Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min 11

Minutes of the Eleventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 1, 1945, 9 p.m.

San Francisco, June 1, 1945, 9 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (19); United Kingdom (5); Soviet Union (4); China (3); and France (5).]

Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting by stating that there were approximately 12 open items on which the sponsoring governments and their distinguished friends from France had not yet reached agreement in their consultations held to date. The time had come, he said, when consultations on these questions must be completed so that the work of the Conference could go forward. He called on Mr. Pasvolsky to state the open items on which agreement had not yet been reached.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the American Delegation, after study of the matter, thought that the following important open questions should now be discussed at the level of the heads of delegations:

1. Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5.

2. Proposed changes in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2.

3. Chapter XII, paragraph 1 concerning which a problem had only just emerged.

4. Convocation of a general conference for review of the Charter.

5. Voting.

6. Election of Secretary-General.

7. Election of Deputy Secretaries-General.

8. Election of judges.

(Mr. Pasvolsky noted that problems 5, 6, 7 and 8 were directly related to the question of voting.)

9. Expulsion—(A point on which the technical committee had already reached a decision).

10. Action by the General Assembly on reports of the Security Council—Mr. Pasvolsky noted that on this question also the technical committee concerned had already acted.

11. Right of General Assembly to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations.

12. Revision of treaties—(A matter pressed by a number of delegations and one likely to come up for discussion before long.)

13. Advisory opinions—(Right of the General Assembly to ask the Court for advisory opinions.)

14. Australian pledge for separate action—(A question raised in Committee II/3.)

15. Reference to raw materials.

16. Reference to reconstruction.

17. Certain questions relating to trusteeship.

18. The preparatory commission.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that all these questions would seem to require the attention of the heads of delegations and consideration at the highest political level.

Mr. Stettinius asked what procedure should be followed in view of the recommendation that these 18 matters be dealt with by the heads of the five delegations and in view of the belief that the discussion of them in the Subcommittee of Five had gone as far as it could profitably go. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the discussions in the Subcommittee had reached a stage where it was necessary to have these questions discussed at a higher level. He suggested that the other delegations might wish to add problems to this list he had given. Mr. Stettinius asked if there were any additions and none were suggested.

Mr. Stettinius then suggested that the Committee of Five might meet as frequently as possible, every day, and if necessary, twice a day, to dispose of the open items and to reach a common understanding so that the work of the Conference could be advanced.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that he wished to cooperate with the Secretary to his utmost. He expressed concern at the number of outstanding questions and said that, if some of them could be cleared in this group, the way would be considerably cleared for the work of the Conference to go forward. He said he was prepared to meet with the Secretary as often as could be arranged. He felt that, if the representatives of the Five Powers, charged with a feeling of urgency, did their utmost to reach agreement among themselves, they could then go before the committees and the Steering Committee with a definite plan of action. This plan, he said, would in some cases involve insisting on certain solutions or, if the solutions were not accepted, of deciding what compromises could be worked out. He thought the purpose of these meetings would be to work out a definite plan of action. He said he could not contemplate with equanimity the dragging on of the Conference and the consequent loss of interest in it. He felt that at this point the leadership of the Five Powers was essential. Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Hiss was present today as an observer. He added that it was clear from the recent discussions on expediting the work of the Conference that it was really difficult to press for faster work on the part of the committees and commissions as long as the sponsoring governments and the French did not present their final positions.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he agreed fully with what Ambassador Halifax had said and that he thought agreement should be reached on all the important open points as the best way of expediting the work of the committees. He stated that the Soviet Delegation was ready to cooperate and that the only correct way was to reach agreement among the heads of the five delegations on this level. He noted that the assistants and advisers could help by discussing the questions before they were taken up in this series of meetings.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the question of primary importance on the list presented by Mr. Pasvolsky was voting procedure in the Security Council. He stated that he was now in a position to give the final opinion of the Soviet Delegation on this subject. Two questions had remained open until now:

1. Whether the Security Council, in deciding whether to accept or not to accept a matter for discussion, should decide by procedural vote or by a vote requiring the unanimity of the five permanent members?

2. Whether the decision in the future as to the substantive or procedural character of a question should be made by a procedural vote or by the normal vote on substantive questions?

