Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 B.W./4–2545

Transcript of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation Between President Truman and British Prime Minister Churchill ²⁴

April 25, 1945, 2:10 p.m.

Churchill: Is that you, Mr. President?

Truman: This is the President, Mr. Prime Minister.

Churchill: How glad I am to hear your voice.

Truman: Thank you very much, I am glad to hear yours.

Churchill: I have several times talked to Franklin, but …²⁵ have you received the report from Stockholm by your ambassador?

Truman: Yes, I have.²⁶

Churchill: On that proposal?

Truman: Yes. I have just a short message saying that there was such a proposal in existence.

Churchill: Yes, it’s of course …²⁵ we thought it looked very good.

Truman: Has he anything to surrender?

Churchill: I called the War Cabinet together and they opposed [approved?] my telegraphing to tell Stalin and also repeating our news through the usual channels to you.

Truman: What has he to surrender? Does that mean everything, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Holland?

Churchill: They mentioned Italy, and Yugoslavia. We mentioned everything and have included that to take in Denmark and Norway. Everything on the Western Front, but he hasn’t proposed to surrender on the Eastern Front. So we thought perhaps it would be necessary to report it to Stalin that is, of course, to say that in our view the surrender must be simultaneous to agree to our terms.

Truman: I think he should be forced to surrender to all three governments, Russia, you, and the United States. I don’t think we ought to even consider a piecemeal surrender.

Churchill: No, no, no. Not a piecemeal surrender to a man like Himmler. Himmler will be speaking for the German state as much as anybody can. And therefore we thought that his negotiations must be carried on with the three governments.

Truman: That’s right, that’s the way I feel exactly.

Churchill: I see, of course, that’s local surrender on the front, Himmler’s allied front. And then Eisenhower is still authorized to make [take?] the surrender, well, then he will wish to surrender.

Truman: Yes, of course.

Churchill: You understand that?

Truman: I understand that. If he is speaking for the German government as a whole, that ought to include the surrender of everything, and it ought to be to all three governments.

Churchill: Certainly, what we actually sent was that there could be no question as far as His Majesty’s Government is concerned of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers.

Truman: All right. I agree to that.

Churchill: Have you said anything to the Russians yet?

Truman: No I haven’t. I was waiting to hear from you. I haven’t received the message from Stockholm. This information that you are giving me now is the only information that I have on the subject, except that I was informed that your conversation was based on a message that you had from Stockholm.

Churchill: Yes.

Truman: I have no other information except what I am receiving now from you.

Churchill: I see. I can give you the message which our ambassador in Stockholm sent me. Would you like me to read it to you?

Truman: I would appreciate it very much if you will.

Churchill: Yes. It is a little long. Tell me if you don’t hear it as it comes.

Could you hear that all right?

Truman: Yes, I could hear.

Churchill: And General Finisberg [Schellenberg] of Himmler’s staff told Bernadotte that it was hemorrhage of the brain.

4. In that statement, [Himmler stated] that while Hitler was still active he would not have been able to take the steps he now proposed but that as Herr Hitler was finished he was now in a position of full authority to act. He then asked Bernadotte to forward to the Swedish Government his desire that they could [should] make arrangements in order to arrange for him to meet General Eisenhower in order to capitulate on the whole Western Front. Bernadotte remarked that such a meeting (Bernadotte is a Swede, a Swedish Red Cross man) was not necessary in that Himmler could simply order his troops to surrender. That announcement asked him [He was not willing] to forward Himmler’s request to the Swedish Government, and that [unless] Norway and Denmark were included in this capitulation. If this were the case, there might be some point in a meeting because special technical arrangements might have to be made with Eisenhower and de Gaulle²⁸ if the Germans were to lay down their arms in those two countries. He then replied that he was prepared to order the troops in Denmark and Norway to surrender to either British, American, or Swedish troops.

5. He in there [Himmler?] hopes to continue resistance on the Eastern Front at least for a time, which Bernadotte told him was hardly possible, in fact, that it would not be acceptable to the Allies. Himmler mentioned, for instance, that he hoped that the Western Allies rather than the Russians would be first to make this step [to enter Mecklenburg] in order to save the civilian populations.

6. Then he said that Himmler’s staff officer, Herr Stinsberg [Schellenberg] was eagerly awaiting to hear something and was putting through [could ensure] immediate delivery to Himmler any message which it might be desired to convey. Bernadotte remarked to [us] that if no reaction at all was forthcoming from the Allies that may mean a lot of unnecessary suffering and loss of human life. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at …²⁹ explained that he thought this was such an important piece of news that he ought to communicate it to my United States colleague and me (that’s the British Ambassador) immediately. Is it okay with you?

I wrote that my United States colleague and I remarked that in [the] reference to the Axis unwillingness [to Himmler’s refusal] to surrender on the Eastern Front looks like a last attempt to sow discord between the Western Allies and Russia. Obviously the Nazi would have to surrender to all the Allies simultaneously.

Truman: That is right. That is exactly the way I feel. He ought to surrender to all the Allies at once.

Churchill: The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Government [Mr. Boheman], while admitting that this motive could not be excluded, pointed out that the fact that the Nazi chiefs would order capitulation of all troops on the whole Western Front, and in Norway, and Denmark might be of great advantage for all the Allies, including Russia and would in fact lead to early total capitulation. (These are all [still] the Swedes talking), and they say in any case,^29a the Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped to clear this up, this provision. He said pass it on to the British and United States Governments who were, as far as the Swedish Government were concerned, at complete liberty to transmit it to the Soviet Government. That the Swedish Government would in no way be, or propose to be, an instrument in promoting any attempt to sow discord between the Allies. The only reason for not informing the Soviet Government directly was because Himmler had stipulated that this information was exclusively for the Western Allies. (He said that if the United States colleague is sending a telegram to say so.) Of course we are not bound by that, and it’s our duty to tell Stalin, in my opinion.

