740.00119 Control (Austria)/12–1245: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:30 a.m.]
558. Reference my 359 [539] December 7,48 see General Clark’s P–7673, December 9 for JCS49 (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to be repeated to Secretary of State, second section, referring to Topic D of Wagx 8627449 My supplemental suggestions are as follows:
Re paragraph (3) of reference section of P–7673, it is my opinion that highest US representative in Allied Commission should be military as long as Soviets have a military man in that position or have any considerable number of troops in Austria. One important reason for this is General Clark’s strong personal relationship with Marshal Koniev, who we believe will continue to be highest Soviet representative.
Subpara (b) of same paragraph states that the matters referred to as appropriate for control or supervision by Allied Commission should be dealt with by latter on basis of unanimity. In some cases Allied Commission would take affirmative action, but in others it would exercise power of veto over proposed acts of Austrian Government. In latter cases there would be two alternatives for the application of principles of unanimity. The first is that when a proposed act of Austrian Government was submitted for approval, it would be allowed [Page 680] to go into effect automatically, unless unanimous agreement was reached in Allied Commission to veto it. This alternative would permit Austrian Government to carry out most of its decisions without Allied obstruction and would encourage development of Austrian self-government. The second alternative is that when a proposed act of the Austrian Government was submitted for AC approval, it would be disapproved unless all four members agreed to approve it. In other words, each representative in AC would alone be able to veto the government’s proposed act. Although this alternative would substantially curtail Austrian independence, it would assure to each occupying power that no action falling within the control or supervision category could be taken if contrary to its policies or interests in Austria.
It seems likely that if Austrian Communist Party had not been so badly defeated in recent elections, Soviets would favor the first alternative. However, it now seems plain they will instead insist upon the second. On other hand, it is possible that, partly on account of election results, British policy might now lean toward the first alternative.