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union had some time ago given its answer to the second question. It was the opinion of the Soviet Union that a unanimous vote of all the five permanent members should be required—the normal substantive vote. Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union considered the answer to question 1 of primary importance. The Soviet Union believed that the Crimean decision should be adhered to as it stands so that all decisions as to whether to accept a matter for consideration by the Security Council would be adopted by a vote of 7, including the 5 permanent members of the Council. He stated that the Soviet Union believed that this was the only correct way of answering the question, which would correspond to the necessity of preserving the position of the great powers as the bearers of the main responsibility for the future organization. This consideration, he said, had to be put above every other consideration. It was essential to safeguard the unanimity and unity of the Great Powers.

Ambassador Gromyko said he had prepared a new text of the joint statement on voting procedure, which, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, would give the proper answers to the questionnaire of the small powers. He said he would like to distribute the text and then give an explanation of it. He said that there was a Russian and an English text. The English text would serve as the working document, while the original document was in Russian. He noted that a copy of the original Russian document had been given to Mr. Pasvolsky.

The document entitled Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 1, 1945,⁵⁴ was then distributed.

Ambassador Gromyko explained that the new text involved no change in the opening unnumbered paragraph from the May 26 statement. The first numbered paragraph of the old text was crossed out and instead a new paragraph was added. Point 2 of the old text was included in the new point 1 with the exception of the final sentence. Point 2 in the Soviet draft was a new text and point 3 was also a new text. Points 3 and 4 in the old text were omitted and point 5 of the old text became point 4 in the new text.

Ambassador Gromyko explained that the Soviet Delegation agreed with the second half of the joint statement revised as of May 28⁵⁴ with the substitution of the word “contains” for “should contain” in point 1. Ambassador Gromyko concluded by saying that this was the explanation he had wished to give of the document before the group.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether there was any further comment.

Ambassador Koo said he fully shared the views of Ambassador Halifax and Ambassador Gromyko as to the urgency of the situation. The work of the Conference should be expedited and to do this it was necessary to have a more rapid method of reaching decisions among the Five Powers. He therefore welcomed the present procedure. Ambassador Koo said he was glad that Ambassador Gromyko had stated his position on the voting question and that time would be needed to study the statement. He thought that many problems could be eliminated by decisions reached in this group, and that, if any were left, those could be put up before the Steering Committee.

Mr. Dejean said he was in agreement that the work of the Conference should be expedited. On a few questions there might be some real difficulty, but he looked forward to a quick and early settlement of others.

Mr. Stettinius asked what procedure the group wished to follow. Did they wish to discuss now the matter raised by Ambassador Gromyko or did they wish to consider the items in the order presented by Mr. Pasvolsky? Ambassador Halifax indicated that he would like time to consider Ambassador Gromyko’s paper and that, if it was agreeable, he would prefer to make progress at this time on some of the other matters. Mr. Boncour, Ambassador Koo, and Ambassador Gromyko concurred in Ambassador Halifax’s statement.

Mr. Stettinius then called upon Mr. Pasvolsky to present the first item on the list of open questions—provision of armed forces.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the first item concerned the three changes in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5. (Proposed Change in Chapter VIII, Section B, Paragraph 5, May 30, 1945, was then distributed.)⁵⁵ Mr. Pasvolsky explained that one point concerned the manner in which the agreements for the provision of armed forces would be concluded. Originally they were to be concluded among the member states and the wording used was “among themselves”. Agreement had since been reached that these agreements should be made on the initiative of the Security Council. It was proposed further that they be concluded between the Security Council and member states or groups of member states. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the second point was the addition of the phrase “facilities including rights of passage”. The four delegations were in favor of this addition, while the Soviet Delegation did not favor it. The third point was the addition of the phrase “their degree of readiness and general location” as one of the items to be governed by the special agreements. Upon this, he said, the five delegations were in agreement. Mr. Pasvolsky said he hoped that he had stated the positions of the governments correctly.

Mr. Jebb suggested that Mr. Pasvolsky had not read from the latest text, or that, if his text was the most recent one, then the British had a suggestion to make. Mr. Pasvolsky asked what the suggestion was and Mr. Jebb replied that the British favored using the following wording for the first point stated by Mr. Pasvolsky: “on the initiative of the Security Council and concluded between the Security Council and member states or between the Security Council and groups of member states”. The last three lines on the May 30, 1945, draft would then be omitted and the last sentence would stop with the word “processes”.

General agreement was expressed with this redrafting and Ambassador Halifax suggested that consideration of the draft as a whole be given sentence by sentence.

