevent a successful operation by concentrating his forces. In order to draw off some of the strength that he will undoubtedly mass in this area, a secondary effort is necessary.

In the plan proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the Cologne-Bonn area had been selected for the secondary effort. The disadvantages seen in this plan were:

a. It is too close to the main crossing of the Rhine to draw off German forces.

b. The crossing points are not good, and

c. Crossings having been made, operations become difficult due to the nature of the terrain.

All of SCAEF’s examinations lead to the selection of the Frankfurt area for the secondary effort. This area is sufficiently separated from the main drive to attract enemy forces. From Frankfurt the drive would be directed toward Kassel, over which route the nature of the terrain would permit the relative ease of movement of armored forces. Also, the lines of communication in this southern area are better than those in the north.

The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the secondary operation will be mounted. General Eisenhower prefers the Frankfurt-Kassel operation as the secondary effort. His great concern is to maintain flexibility, and in order to provide against the possibility of a slowing up of the main effort he is strongly in favor of this secondary drive.

In answer to a question by Admiral King, General Smith explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the rotation of the planned reserve.

In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn area, General Smith stated that SCAEF felt that a threat in this section would hold as many German forces as an actual crossing.

If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.

General Bull explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be possible after the first of March until the high water and ice had receded.

In response to an inquiry by General Marshall, General Smith explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all part of the build-up for the main effort in the north. He anticipated that General Bradley would encounter strong opposition when he approached the Rhine and would substitute operation Grenade . He felt that if operation Veritable could be mounted by the 8th of February the main effort would be successful as far as timing is concerned.

General Marshall referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Appendix “A” to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments in the light of the British position concerning the operations referred to therein.

General Smith emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in the Supreme Commander’s plans. It would be dangerous to try to define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented. General Montgomery is now in agreement with General Eisenhower’s plan and is quite satisfied with the arrangements. General Eisenhower has committed himself to the main effort to the north and he, General Smith, as well as the rest of the Staff, felt that the main effort would not be successful unless a secondary effort were mounted.

General Marshall referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix “A” to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command arrangements for SCAEF’s armies.

General Smith said he felt that the British would not raise the question of command at the present time. They had proposed that General Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to General Montgomery’s attitude on this matter, the British position was not yet firm.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the memorandum in Appendix “A” of J. C. S. 1237 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 761/4 (Argonaut ).)⁹.

3. J. C. S. 183d Meeting. The meetings of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that body, which took place in Washington on February 9, 1942.
4. Ante, p. 426.
5. Not printed as such, but see C. C. S. 746/7, post, pp. 536–538.
6. Post, pp. 536–538.
7. Not printed.
8. SCAF 180 was Eisenhower’s appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 1945; SCAF 194 contained General Smith’s rewording of certain paragraphs of the plan. In Message No. S–77211 Eisenhower agreed to the changed text. SCAF 180 and SCAF 194 are summarized in the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, post, pp. 828–829.
9. Not printed