740.00119 Control (Germany)/12–1145
The Chargé in Sweden (Ravndal) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 18, 1946.]
Sir: With reference to the Department’s telegram no. 2184, December 4, 1945,49 I have the honor to report the steps taken to implement the program of repatriating German nationals in neutral countries. On August 3, 1945 Note no. 770, a copy of which was transmitted with Legation’s despatch 5990, dated August 7, 1945,50 was delivered to the Swedish Foreign Office, jointly with identical notes presented by the [Page 814] British, Soviet and French Legations. With Note no. 770 was appended a list of 435 persons the repatriation of whom was requested by the four Allies. On October 17, 1945 Notes nos. 833 and 834 were presented, copies of which are enclosed as enclosures nos. 1 and 2 respectively,52 making known the grounds on which the repatriation was requested and presenting particulars with respect to additional persons, the repatriation of whom was desired.
On October 19, 1945 an informal letter from this Legation, to Counselor Engzell of the Swedish Foreign Office, was presented (enclosure no. 3). With this letter were included further particulars about a number of persons included in the first list attached to Note 770, indicating why such persons were considered “obnoxious” under the terms of the A.C.C. Resolution. A copy of this document is attached as enclosure no. 4. Also attached to this letter was a list of former German nationals regarded as enemies of the Allies who were granted Swedish citizenship during the war, copy of which document is enclosed herewith as enclosure no. 5. The repatriations which have taken place up to this point are summarized in the letter to Counselor Engzell (enclosure no. 4). To the knowledge of the Legation no further repatriations have occurred.
On November 30, 1945 another informal conversation was held between Officers of this Legation and Counselor Engzell. At this conference the Legation was presented with the document, copy of which (in translation) is attached as enclosure no. 6. The document covers less than one fourth of the total names submitted for repatriation, if the individual[s] were German nationals and resident in Sweden. The remaining names are still under investigation by the Aliens’ Commission. Engzell stated that the Swedish security police in various parts of the country had been ordered to submit information about German nationals within their district. He added that the Government was not desirous of repatriating some of the individuals, either for humanitarian reasons or because they had been of assistance to Sweden during the war (chiefly as industrial technicians and business managers). As a sequel to these conversations the attached letter was addressed to Counselor Engzell, (enclosure no. 7).
The Swedish Government has refused to furnish a list of German nationals now residing in Sweden. They will, however, furnish information as to residence and citizenship of specific names submitted. It is therefore planned to submit a further list of persons with a request for information as to citizenship and residence, prior to working up detailed dossiers on additional persons. The usefulness of this work, however, is open to doubt, since Swedish police records contain [Page 815] much more complete information on the obnoxious Germans than do the files of the belligerent Legations.
Due to this absence of official information about residence and citizenship, it has become clear that the lists previously submitted included names of persons who no longer were Germans or who no longer were in Sweden. In pressing the Swedes to take action it is planned in the future to concentrate on the “worst offenders” and to interpret narrowly the A.C.C. Resolution calling for repatriation of “obnoxious” Germans.
The question may be raised whether Swedish reluctance to repatriate is based on lack of facts or whether there are not other considerations, particularly, that Government’s desire to protect its “right of asylum”. The Swedish authorities have indicated that they are, in principle, in agreement with our repatriation objectives. However, in actual fact, the repatriation program is delayed by not only the “right of asylum” but also by factors which may be enumerated as follows:
- 1.
- With respect to official Germans there have been some delays by reasons of health, presence of minor children, and other humanitarian considerations.
- 2.
- There have been some cases in which the “official” character of the persons involved has not been clearly established to Swedish satisfaction. Examples include minor Consular employees and employees paid by the German Legation but using non-official covers. The Legation is attempting to furnish information exposing the facts concerning the most active of these.
- 3.
- Regarding non-official Germans, there is an obvious difference of opinion between the Allies and the Swedes as to the character of occupation or activity which renders a person “obnoxious”. The Swedes are reluctant to admit the obnoxious character of persons prominently identified with important and responsible economic activities in the German interests, particularly where such activities have been to the joint benefit of the Germans and Swedes. In those cases where it will be impossible to show either unlawful acts, according to the Swedish law, or public activity on behalf of Nazi organizations, it may be expected that considerable resistance will be met. It may also be expected that humanitarian considerations, such as size of family, health, number and age of dependents, and the length of stay in Sweden, will carry great weight with the Swedes.