Mr. Pasvolsky then read the first sentence in which it was proposed to add the phrase “including rights of passage”.

Ambassador Halifax stated that he understood the French Delegation attached considerable importance to the inclusion of the provision for “rights of passage”, and that the Soviet Delegation did not want to include this provision. He understood the argument of the Soviet Delegation was that the use of the general term “facilities” was satisfactory, whereas doubt would be thrown on certain very important facilities if only one of them, i.e., the rights of passage, was included. He stated that, so far as the British Delegation was concerned, they felt the force of the Soviet argument. However, the British Delegation did not think the enumeration of the rights of passage would be restrictive since the word “including” was used. The Delegation did not feel strongly that the words should be in or out, but, since the French Delegation attached such importance to the addition and since the rights of passage would certainly be needed as one of the facilities, the Delegation took the view that the phrase should be added. Mr. Dejean said he was very happy at the statement made by Lord Halifax and that the French did attach great importance to this provision.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Soviet Delegation took the view that facilities include “Rights of passage” and that to mention them threw doubt on other facilities.

Mr. Dejean stated that, if it was not possible to reach agreement among the Big Five, then it would perhaps be wise to handle the matter further in the technical committee. Ambassador Halifax agreed that this was a good suggestion and that a decision might well be left to the vote of the committee. Mr. Stettinius asked if this was agreeable to Mr. Koo. Ambassador Koo did not think it was necessary to include the phrase, but, because of the feeling of the French on the importance of the phrase, the Chinese Delegation was willing to accept it on the understanding that the French would withdraw their two other related amendments. Mr. Dejean agreed that the French Delegation would not insist on its amendment to paragraph 6, but that its other amendment was in a somewhat different category.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the position of the United States Delegation was similar to the British Delegation. He stated that he was very anxious that agreement should be reached and was agreeable to the suggestion that the question now be brought before the technical committee and eventually, if necessary, before the Steering Committee. Ambassador Gromyko said he wished to make it clear that he was not ready to accept the inclusion of the phrase “rights of passage” at this meeting or at any meeting of a technical committee.

Mr. Stettinius commented that this was already the fifth week and that it was very important to bring the work to a successful conclusion. On some items it was possible to reach unanimous agreement. When it was not possible to reach unanimous agreement, a decision would have to be made on how to deal with the question at issue. He suggested that there be a discussion of the procedure. Ambassador Halifax questioned whether it was well to refer the problem under discussion to the Steering Committee. He preferred letting the matter come to a vote in the technical committee and questioned whether it would be a very serious matter for the Soviet Ambassador, on a matter which was not vitally important, to have the vote go against him. He pointed out that every state had at times to accept adverse votes and that this was not serious so long as a vital problem was not at issue. Each state, he said, could give their position in the technical committee and should be content with the decision of the committee.

Mr. Dejean said he also favored reference of the problem under discussion to the Technical Committee. Ambassador Koo also agreed, but noted that reference to the Technical Committee should only be a last resort after the best effort had been made to reach agreement among the Five Powers.

Mr. Stettinius said the procedure suggested was agreeable to him. If, after discussion was exhausted in this group, agreement had not been reached, he felt the matter should be referred back to the technical committees for their decision. Ambassador Gromyko indicated he had nothing to say on this matter. Mr. Stettinius commented that, when it was impossible to reach a final decision in this group, consultations would have to be ended and there was obviously no other recourse but to refer the matter to the committees.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that he could not at any time give his consent to inclusion of the phrase concerning “rights of passage”. Mr. Stettinius commented that the French would not withdraw their amendment and the Soviets would not consent to the amendment. He asked if some one had a suggestion as to what should be done. He added that, since the Soviet position was not acceptable to the French Delegation, he saw nothing else to do but go to the committee for a vote.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that the Soviet position rested on the assumption that “assistance and facilities” includes “rights of passage” and that it was not logical to enumerate one type of assistance and not to enumerate naval bases, airfields, etc.

Mr. Boncour pointed out that the French believed that provision for rights of passage was very important and was not a mere detail. The absence of rights of passage before the war had been one of the greatest obstacles to the prevention of aggression. It was too important not to be expressly mentioned. Mr. Dejean pointed out that, if agreement could be reached at this meeting that facilities includes rights of passage, then already some progress had been made.

