Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–1945: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

[London,] May 19, 1945.

52. Your number 42.⁵¹

1. I hope you will not mind my putting to you with great respect the need for some further consideration of the words “A war with the Yugoslavs” and secondly “attack us.” I do not envisage a war with the Yugoslavs, and, short of war, I do not consider ambassadors should be withdrawn. It is at critical junctures that ambassadors should be on the spot.

Meanwhile Tito’s answer has arrived and is completely negative. We clearly cannot leave matters in this state, and immediate action will now be necessary. Otherwise we shall merely appear to have been bluffing and will in fact be bluffed out.

2. I think we should prevent the rough handling of our front line troops, or infiltrations ostensibly peaceful but contrary to the directions of the Allied commanders and on a scale to endanger the position of our forces where they now stand. For instance, supposing they take up positions all around a British or American unit until they have it at their mercy, are we to wait till they open fire before asking them to move back beyond the line you have indicated as desirable? I am sure this is not what you mean, but it is just the sort of incident which I think may arise.

3. A short time back I received the following from Field Marshal Alexander.

“If Tito puts his fighting and administrative troops under my command in areas for which I am responsible, it will meet my military needs, although I should prefer that he withdraw completely. If he refuses to do so, it will inevitably lead to armed conflict, since I must very soon insist on the proper functioning of my AMG. For example, I must remove Tito’s proclamations and replace them with my own. Again, I cannot allow my movements to be restricted by Yugoslav posts and sentries.”

Since then the situation has changed, as is shown by Alexander’s telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Naf 976, in which he reports as follows:

“Yugoslav behaviour both in Austria and Venezia Giulia is making a very unfavorable impression Allied troops both United States and British. Our men are obliged to look on without power to intervene whilst actions which offend their traditional sense of justice are permitted. Further, our men feel that by taking no action they are condoning such behaviour. As a result feeling against Yugoslavs is now strong and is getting stronger daily.

“It is now certain that any solution by which we shared an area with Yugoslav troops or Partisans or permitted Yugoslav administration to function would not work.”

In these conditions I should not consider action by Alexander to ensure the proper functioning of his military government as constituting “A war with the Yugoslavs.” But I certainly think that pressure should be put upon them to quit Trieste and Pola and return to the lines marked out, and that this pressure should be regarded as in the nature of frontier incidents rather than as principal diplomatic decisions.

I cannot allow our own troops to be knocked about and mishandled inside the zone which we both consider they are entitled to occupy, on the basis that they are in no circumstances to open fire. A great many of the Yugoslavs have been filtering back today over the Isonzo and their truculent attitude is already somewhat abated.

I rest myself on your number 34.⁵²

51. Not printed. In this telegram President Truman said in clarification of his message No. 37, May 14, p. 1160: “… it means definitely that I am unable and unwilling to involve this country in a war with the Yugoslavs unless they should attack us, in which case we would be justified in using our Allied forces to throw them back to a distance that would preclude further attack on our troops.”
52. See footnote 41, p. 1156.