740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–1045
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman
I refer to my memorandum of May 4, 1945 (copy attached)31 submitting the background to the dispute with Marshal Tito over the [Page 1152] occupation and administration of northeastern Italy (Venezia Giulia). Field Marshal Alexander’s forces have entered and are in partial occupation of Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia. Tito’s forces also occupy portions of these three cities as well as, apparently, the remainder of the Compartment of Venezia Giulia. While Allied forces proceeded no further than the three points mentioned above, Tito has continued pouring his Yugoslav troops into the entire area east of the Isonzo River. He has persisted in his claim that this area is his exclusive operational theater. He is now receding even from his agreement of May 5 to afford facilities to Alexander’s troops. His forces are setting up the administration of the area and Alexander’s forces have been unable to establish Allied Military Government even in the portion of the three cities we have entered. The formation of a “Slovene Government” at Trieste has been announced.
I feel that the implications of the developments in Venezia Giulia are of such importance to the future peace of Europe and will have such far-reaching consequences with respect to United States policy and prestige that I should bring considerations, in addition to those mentioned in my May 4 memorandum, to your attention.
The Department’s policy that Allied Military Government should be extended to all of Venezia Giulia, up to the 1939 Yugoslav-Italian frontier, in order to prevent the area’s becoming prejudiced by unilateral action by force is based on reasons much more fundamental than the Italian-Yugoslav aspects of the problem. What we must keep in mind is whether we are going to uphold the fundamental principle of territorial settlement by orderly processes, against force, intimidation or blackmail. Tito has an identical claim ready for South Austria (a large portion of Carinthia and Styria) and may have similar designs on parts of Hungary and Greece, if his methods in Venezia Giulia succeed (see Caserta’s telegram 2037, May 8, midnight, and 2042, May 9, 2 p.m.)32
Although the stability of Italy and the future orientation of that country with respect to Russia may well be at stake, the present issue is not a question of taking sides in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or of becoming involved in internal Balkan politics. The problem is essentially one of deciding whether we are going to permit the Soviet Government, which operates directly on territorial settlements in the case of Poland, lying in the Soviet military theater, to operate through its satellite Yugoslavia in the Mediterranean (Anglo-American) theater, to set up whatever states and boundaries look best for [Page 1153] the future power of the U.S.S.R. Yugoslav (Russian) occupation of Trieste, which is the vital outlet of large areas of Central Europe, would have most far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate territory involved.
Tito’s anxiety to “liberate” parts of Italy, while sizable parts of Yugoslavia itself (the region between Istria and Belgrade) were still in German hands can, of course, be explained by his primary interest in territorial aggrandizement rather than defeating the common enemy.
Thus on the very day of victory in Europe, we see tactics being employed by some of our allies which are strongly reminiscent of the methods the Japanese used in Manchuria and Hitler copied in 1938–1939 to increase their territories and ultimately to plunge all of Europe and the world into war. At a time when we have at last achieved military victory in Europe and have a force of millions of men in arms on that continent, we must decide if we will acquiesce in unilateral action by force as a method of drawing the future boundaries of Western Europe. (See Rome’s 1209 of May 8, 3 p.m. attached.)33
There is no doubt that Prime Minister Churchill sees the implications in these developments and feels, as suggested in his message to you of April 30,34 that we should not give way to Tito.
Alexander’s Chief of Staff has been authorized to endeavor to obtain from Tito an agreement on a purely military basis to permit Alexander limited facilities in this area. Tito’s acquiescence even to an unsatisfactory minimum now seems questionable. In these circumstances we may be faced with the necessity of withdrawing completely from this area, with all of its consequences, or of implementing our present policy by threat of force to secure complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the keys to the region.
There is attached for ready reference a map of the Compartment of Venezia Giulia and surrounding area.35