Ambassador Halifax said he would like to make it clear that the British would be content with a committee vote on this question. The use of the word “including” implies that rights of passage are included in the term “facilities” and he said did not imply that any other particular facilities were excluded.

Mr. Boncour suggested that, if the Soviet Delegation applied their principle consistently, then it was not proper to enumerate the measures that could be taken by the Security Council under paragraph 3, Section B, Chapter VIII. Ambassador Gromyko indicated that in this paragraph a large number of measures were enumerated and not simply one. Mr. Dejean noted that the French insistence on enumerating the “rights of passage” was due to a conviction that these rights were essential. Mr. Boncour referred to an incident when a statesman in reply to the comment that “the matter goes without saying” replied that it “goes all the better if you say it”.

Ambassador Koo suggested that it might be better to include the phrase “rights of passage” in brackets. Mr. Boncour suggested that the rights of passage were the least one could ask of a state that was not called upon to supply armed forces. He noted that “rights of passage” were specifically mentioned in the League Covenant. Ambassador Gromyko added that this special mention did not help to get the League Covenant accepted. Mr. Boncour replied that it would have been far worse not to have them mentioned.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the Subcommittee of Five had considered the possibility of not mentioning the “rights of passage” in the text, but including them in a supplementary memorandum and agreeing to an official interpretation of the text.

Mr. Stettinius said he could see nothing better than to go before the Committee for a discussion and a vote on this matter. He indicated that, if no objection was raised, this procedure would be followed. Since no objection was indicated, Mr. Stettinius announced that consultations on this item were closed and that the question would be referred to the Technical Committee.

Mr. Stettinius then asked Mr. Pasvolsky to proceed to the next item of business. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the next business before the group was to consider the proposed French amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. He asked that distribution be made of the document Proposed Change in Sponsoring Governments’ Amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, May 23, 1945.

Mr. Pasvolsky explained that on this paper a proposal was set forth by the French Delegation for the substitution of a last sentence in place of the final phrasing of the sponsoring governments’ amendment. Mr. Pasvolsky then read the additional sentence: “The authorization of the Security Council shall be necessary for such measures from the moment when, at the request of the governments parties to the arrangements referred to above, the Organization is charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by a state enemy of the United Nations in this war.”

Mr. Pasvolsky noted that there had been some discussion of the addition of the word “enforcement” before “measures” in the second sentence. Following discussion of this question on many occasions in the Subcommittee of Five agreement had been reached to eliminate the word “enforcement”. He said that the situation with respect to the proposed amendment was a complicated one. The French and the Soviet Delegations favored the substitution of the new language just read for the previous text of the sponsoring governments’ amendment. The United States and Chinese Delegations favored retaining the original text, changing only the words “by consent” to “on request”. The United Kingdom has said it would accept either version.

Mr. Dejean explained that on the question of substance there was general agreement and that it was felt that the two texts actually meant the same thing. He added that the French Delegation believed their text to be clearer. He said the French had two preoccupations on which he felt there should be agreement among the Five:

1. To make sure that the scope of this paragraph is limited to preventive measures, and

2. That the regional agreements directed against removal [renewal?] of aggression on the part of the enemy states remain in existence.

He explained that the reason for the presentation of the new text was in particular to correct the misinterpretations that had arisen to the effect that the regional agreements would go out of existence when the Security Council assumed responsibility for preventing further aggression by enemy states.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that with respect to the first point raised by Mr. Dejean the texts were exactly the same. In both texts the regional arrangements would be defined as those directed against removal [renewal?] of aggressive policy on the part of enemy states and in both the alternative texts under discussion the phrase “responsibility for preventing further aggression” was used. As to the second point, he felt that under the original text there was no room for doubt as to the continued existence of regional agreements. The entire paragraph dealt only with the measures under such agreements directed against aggression on the part of enemy states. Mr. Dejean said that his Government had been severely criticized and, if there had not been wide-spread misinterpretation of this paragraph, there would have been no need of the proposed French clarification.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Ambassador Koo would like to comment on this question. Ambassador Koo replied that the Chairman would recall that the position of the Chinese Delegation on this matter was clear. So far as the prevention of aggression by enemy states was concerned the Chinese Delegation felt that the original text was satisfactory. So far as the position of the regional arrangements was concerned the Delegation preferred the wording of the paragraph in the sponsoring governments’ amendment with “by consent” changed to “on request”.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Ambassador Gromyko wished to comment further on this question. Ambassador Gromyko replied that the French text was better than the original. It was more precise and gave a better definition of the idea involved. He said he still maintained the view that the text as set forth in the draft of May 23, 1945, was desirable with the exception of the elimination of the word “enforcement”.

