7440.00119 Council/10–145

Memorandum of Conversation47

Present: The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Molotov
Ambassador Gusev
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bevin
Sir Ronald Campbell
Mr. Paton-Smith

Mr. Molotov said he had asked the others to come in order to find some way to finish this matter in peace. He said the only way to do that was for no one to attempt to impose their decisions on another. What had been agreed on should be recorded in protocols but disagreements should merely be taken note of. Otherwise, an awkward situation would develop. He added that no international conference could impose a decision on any country except on a defeated country and everyone at this Conference was on equal footing.

The Secretary replied that there must be some misunderstanding, that there was no question of imposing any decisions on anybody. He said of course all were equal but it looked a little to them as though the Russians were asking that the others accept their wishes. He added that last night Mr. Molotov had said that the participation of China and France was based on invitations issued by the signatory powers and a reference to that effect should go into the protocols in regard to the peace treaties.

Mr. Molotov interposed to remark that only on the understanding that there should be a further notation to the effect that this decision had been repealed. In this way a mistake would be corrected.

The Secretary replied that that was precisely the question—whether all could agree to repeal the invitations. He went on to say that they had also agreed to invite White Russia and the Ukraine to come and state their views and that if the invitations under the September 11 decision were null and void did this mean that the other [Page 518] invitations were also. For example, what would happen if Mr. Bevin decided to object to these other invitations.

Mr. Molotov said he would have that right and that there would then be no decision.

After further discussion as to the status of other information Mr. Molotov remarked that the Soviet delegation considered the invitation withdrawn due to their objection and that no one could force him to sign any agreement which he felt had been wrongfully taken.

The Secretary remarked that it was likewise impossible to force him to withdraw invitations which had been issued in full conformity with the Berlin decision. He said he was regretfully prepared to withdraw this invitation if his proposal for the convoking of a conference was accepted which would constitute assurance to France and China as well as other nations that they would be brought in at a later stage on an equal footing.

Mr. Bevin said he agreed with Mr. Byrnes and in a spirit of compromise could they not agree to record what had happened. That is, leave the decision of September 11 as it was adopted in the protocol but include the Soviet reservation as set forth in their statement of September 22.48 They could then continue the consideration of the other protocols. He added that on Saturday he had agreed that the signatures on the various protocols would be limited to the representatives of the countries who had participated in the decision.

Mr. Molotov remarked that nothing could come out of such a proposal and that he felt Mr. Bevin was trying to bring on a quarrel.

Mr. Bevin replied that he would ask Mr. Molotov not to charge him with motives that he did not have when he had made the suggestion in good faith.

Mr. Molotov then said that for example at Dumbarton Oaks49 there had been two separate sets of meetings; one, the U.K., the U.S., and the U.S.S.R.; the second, the U.K., the U.S., and China and that the general protocol had then been issued and that no one had felt offended, neither China because she was not in the first series nor the Soviet Union because she was not in the second.

The Secretary remarked that Mr. Molotov apparently wished to completely reverse the Dumbarton procedure. There, there had been separate meetings and one protocol, and here there had been one meeting and Mr. Molotov wanted separate protocols. He said furthermore that everyone had known the reason why the Soviet Union [Page 519] and China did not want to sit together at Dumbarton Oaks because the Soviet Union was not in the Pacific war.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that they join the Council as they did not appear to be getting very far.

  1. Authorship of this memorandum not indicated, but presumably written by Mr. Bohlen.
  2. For Molotov’s statement at the Council’s 17th meeting, September 22, 5:30 p.m., regarding the Soviet reservations, see p. 316.
  3. For documentation regarding the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21 to October 7, 1944, regarding the establishment of an International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 713 ff.