The basic reason for the Allied desire to repatriate “obnoxious” Germans is to prevent them from becoming a source of renewed German aggressive power, from developing and advancing their technical and scientific ability, their commercial and business contacts for the purpose of returning at some future date to Germany to put their knowledge and skill at the service of a then unoccupied and inadequately controlled Germany which might desire by force to erase its [Page 816] latest defeat. Alternatively, these “obnoxious” Germans may elect, or be ordered by the future German Government, to remain in Sweden and other neutral countries, there to assist in the rebirth of German military power. In Sweden there are a few German nationals whose repatriation for the above reasons is of importance to the Allies. These persons are mainly business executives, technical experts and scientific research men. Their continued presence here is dangerous to Allied policy. It is also a constant reminder to the Swedes that Germany may soon again have great economic and technical power. This thought may affect Swedish foreign policy.
Their presence also suggests that the Allies apparently are unable or reluctant to enforce their own decisions regarding the treatment of Germans. If acknowledged and notorious Nazis are allowed to remain in Sweden, this cannot fail to be interpreted as a sign of weakness and of a lack of a serious policy on the part of the Allies. Newspaper comment, expressing surprise that notorious Nazis are still in Sweden, has been published. The Allies’ efforts to secure their repatriation is barely known to newspaper vendors [editors?].
It is also of importance from the standpoint of equity as well as from the standpoint of satisfying certain segments of public opinion in Sweden that Germans everywhere be given equal treatment. Many Swedes feel that there is no reason why active Nazis, because they happen to have been resident in Sweden on May 8, 1945, should continue to enjoy the comforts of life in Sweden. Such pro-Allied Swedes now think that the Allies are slow to act; they may come to think that the Allies (particularly the United States and Great Britain) simply do not care.
The potentialities for a pro-German and an anti-Allied propaganda activity are substantial. This has already begun to make itself felt in the compassionate campaign of “Pity the poor Germans”. The longer the time elapses from the end of the war, and the more the concentration camp publicity recedes in the background, the more possible it will be to intensify a propaganda campaign which in part may be honestly humanitarian, but in fact may become pro-Nazi. The retention of a large number of Nazi German nationals in the country will considerably enhance the effectiveness of such propaganda and will ensure its being given an anti-Allied slant.
The Dagens Nyheter, Sweden’s largest newspaper, with a pro-Allied reputation, published the following advertisement December 14: “Business connections resumed with Germany, (British Zone). Reply to Rau-Roesecke.” Roesecke is a German national (Proclaimed Listed), Stockholm head of the Deutsche Arbeits Front. His repatriation has been vainly requested twice by the four major Allied Legations.
A considerable part of the foreign news appearing in the Swedish press is still supplied by the Skandinaviska Telegraf Bureau (Proclaimed [Page 817] Listed). The organization was owned during the war by the Deutsche Nachrichten Bureau and functioned as part of the Goebbels propaganda machine in Sweden. Its news now is strictly objective but it is said to be employing news sources who are German nationals. The titular owner is a Swede; he was given DNB’s shares (100 per cent) prior to the German collapse. The Swedish position to date has been that the firm now is Swedish and hence not a German asset (Safehaven) and that any Germans employed there are not obnoxious.
The above facts and arguments illustrate the importance of ensuring the quick repatriations of the worst offenders among the “obnoxious” Germans. The Legation, however, does not believe that these non-official Germans will be repatriated unless some form of sanction is employed. If the repatriation of these Germans, none of whom is, of course, of the international war criminal category, remains a basic part of the Allies’ post-war program, and provided that the achievement of said policy does not conflict with other more important policies or affect the attainment of other objectives deemed by the Department to be more vital to the national interests, the following is suggested:
- 1.
- The issuance by the Allied Control Commission of a public statement requesting, by name, the repatriation of certain German nationals. It would be indicated that the nationals referred to were in Sweden and that they fell into the category of the worst political and commercial enemies who had actively aided the German war effort. The list, which probably would not exceed 100 names for Sweden, would be agreed on by the four major Allied Legations.
- 2.
- The policy of listing all firms retaining in their employ “obnoxious” Germans, or alternatively, the refusal to delete such firms which are listed already.
The French Minister informally predicts that the suggestion outlined above would meet with his Government’s approval. A member of the British Legation states that on or about October 2, 1945 he informed London that no more repatriations in substantial numbers could be expected unless “strong measures were employed”. He asked for fresh instructions. The officer adds, however, that none has been forthcoming and he believes that his Government would be reluctant to do more than what has been done.
In view of the early abolition of the Proclaimed-Statutory List, it is recommended that such action, which is the minimum which gives reasonable hope of effectuating the A.C.C. Resolution, should be taken promptly if it is to be taken at all. Swedish officials appear to believe that by delaying action they can dissipate the Allies’ determination to accomplish their peace aims and that the desire for a return to “normalcy”, and impatience with war-time controls, will increase throughout the world with the passage of time.
Respectfully yours,