Ambassador Halifax said that the British did not detect any great difference between the two texts and said that they did not feel strongly on the subject. They were inclined, however, to feel that the French text was clearer and on balance would prefer to see the French text adopted. Mr. Stettinius stated that he did not believe the delegations were too far apart on this question. In principle they were in agreement. He wondered whether it would not be wise to sleep over the issue and see if we could not come up with some revised language that would meet the wishes of all. He asked Ambassador Gromyko if this procedure would be satisfactory. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he would agree to it if everybody else agreed, but that he still believed that the French text most perfectly expressed the idea we wanted. Mr. Dejean indicated that he also felt that the French text was quite clear, but that he realized an effort should be made to come to an agreed text. Ambassador Gromyko said there were no defects in the French text that he would wish to have eliminated.

Ambassador Gromyko then asked the Secretary for the reasons why the American Delegation would not accept the French text. He commented that very little had been said upon this question.

Mr. Pasvolsky explained that the United States Delegation felt that the original text was quite direct and simple and stated adequately the ideas we have in mind. He added that it was clear from this text that the only thing excluded from the scope of the Organization were enforcement measures against enemy states under Chapter XII, paragraph 2 or under regional arrangements. Moreover, the original text tied the exception closely to the subsequent provision for action by the Organization. He explained that the United States Delegation liked the phrase “until such time as” since this indicated the strong probability of the Organization at some time taking over the responsibility for preventing aggression by present enemy states. He felt the position of both the Organization and of the regional arrangements were safeguarded and that the separation of the thought into two distinct sentences introduced an element of weakness. He added that it was clear from the original text, if the words “by consent” were changed to “on request”, that the functions involved could only be passed over to the Organization when a request was made and the Organization was agreeable to accepting these functions. He explained that the United States Delegation favored the phrase “on request of the governments concerned” to the phrase “parties to the arrangements referred to above” since it raised fewer questions. Fundamentally, the United States Delegation questioned why we should begin to revise the text of this paragraph when in fact it covers the needs of the French.

Ambassador Halifax said he would like to make one observation. He said he did not detect any real difference between the two proposals before the committee. He saw the virtues claimed by Mr. Pasvolsky for the original text in the French amendment. From the point of view of public acceptance, he thought the French text would be better, particularly since it appeared to give greater place to the role of the Security Council. Instead of the phrase “until such time”, the statement was directly made “the authorization of the Security Council shall be necessary …” He suggested that this emphasis was a good one for those who were interested in building up the Security Council.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that, while the United States Delegation had no intention of weakening the regional arrangements, they wished to indicate clearly that these arrangements would not operate in perpetuity to prevent aggression by the enemy states. The phrase “until such time” he felt suggested clearly that the Organization would take over these functions, that were now for good reason outside the purview of the Organization, when it was sufficiently effective to take them over. Clearly, he said, the regional arrangements themselves would not need to go out of existence, but the principal interest of the United States Delegation was in the time factor.

Ambassador Halifax commented that the time factor was expressed with clarity in the French amendment.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that Mr. Stassen wished to ask a question on a point of clarification. Mr. Stassen said it was not clear in his mind why a change was desired in the text of the Four-Power amendment which had been agreed to after the most thorough and painstaking discussion. He said he did not understand why, if the new text meant the same as the old, the new text was so strongly preferred. He wondered whether there was not in fact some real difference between the two texts. He understood that the French Delegation had been consulted on the original text and that the Soviet Delegation had withheld final approval of the text until it had had time to study it carefully and had given its approval a day or two after the other three governments had agreed to sponsor it. He asked why the request for a change had come up at this time.

Mr. Dejean commented that the original text had been misinterpreted in France and that a clarification seemed necessary. He said he did not believe the French had had any part in the formulation of the original Four-Power amendment. Senator Vandenberg thought that, if the question was really a matter of misinterpretation, it would be possible to correct the misinterpretation by an agreed official interpretation. Mr. Dejean thought the language should be clear in the Charter. The misinterpretation that he had spoken of earlier, he said, was that people believed in France that under the original proposal the regional agreements would cease to exist.

