874.00/11–345: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:02 p.m.]
652. From Ethridge. Just returned Sofia after two and half days in provinces. Trip curtailed by word of your message regarding Moscow.90 Nothing yet heard from Biryuzov. Glad to go to Moscow your direction but would like to make further observations now and request more detailed instructions as to conversations there.
Trip to provinces only confirms impressions previously reported that interim government not representative and that elections under [Page 361] present circumstances cannot be considered free expression of people. We would be betraying them and ourselves if we pretended that victory of Fatherland Front in circumstances more than fait accompli. Only refinement of previous impression gained from provinces is that despite their adherence and attachment to Petkov, mass of Agrarians constituting probable majority in country may vote for Fatherland Front in elections either through attachment to party rather than leaders or because of coercion and fear. Must repeat, however, that without representation of Petkov Agrarians and Lulchev Socialists present government dominated by Communist minority is not representative.
Whether Moscow conversations have chance of success depends in final analysis upon Russia’s intentions here. If she wants merely friendly government she can have it by restraining local Communists [and] supporting change of Minister of Interior and perhaps Justice. These measures would halt political arrests and facilitate agreement of all leaders for reorganizing Fatherland Front granting general amnesty and holding free elections. No responsible leader here takes any position other than that Bulgaria’s policy must be oriented to Russia’s strategic and economic needs. The country would of necessity maintain a friendly policy toward Russia regardless of results of free elections. Petkov told me other day he was seeking interview with Biryuzov to tell him that:
People here fear other possibilities after November 18 elections. One is declaration of republic with Georgi Dimitrov, whose record you have, as president with an entirely Communist-dominated government ruling by repression. In that event people expect further outbreak of terrorism which, for the moment, by general agreement has moderated although political arrests and threats continue. If that comes about without our protest we have delivered Bulgaria to a minority ruling by force. Some non-Communist members of government frankly fearful but hope to be able to continue on present line of moderating what they regard as natural revolutionary terrors. If Dimitrov comes to power, no possible question of Russian intention. She may be determined to have it that way and therefore be cold to any suggestion that would shake loose present Communist power.
Another possibility openly discussed is that Bulgaria may become Soviet Socialist State. Do not believe that even Bulgarian Communists, with few exceptions, want that and effort to achieve it would bring perhaps blood bath. Bulgaria already Socialist state and efforts of Communists to carry through so-called land reforms temporarily stalled because Bulgaria as strongly individualistic as South Carolina Baptists. But only Moscow knows answers to its intentions and could force through anything it desired with Russian troops here [Page 362] Should Moscow conversations fail to produce change before elections, there are, to my mind, and offered only for your consideration, certain courses that might be followed:
- 1.
- A flat statement in advance of the elections that you do not consider the interim government representative in accordance with the Yalta Declarations, and will not recognize the government that comes out of the elections. This is the bold and positive course. While it might heighten political tension here for the moment, it would, in my mind, have the advantage of bringing better long-term conditions and of fulfilling the faith in America which is most strong with all Bulgarians with whom I have talked, except the most rabid Communists. It is the course which I personally would take given only the Bulgarian situations with which to deal.
- It is, of course, recognized that the two following points are not consistent with general policy outlined your telegram 356 October 31, but they are offered in consideration of the general picture.
- 2.
- Make no statement in advance of elections but at a later date stipulate conditions for recognition which would embrace broadening the base of the government as suggested in paragraphs two [second?] and three [third?] above and ending political reprisals. This course would serve to strengthen the hands of moderates in any event. I reported previously (my telegram 646, October 30) that the Prime Minister has hopes that changes after election will improve the situation under the Yalta formula of representative government. This course is merely a policy of watchful waiting preparatory to a compromise which would try to get the best we can for the Bulgars and ourselves out of a bad situation. It also presupposes that the moderate elements will continue in the government after the elections and will continue to fight for political reform.
- 3.
- Confess to ourselves that the Russians have no enthusiasm for the Yalta Declaration and no intention of implementing it where they have “security” or strategic interests and consider recognition as the first step toward a peace treaty that should certainly stipulate removal of Russian troops. Withdrawal of troops would in itself tend to stabilize the political stiuation. Such consideration should be coupled with a continuing vigorous American policy here designed to further political freedom and establish trade and cultural relations.
In the meantime, it is my strong feeling that everything possible should be done in Washington, Moscow and here to express our point of view and our determination not to make merely face-saving gestures. My readiness to go to Moscow if you think advisable is based on previously reported long-shot hope. Do not think it more than that if situation in Bulgaria is considered apart from the whole pattern of Russian-American relations.
These observations, as you know, do not come out of anti-Russian or anti-Communist attitude. Communists here have done great good for previously exploited workers and have their natural support.
Personally, I feel that Communists are stronger natural force than opposition believes and would poll higher vote than low estimates [Page 363] I have been given, but nothing like majority. Difficulty is that with superior organization with dynamic force as opposed to dialectics of coffee-house politicians, with arms at their command and Russia at their back, Communists have the whole show and non-Communist government Ministers are largely stooges or worn-out politicians who think they can out-maneuver them.
Repeated Moscow as 283. [Ethridge.]
- Not printed; it requested Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to arrange for Mr. Ethridge’s visit (870.01/11–145).↩