740.00119 Control (Austria)/9–1845: Telegram
The United States Military Commissioner for Austria (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 5
PV 7521. This is Part 2 of my P[V] 7519 and contains my personal views.
1. At the outset of the discussion it was made clear by the Soviets that they would insist upon a minimal feeding standard for Austria. The following proposal with regard to foreight [foreign?] sources of food supply was made by me and supported by the British and French:
“The Allied Council for Austria is further unanimously agreed that, as a matter of policy, food to meet the Austrian deficit should come from normal prewar sources, principally Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria;
That an examination be made of the imports which present conditions in those countries will permit;
That the resulting quantities be taken into account as a part of the means of meeting the deficit and that to the extent that the need cannot be met from the countries concerned, other sources of supply be found.”
The Russians firmly refused to support this proposal on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the Council’s competence.
Further they stated that though we were not fully cognizant of conditions in central and southeastern Europe there were indications that because of droughts and other factors there were no surpluses for Austria to be had from those areas and it would therefore be impracticable to recommend that any reliance be placed on such sources.
Despite innumerable attempts to reword this paragraph in more innocuous terms, the Russians resolutely refused to accept any text which made any reference to the Danubian Basin or Central European supply sources. In fact they refused to accept the recommendation that as a matter of policy, deficit would come from “normal pre-war sources,” no geographical areas being named.
2. In this connection, I am aware of the alarming proportions to which the United States is becoming committed as the residual world supplier. I have done everything to stress in the Council meeting the importance of reserving local resources entirely for the Austrian population and of obtaining for Austria supplies from nearby countries. Yet we must steer clear of wishful thinking and give you a fair picture of what we believe are the facts of the case as seen from here.
[Page 601]It would be unrealistic to assume that more than insignificant quantities of foodstuffs, possibly sugar, from Czechoslovakia, could be obtained from the Danubian Basin during 1945–1946. It has become evident since I dispatched my P 10546 to you a month ago that sweeping social changes, population transfers, hasty land reforms, changes in farm controls, indiscriminate removal of livestock, farm machinery and transport vehicles in all of eastern Europe, as well as the drought that affected much of the area, have eliminated virtually all surpluses that would under normal conditions have been produced in these regions.
(This information furnished by experts of the Department of Agriculture. Have had presently the advice of Dr. Motz and Dr. Richter, which was concurred in by a recent conference of 15 United States Agriculture Attachés. These facts, they tell me, are well known in Washington and in London.)
Of course I am speaking of the present crop year and it may well be that over a long-term, the Danubian Basin will be the granary for Austria.
3. As indicated in para 2 of the official agreement,7 the differences in the calculations of the deficits are accounted for by differences in the feeding goals envisioned. The British-French estimates are based on a feeding goal of an average ration of 1700 calories for the total population, including farmers. The American estimate is based upon an average ration of 1700 calories for the non-farming population, allowing for unavoidable retentions by farmers of approximately 2750 calories, or slightly less than their retentions in previous years. The Soviet position is that the Austrian ration scale should be limited to the ration of a vanquished nation.
Russians also wish to reserve barley for human consumption, while the United States, British and French feel that it will inevitably be used for animal feed.
4. The Russians brought up several proposals for increasing Austrian food supplies, such as making use of the existing Central Austrian Government for the initiation of a foreign trade program, rehabilitation of Austrian industry and railroads, and the extension of arable land, all of these proposals answering [assuming?] political recognition of the Renner government. These, however, were rejected on the ground that the question of the Renner government is on the Agenda for the next regular meeting of the Allied Council of September 20th.
5. With regard to point 5 concerning non-requisition of indigenous food supplies,8 it should be pointed out that although the Russians have invariably taken the position that they never have requisitioned [Page 602] Austrian supplies nor intend to do so, entirely reliable sources report that extensive requisitioning is going on not only by individuals and units throughout lower Austria, but also centrally by the Russian High Command in Vienna with demands in some instances placed directly on the Renner government.
6. In view of the urgency in reporting to the Council of Ministers, it had previously been decided that only food and not fuel would be dealt with at this time.
[Here follow statistics based on the estimates of United States authorities of the food import requirements for all zones of Austria for the next twelve months.]