Mr. Stassen wondered whether the problem could not be solved if wording was found to make clear that the Organization would have in the course of time the right to take over responsibility for preventing further aggression against enemy states, but that the arrangements themselves would continue in force for the other purposes for which they had been organized. Mr. Dejean agreed that some language to convey this idea ought not to be difficult to find and pointed out that the French did not attach special importance to the separation of the two sentences.

Ambassador Gromyko pointed out that there seemed to be a real difference in the two formulas. The words “the responsibility” suggested that all responsibility would be taken over by the Security Council so that the treaty arrangements would altogether cease to exist. The phrase “arrangements” in the French amendment, however, suggested that part of the responsibility only would be transferred to the Security Council at the request of the parties and part of the responsibility would still be carried by the regional arrangements. He said this difference was very important for those who believed in the treaties.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be studied over night to see whether some modification of language could be arrived at. This procedure was accepted.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the next item for discussion involved Chapter XI and concerned the question of the time at which a general conference for review of the Charter would be convened and also the question as to the type of majority vote required in the Assembly for the calling of such a conference. Mr. Pasvolsky added that the point had also been suggested that the vote of the Council might be entirely eliminated in the calling of the conference so that the Assembly alone would have the power to act on this question. He stated that the United States Delegation had studied the matter and had no objection to a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, had no objection to stating that the conference would be called within a certain period, say between seven and ten years, and felt strongly that elimination of the Council from the decision to call the conference should be resisted.

Mr. Pasvolsky added that there was a related question as to what would happen to a country not one of the permanent members that found itself unable to accept an amendment. Should this country be given the right to withdraw? The matter might be handled, he said, by providing in a committee interpretation that, should a country at any time find an amendment impossible to accept, the silence of the Charter on withdrawal would not forbid withdrawal and each withdrawal effort would be considered in the light of the circumstances of the time.

Mr. Stettinius called on Ambassador Gromyko to comment on the problem under discussion. Ambassador Gromyko stated that it would be undesirable to accept a specific period of time for the calling of the conference. If such an acceptance was decided upon, the implication would be that, for the period until the calling of the conference, the Organization we were setting up had merely a temporary character. He pointed out that it was not accidental that many of the delegations were pushing this proposal. They were opposed to the veto provision and wished to give the Charter a temporary character so that the next conference could be the real one. From this point of view he did not think it advisable to accept the definite period of time. He added that, supposing the period was set at seven years and it became necessary to call a conference within five years, we would find ourselves bound by a rigid provision. On the other hand, perhaps in ten years there would be no important proposals for change, yet we would have to call a conference. What would there be to discuss? In his opinion the most flexible formula, which did not state the time of the conference but allowed it to be called according to circumstances, would be most satisfactory.

Mr. Stettinius asked Ambassador Gromyko whether he would be willing to accept a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he would prefer to stick to the former agreement on a three-fourths vote. He added that the more votes the better and the more democratic.

Ambassador Halifax expressed agreement that it would be a great mistake to specify the period for holding the conference. There was great force in the argument that we might not want a conference at the time set, so that everyone would have to set to work to find flaws in the Charter about which to make speeches. He said he could not help recalling that when the Constitution for India was drawn up it had been unwisely provided that at the end of ten years the Constitution should be reviewed. Regardless of the circumstances it had been necessary to have the inquiry. This had persuaded him of the evil of fixed dates. He did not like the idea of pulling up the plant to see how it was growing, and preferred saying in the Charter that, after the lapse of a certain time, machinery could be set to work to hold a conference if it was desirable.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that this whole matter was related to the opposition of many states to the veto provision. Since many states were very sensitive on this matter, it would be good to meet their desires to some extent. He would be agreeable, therefore, to changing the vote in the Assembly from a three-fourths to a two-thirds vote. With respect to the right of withdrawal, he would strongly oppose doing anything that would emphasize that the Charter had anything other than a permanent character.

Mr. Dejean said he had no objection to the change to a two-thirds vote, but that he felt that it would be better not to stipulate a specific time for the holding of a conference. Ambassador Koo commented that it was quite unusual to have any provision for the general review of an instrument. He realized, however, that other countries were very anxious to strengthen this provision and that it was important to complete the work of the conference with maximum satisfaction, so that the delegations would go away with a real sense of confidence. He said that if there was a definite period stipulated of seven to ten years he would favor a two-thirds vote. If, however, no definite period was set, he would favor a three-fourths vote. He said the one concern of the Chinese Delegation was to make this provision more acceptable in order to diminish the anxiety felt by many states. He expressed a preference for not setting a definite time for the conference, feeling that this would induce misgivings.