Truman: I think so, too. Have you notified Stalin?

Churchill: I held it up for about two hours, hoping to get an answer to the telegram I sent you, but I have now released the telegram. This is the telegram I have sent.

Truman: All right, then you notify Stalin, and I shall do the same immediately of this conversation between us.

Churchill: Exactly. Here is what I have said to Stalin³⁰ and I have telegraphed it over to you. The telegram immediately following is one I have just received exactly from the British Ambassador in Sweden.

The President of the United States has the news also. I thought you had gotten it. Your telegram has not gotten thru.

Truman: No, I haven’t received my telegram as yet.

Churchill: There can be no question as far as His Majesty’s Government is concerned, arranging thus an [of anything less than] unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers.

Truman: I agree to that fully.

Churchill: We consider Himmler should be told that German folk [forces] either as individuals or in units should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens, the attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theaters where resistance continues will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor.

Nothing in the above telegram should affect the release of our oration [orations on the link-up.]^30a I sent it off a few minutes ago and I was sending it to you with the following telegram from me, you see. That which I read you. I called the War Cabinet together at once and they approved of this telegram I’ve just read you.

Truman: I approve of it too.

Churchill: The one I sent to Stalin.

Truman: I approve of that telegram you sent to Stalin, and I shall immediately wire Stalin on exactly the same line.³¹

Churchill: Thank you so much. That is exactly what I wanted. We hoped you would find it possible to telegraph to Marshal Stalin and to us in the same sense.

Truman: Mr. Prime Minister, would you please repeat your message to Stalin and repeat it slowly so I can take it down here.

Churchill: I have already done so through the American Embassy over an hour and a half ago, and it should be with you almost immediately. Would you like me to send you also the telegram I got from Stockholm today?

Truman: I would very much.

Churchill: I will. You will get it very soon. You will get the one from me, the one I just sent out.

Truman: I would like for you to repeat the one which you sent to Stalin so I can send one substantially like it to him.

Churchill: Good. I hope I may——

Truman: Would you do it slowly, please, Mr. Prime Minister?

Churchill: The telegram immediately follows: It is a long one.^31a

Truman: I thank you very much.

Churchill: I have just received from the British Ambassador in Sweden. The President of the United States has the news also (that is what I thought). There can be no question as far as state history [H.M.G.] is concerned about anything else but [less than] unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers. We consider Himmler should be told that German folk [forces] either as individuals or in units should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens, the attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theaters where resistance continues will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. Nothing in the above telegram should affect the release of our oration (?). (That is intact), [orations on the link-up.] That is what I sent I think, about half an hour ago.

Truman: Thank you very much. I shall get one off immediately to him, and I certainly do appreciate your talking to me on it.

Churchill: I’m delighted. I am so sure we would be pretty well in agreement, and I hope that Stalin will wire back and say, “I agree too.” In which case we could authorize our representatives, in Stockholm, to tell Bernadotte that you will pass on the message to Himmler. Because nothing can be done about that until we are all three agreed on it.

Truman: All right.

Churchill: You have my text and your own, and let’s see what Stalin says.

Truman: All right.

Churchill: Thank you very much, indeed.

Truman: Thank you.

Churchill: You remember those speeches we were going to make about the link-up in Europe?

Truman: I didn’t understand that last statement, Mr. Prime Minister.

Churchill: You know what I am talking about, the speech, the statements that are written. Well, I think they should be let out just as they would be anyhow as soon as the link-up occurs.

Truman: I think you’re right on that. I agree on that.

Churchill: Anything helps to beat the enemy.

Truman: I agree with that.

Churchill: Good. I rejoice that our first conversation will be about the first of June. It’s very good news.

Truman: I hope to see you some day soon.

Churchill: I am planning to. I’ll be sending you some telegrams about that quite soon. I entirely agree with all that you’ve done on the Polish situation. We are walking hand in hand together.

Truman: Well, I want to continue just that.

Churchill: In fact, I am following your lead, backing up whatever you do on the matter.

Truman: Thank you. Good night.

24. The time when this conversation took place is not indicated on the transcript. Prime Minister Churchill (Triumph and Tragedy, p. 536) states that it took place on April 25 at 8:10 p.m., London time. Admiral Leahy (I Was There, p. 415) says that it occurred shortly after 2 p.m., Washington time. The Department of State press release of May 2 giving a chronological account of the Himmler surrender offer places the conversation in the “early afternoon” of April 25 (Department of State Bulletin, May 6, p. 863). Corrections (except in cases of minor variations) have been supplied by the Editors on the basis of the related texts in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, pp. 332 ff., and Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 534 ff.
25. Omission indicated in original transcript of conversation.
26. See footnote 18, p. 759.
25. Omission indicated in original transcript of conversation.
28. Charles de Gaulle, Head of the French Provisional Government.
29. Points appear in the original transcript of conversation.
30. In the text printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, this passage and the following two sentences read: “In any case, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thought Bernadotte’s information should be passed on to the British and United States Governments who were, as far as the Swedish Government were concerned, at complete liberty to transmit it to the Soviet Government, as the Swedish Government would in no way be or be thought to be an instrument in promoting any attempt to sow discord between the Allies.”
30. For text as transmitted from Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, see ibid., vol. i, p. 332; excerpt printed in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 537.
31. A reference to recorded statements by President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin that were to be broadcast when the Allied and Soviet forces were linked up in Germany.
31. See infra.
32. This sentence should read “The telegram immediately following——”