Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945

Executive Secretariat Files

Briefing Book Paper

undated

Problem of Voting in the Security Council

Summary¹

1. President’s formula calls for unanimity in most cases.

Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the voting formula proposed by the President on December 5, 1944,² would prevail in six categories of decisions having political and enforcement character. It would also prevail in the remaining category of decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, except when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.

2. Soviet proposal would increase domestic United States opposition.

The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems more clearly essential to us now than heretofore. Our talks with members of Congress, and groups and individuals throughout the country, indicate that its abandonment would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists and isolationists with a powerful weapon against American participation in the Organization. It is furthermore disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity rule would be interpreted as surrender to Russia, whose rigid advocacy of that rule is widely known.

3. Soviet proposal is opposed by small nations.

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of other American republics and United Nations have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure popular support for entrance into an international organization which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and that under such a rule various smaller nations after joining the organization may feel obliged to align themselves with great powers, which would render the organization undependable and unstable.

The Problem of Voting in the Security Council

I

To bring the problem into its proper perspective, the question of voting procedure in the Security Council must be considered in relation to the functions and powers to be assigned to the Council and, therefore, to the type of substantive decisions which the Council might be called upon to make. The various types of decisions are listed in the attached memorandum,³ in which they are grouped into seven categories.

Under the voting formula proposed by the President, unanimity of the permanent members would always be required for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, a permanent member of the Council would not cast a vote if it is a party to the dispute in question.

This exception is based upon the principle that the procedures involved under the excepted category would be quasi-judicial in character, and in such procedures no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based fundamentally on the principle of equality under the law. The rule of unanimity should always prevail under the other six categories of decisions because the procedures involved are of a political character and may require the use of force. In such procedures there is every justification for placing the permanent members in a special position since they must bear the principal responsibility for action in the maintenance of peace and security.

While it is clear that, in general, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is necessary, the proposed voting formula—or, at least, its basic principle—is essential from our point of view. It amply safeguards our basic national interests. Its abandonment would weaken rather than strengthen our position, both at home and abroad, and would cause us no end of trouble.

Our talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country clearly indicate that failure to provide for at least this much of a modification of the unanimity rule would be profoundly deplored by many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. There is strong evidence that it would become a powerful weapon in the hands of both the perfectionists and the isolationists. Moreover, acceptance by us of a straight unanimity rule would inevitably be interpreted as surrender to Russia. These factors might well jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country.

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have already disclosed their strong opposition to the straight unanimity rule. All of them have indicated that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure whole-hearted support on the part of their peoples for an international organization which would thus, in popular estimation, have every earmark of a great-power alliance. Without at least some such provision as is contained in the proposed voting formula, all of them will be bitterly disillusioned, and some of them may even decide to stay out. Furthermore, under these conditions, the smaller nations, even after joining the organization, might well seek to align themselves with the various great powers and thus render the whole system precarious and unstable.

Taken in conjunction with the fact that we may have to acquiesce in some unsatisfactory peace settlements, all this would inevitably impair both our moral prestige and our political leadership in the world and might come perilously close to defeating the great cause in which we are now exercising so vigorous a leadership.

Soviet Russia’s case against the proposed formula is extremely weak. Under the proposal, she—as well as we and each of the other three permanent members—would have veto power in the following decisions:

1. Admission of new members;

2. Suspension and expulsion of members;

3. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of a breach of the peace;

4. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;

5. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;

6. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;

7. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

So long as this is so, Soviet Russia has more to gain than to lose, just as have we—in stature, in prestige, in leadership, and in prospects for a successful and effective world order—by agreeing to place herself on an equal footing with all other countries before the bar of world opinion as regards efforts on the part of the new organization to bring about peaceful settlement of whatever controversies may arise between her and other countries.

II

The manner in which the proposed voting formula would safeguard our basic national interests may be seen from the following concrete example. If the United States were to become involved in a dispute with Mexico, and if Mexico or some other country were to bring the situation to the attention of the Security Council on the plea that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace, the United States would accept the Council’s decisions made without its participation, by a vote of the other permanent members and at least two non-permanent members, only on the following questions:

1. Whether the matter should be investigated by the Council;

2. If an investigation is made, whether, on the basis of its results, the dispute should be considered to be of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

3. Whether the Council should call on the United States and Mexico to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice;

4. Whether, if the United States and Mexico, having failed to settle the dispute by means of their own choice, refer it—as they are obligated to do—to the Council, the latter should make a recommendation to them as to methods and procedures of settlement;

5. Whether the circumstances require that such a recommendation be made by the Council before the dispute is referred to it by the parties;

6. What should be the nature of the recommendation;

7. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

8. Whether the dispute does in fact arise out of a matter which, by international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States when the United States claims that this is the case;

9. Whether, if there exists a regional inter-American agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, the Council should ask such an agency to concern itself with the dispute in question;

10. Whether the matter should be referred by the Council to the General Assembly for consideration and recommendation.

Once the situation gets beyond the field of conciliation and of efforts at peaceful settlement, and the Security Council is confronted with the question as to whether or not the dispute between the United States and Mexico constitutes a threat to the peace, the United States would resume the right to cast its vote in the Council’s decisions. The right of the United States to cast its vote under the unanimity rule in all other substantive decisions of the Council would, of course, remain unimpaired throughout.

1. This summary evidently contained one more page, but it has not been found.
2. Ante, pp. 58–59.
3. Infra.