Mr. Stettinius indicated that Ambassador Gromyko had indicated a desire to study this question further. Ambassador Halifax asked whether it would be possible to record some common agreement on the question. Ambassador Gromyko stated that a number of new thoughts had been presented and that he did not find himself in a position to state his final views. Mr. Stettinius suggested that further study be given to this matter.

Mr. Stettinius then stated that Norway’s request to invite Denmark to the Conference should next be discussed. He added that the Soviet Government had requested that three matters go before the Steering Committee—the election of the Secretary-General, the election of deputy secretaries-general, and expulsion. He thought it might be preferable to defer action in the Steering Committee on these points until agreement had been reached in this group. Ambassador Gromyko said this procedure was quite agreeable to him.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the possibility of a meeting of the Steering Committee and of the Executive Committee was under consideration. There was the problem, however, that a large number of questions would be asked on points on which it would be difficult to give an answer at this time. He called on Mr. Hiss to indicate something of the background on the situation.

Mr. Hiss recommended that a series of Steering Committee meetings be avoided while the technical committees were still at work. The holding of Steering Committee meetings interrupted the work of the technical committees and also he felt it would be well to clear up as many points as possible in this group before calling any meeting of the Steering Committee.

Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Hiss to report on the progress of the Conference. Mr. Hiss stated that, if the eighteen questions before the group were cleared up, he thought the committees could finish by the end of next week, the commissions meet by the first of the next week, and the drafting be completed by the Coordinating Committee during that week. He thought that speed on these eighteen issues and a decision on them would immensely speed up the Conference as a whole.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether there was considerable uneasiness in the committees at the necessity of waiting for decisions by this group. Mr. Hiss replied that he had not received many reports of criticism, but that he felt the criticisms would grow in the next day or two unless the more important log jams were broken. He pointed out that already a number of committees were unable to do anything. Ambassador Halifax indicated that a number of committees were not even meeting.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this group reconvene at ten the next morning and spend the necessary hours to go through the open questions.

Ambassador Halifax agreed to this procedure, and asked that an agenda be prepared for each meeting so that the subjects under discussion would be clear. He said he hoped that Denmark would be asked to the Conference, and quickly. He thought the power rested with the sponsoring governments to invite Denmark and questioned further delay. Ambassador Halifax asked Mr. Hiss if his assumption was correct.

Mr. Hiss replied that without any ruling the Conference had assumed the right to pass on all invitations when it admitted the three delegations not originally invited to the Conference. Once the Conference began, the function of inviting additional members became a Conference function and the authority of the sponsoring governments expired. Mr. Hiss pointed out that there was no specific rule to this effect but that it would seem to be understood.

Mr. Stettinius agreed that all the United Nations would want the opportunity to express their approval or disapproval of a further invitation. Mr. Boncour suggested that the matter might be referred to the Steering Committee. Mr. Stettinius indicated that was what he had in mind. Ambassador Halifax noted that with respect to the three delegations previously admitted to the Conference there had been no agreement among the sponsoring governments, whereas he thought there could be such agreement on Denmark. The sponsoring governments could then report their decision to the Steering Committee and expect unanimous support. Ambassador Halifax suggested that there were two alternatives: To call a meeting of the Steering Committee the next day with this one item of business on the agenda or to call a meeting of the Steering Committee on Monday with this item and possibly a number of others on the agenda.

Mr. Stettinius suggested it might be best to hold an Executive Committee meeting first to formulate a recommendation to the Steering Committee. Ambassador Halifax thought a short circuit might be used since there was general agreement in the group on the substance of the matter.

Ambassador Gromyko indicated that either way he handled the matter would suit him. Ambassador Koo suggested that in the interests of economy the Steering Committee meetings be held only when there were a number of items to discuss.

Mr. Stettinius suggested the meeting be called on Monday following the strenuous labors of this group to reach decisions on the open items and that the issue of Denmark’s invitation be placed first on the agenda of the Monday meeting. Mr. Stettinius asked if this was agreeable to the other members of the group and all of the members indicated their agreement.

Ambassador Gromyko suggested that this present group should determine the agenda for the Steering Committee meeting. Mr. Stettinius agreed.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:05 p.m.

54. Not printed.
54. Not printed.
55. Not printed.